The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715

by Henry Offley Wakeman

Below the purely legal aspect of the matter there was felt to be a momentous European question. Spain had been permitted to retain her vast and splendid dominions, because she was daily becoming weaker and more effete. The longdrawn agony of the Spanish monarchy exactly suited the plans of European statesmen, as long as Europe was in a state of transition. When the chief powers were fighting among themselves for the Low Countries and the Rhine, for the lower Danube and the Baltic, it was highly convenient that problems so grave should not be further complicated by questions of South American trade, and access to the Mediterranean. All Europe was content to leave the monopolies of Spain alone, because Spain was unable to utilise them. But towards the end of the century this feeling was passing away, and the prizes which Spain continued to hold but did not know how to use, were being eagerly and avariciously eyed from two quite different quarters. The ‘maritime nations,’ as they were called in the language of diplomacy, England and Holland, since the revolution of 1688, had succeeded in establishing on the firm basis of a close mutual alliance the superiority of their commerce to that of France. Already they shared between them the trade of the Baltic, of North America, and of the East. But from two quarters of the world they were shut out. The policy of Spain excluded them from a share in the trade with the Spanish Indies, and especially from the lucrative commerce in negroes, which was becoming of greater importance every day in those islands and districts of central America where white labour was an impossibility. The want of a harbour and naval station in the Mediterranean placed their commerce with the Levant at the mercy of pirates, and dependent on the goodwill of the southern powers. At the same time the policy of the House of Habsburg, since the peace of Westphalia, had been tending more and more in the direction of trying to secure a hold upon north Italy. While national interest and the course of events had been pushing the Austrian power further and further down the Danube at the expense of the Turks, the dynastic and personal policy of the Emperors had been rather directed to the gain of compensation upon the Po for what they had lost upon the Rhine.

Importance of the European interests involved.

It was clear then that the question of the succession to the crown of Spain could not be decided merely according to the legal claims of the various candidates. The vast empire of Spain could not be disposed of merely on principles which decide the devolution of a private inheritance. Behind all personal claims, behind all legal rights, behind even all national policy, loomed the greater principles of the balance of power and the freedom of commerce. If the interests and the rights of France could not permit the union of the Spanish inheritance with the power of Austria, if the interests and the rights of the House of Habsburg could no less permit the annexation of the empire of Spain by the power of France, neither Germany nor England nor the United Provinces could in the interests of Europe permit either the one or the other. But if Europe was going to claim her right to be heard, if claims of descent and of legal rights were to be subordinated to the general good of the European family of civilised nations, the maritime nations would assuredly demand their share in the commerce of the Spanish Indies as the United Provinces would insist upon their barrier against the aggression of France, and Austria the security of its hold upon Italy.

With his usual diplomatic foresight Louis XIV. had grasped the situation as long ago as the period of the war of Devolution. At that time Charles II. was young and as yet unmarried. It was quite possible that in spite of the weakness of his health he might have children born to him before he died. The Partition Treaty of 1668. Nevertheless his death might occur at any moment, and Louis with his keen eye to the future determined to be ready for all emergencies. He at once recognised the improbability of being able to annex for himself or his house the whole of the Spanish dominions, and accordingly decided to try and obtain by negotiation with the only other serious candidate then in the field—the Emperor Leopold—that part of the inheritance which was of most value to France. His policy was completely successful, and on the 19th of January 1668 he concluded with the Emperor a secret treaty for the partition of the Spanish dominions, after the death of Charles II. without heirs, by which the Emperor was to have Spain and the Indies and the Milanese, and France the Netherlands, Franche Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily and Catalonia. In the thirty years which elapsed between the partition treaty of 1668 and the peace of Ryswick much had happened. Changes in Europe since 1668. Louis had already annexed Franche Comté, and become master of so much of the Spanish Netherlands as to give France a safe and defensible frontier. The Netherlands were no longer of the same value to France as they were in 1668, while their acquisition was much more difficult. Since 1668 the United Provinces, through their successful resistance to Louis in the Dutch war of 1672 and in the war of the League of Augsburg, and through their close alliance with England since 1688, were far more formidable antagonists. Louis knew well that they would fight to the death rather than permit him to break down the barrier of the Spanish power in the Netherlands, which alone kept the Scheldt closed and Amsterdam safe. At the same time the maritime powers, as we have seen, had ambitions of their own in the direction of the Spanish and Mediterranean trade, which would prevent them from acquiescing without a struggle in the rule of France at Naples, or her ascendency in Spanish waters.

Adoption by Louis of a policy of Partition.

The problem therefore had increased in difficulty since 1668. New interests had to be consulted if diplomacy was to try her hand at a settlement. A long and sanguinary war, which could not fail to embrace all Europe in its terrible folds, was absolutely certain if things were left to take their chance. Who could tell what the results of such a war might be? Both Louis and William had reached an age when statesmen do not willingly set fire to the house on the chance of carrying off some valuables in the confusion. It was madness to think that France could gain more even by a successful war than she had gained by diplomacy in the treaty of 1668. So when the treaty of Ryswick was signed and Europe was once more at peace, Louis sent his friend the Comte de Tallard to London, on a special mission, to submit to William III. a project for the partition of the Spanish monarchy when the moribund king had breathed his last.

Mistrust of William III. and Heinsius.

Tallard found William III. discouraging, and his friend and confidant the duke of Portland almost hostile. They were naturally suspicious of gifts which came from so pronounced an enemy as Louis XIV. They were astonished at the boldness, not to say the rashness, of the proposal to parcel out the dominions of Charles II. in his lifetime. But the more William thought over the idea the more feasible it seemed. Heinsius, the grand pensionary of Holland, was by no means opposed to it on principle, though he doubted whether the interested parties could ever come to an agreement on the details. William found the people of England so distrustful of him, so suspicious of his designs, so hostile to his advisers, so determined to deprive him of his army, and fetter him by poverty, that he did not dare to reckon on their support should he call upon them again to follow him in a crusade against France. In March 1698 he authorised Portland, who was at Versailles, to invite Louis to lay his proposals for a treaty before him. In so doing he not only expressed his willingness to enter into negotiations with a view to the partition of the Spanish dominions, but also his determination not to consider himself bound any longer by the clause in the League of Augsburg negotiated in 1688, by which he had pledged himself to recognise and enforce the claims of the Emperor upon the whole inheritance.

Progress of the negotiations.

In April 1698 the negotiations for a partition treaty between France, England and the United Provinces were fairly launched. When once begun they proceeded briskly enough. Did they seem to be flagging, the news of a relapse in the health of Charles II. would set them again feverishly at work. Yet the business owing to its delicate character and many ramifications took a long time to finish. It was not till the September of that year, after five months of incessant negotiations, that Louis could feel sure that his efforts would be crowned with success. During that time the despatches show Louis to have constantly been the active agent in the discussions. William and Heinsius played mainly a passive part. It was theirs to criticise, to accept or to reject what Louis proposed. But as the negotiations continued it is pleasant to see how the desire for peace and agreement grew stronger and stronger, how confidence succeeded to suspicion, and frankness of mind to mistrust. Never did Louis show his great mastery over the foreign politics of Europe in clearer light than in these negotiations. Throughout, his is the master mind. Tallard but played the part of his eyes and ears and mouth in England. William, though quick and clever at seeing the drift of a suggestion, fixed his eyes too closely upon the national interests of the maritime nations to take so broad a view of the whole as that which illuminated the mind of Louis.