The Battle of Stone River

by Henry Myron Kendall

Rosecrans now decided to give battle on the 31st, and made the following plan: McCook was to hold strong ground, refusing his right, and make strong dispositions to resist the attack of the enemy. If, however, the enemy did not attack, McCook was to attack sufficient to hold all the force on his front and prevent the enemy from detaching any troops to the right, the real point of attack. Thomas’ corps and Palmer’s division were to open with skirmishing and engage the enemy’s center and left as far as Stone river. Van Cleve’s division was to cross the river and advance on Breckenridge, followed by Wood’s division by brigades on its right, and carry everything before them into Murfreesboro’. In front of Crittenden’s corps across the river was high ground, the occupation of which would enable an enfilade fire to be brought on the remainder of Polk’s corps. Palmer and Thomas were to follow the movement, advancing in its support. After taking Murfreesboro’, Crittenden was to move westward and getting in on the flank and rear of the enemy drive them off their line of communications. The success of the whole plan of course depended upon McCook’s being able to hold on without support, and Rosecrans criticised his line, saying it was an error for it to face so much to the east. He thought it should rather face to the south and impressed the fact on McCook that he must be careful and make a strong disposition. McCook was ordered also to build fires to his right prolonging the general line and simulating the camps of a large force. It was hoped in this way to draw off a large part of the rebel force from the real point of attack.

Bragg formed an exactly similar plan of attack. Hardee with two divisions was to advance on the left and force back the Union right. Then Polk was to push the center. By a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk’s corps as a pivot the Union force was to be thrown back on Stone river, off its line to Nashville, the objective of his campaign. The plans being identical a good deal depended on which army began the movement first. Rosecrans’ orders were for the attack to begin at seven o’clock, while Bragg ordered the attack to begin at daylight.

Rosecrans’ movement began on time and for a time was going very successfully. But about 6.30 A. M. the enemy in force attacked McCook’s right and found that the two brigades were weakly posted, without support, the remaining brigade of Johnson’s division being nearly a mile and a half to the rear at Johnson’s headquarters. The command was not in any way ready for battle. The horses of some of the batteries were being watered at the stream and the men of one brigade were cooking breakfast. Kirk’s brigade, the first attacked, tried to make some resistance and called for help upon Willich’s brigade, but Willich was absent at headquarters and his brigade was without a commander and made no effort to support Kirk. Both brigades were quickly rolled up. Baldwin’s brigade, in reserve, was moved up, but was too far distant, and the rout of the other two brigades was complete before assistance could be rendered. The weight of the attack then fell upon Baldwin, whose brigade, with Simonson’s Fifth Indiana Battery, succeeded in checking the assailants and inflicting heavy loss, but was soon forced to retire to avoid being surrounded.

Meanwhile a severe attack had been made all along McCook’s front, and after the rout of Johnson’s division the flank of Davis’s division was exposed. The enemy’s attack was repulsed, but he soon reformed, brought up his reserves and renewed the attack. The attack was again repulsed. Davis’s division now formed almost a right angle with Sheridan’s, and the rebels directed the next attack on the vertex of the angle. Davis’s division was driven out of its position, being greatly overlapped, and Sheridan had to withdraw his right, gaining time to do so by charging with Robert’s brigade. His new line was at right angles to his first position. Here he held on desperately, trying to reform the broken division to his right. After repulsing several attacks, his ammunition was exhausted and he was forced to fall back, as was also Negley, whose division had been heavily engaged in front and afterward on the right flank.

Word had been sent to Rosecrans soon after seven o’clock that McCook’s corps was heavily pressed and needed assistance. But he did not realize the extent of the disaster, and it was not until informed by a second messenger that the right wing was being driven that he realized the true state of affairs. He found then that he must abandon his plan and take every means to prevent the terrible disaster that seemed imminent. He directed the movement on the left to be suspended and placed Rousseau’s division in the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan. As soon as it became plain, from the great amount of fugitives, that McCook’s wing was routed, Van Cleve’s division was placed on the right of Rousseau’s, and a brigade of Wood’s division to its right. Negley’s and Sheridan’s divisions fell back upon this new line. Upon this line the rebels made four distinct attacks, but were repulsed with very heavy losses. The fighting was almost hand to hand, and the losses on both sides were heavy. That of the regular brigade was especially severe, being 637 out of a total of 1,566. The new line succeeded in holding its ground and driving back the enemy from its front.

The left had also had severe fighting, becoming gradually engaged as Bragg’s turning movement went on. As the change of front went on the left became more important until when the final line was formed, close to the Nashville turnpike, the left became the vital point, since a disaster there would have permitted the line to be enfiladed and the stragglers would have carried any resulting disorder along the whole line. During the afternoon Breckenridge made several heavy assaults on Palmer’s division, but was repulsed.

Rosecrans succeeded in placing his troops in rather a strong line near the road, and the subsequent assaults of the enemy were repelled. The army slept in the position, spare ammunition was issued and found to be sufficient for another battle. The left was withdrawn slightly to more advantageous ground, and Rosecrans determined to await the attack of the enemy in his new lines, but if Bragg did not attack to do so himself.

During the morning of the 1st of January the rebels made repeated attempts to advance on Thomas’s front, but were repulsed. During the afternoon the enemy massed a large number of troops in front of the right but did not attack. Bragg’s object was evidently to feel the Union lines and find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Satisfied that he was not, he felt himself unable to attack in view of the heavy hammering his army had received the day before. Rosecrans passed Van Cleve’s division across the stream and occupied some hills which threatened Polk’s lines in enfilade. Next day Bragg tried to drive back Van Cleve’s division, which was commanded by Colonel Beatty. The movement failed after severe fighting. During the night Bragg massed his force on his former right and Rosecrans greatly strengthened his left.

On the 3d Bragg caused a constant picket firing to be kept up to determine if Rosecrans was still holding on. Finding that such was the case he concluded, after consultation with his generals, to retreat. He retreated in good order, his cavalry holding Murfreesboro’ until the 5th. On the 5th Thomas’s entire command, preceded by Stanley’s cavalry, marched into Murfreesboro’. The object of the campaign had been accomplished. Up to the 31st everything had gone favorably for the Union Army; the fighting of the morning of the 31st had been all in Bragg’s favor, and had almost resulted in the total defeat of Rosecrans; but from that time on, everything had again been in Rosecrans’ favor. His losses were on the whole greater than those of Bragg, but the latter’s retreat gave the victory to Rosecrans.

Rosecrans’ force on the battlefield was 43,400; his losses were 13,249, more than thirty per cent. Bragg’s total force on the field was 44,750, and his loss 12,334, about 28 per cent. Rosecrans lost 28 pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon train, but Bragg lost only three pieces of artillery.