“The object of the knowing faculty is that which is.... Many kinds of things lie hidden within, to which the intellectus of man should penetrate. Beneath the accidens the substantial nature of the thing lies hidden; beneath words lie their meanings; beneath similes and figures, lies the figured truth—veritas figurata (for things intelligible are, as it were, within things sensible); and in causes lie hidden the effects, and conversely. Now, since human cognition begins with sense, as from without, it is clear that the stronger the light of the intellect, the further it will penetrate to the inmost depths. But the light of our natural intellect is of finite virtue, and may reach only to what is limited. Therefore man needs the supernatural light, in order to penetrate to the knowledge which through the natural light he is not able to know; and that supernatural light given to man is called the donum intellectus” (Qu. viii. Art. 1).
This gift follows grace. Grace is more perfect than nature. It does not abrogate, but perfects the natural faculties. Nor does it fail in those matters in which man’s natural power is competent (Qu. ix. Art. 1). So, besides the donum intellectus, to Faith belongs the donum scientiae also, which brings and guides knowledge of human things (Art. 2).
And now we shall not be surprised to find sapientia, the very highest gift of the Spirit, attached to the grace-given virtue caritas. For caritas is the informing principle of Faith, and the highest virtue of the grace-illumined will. The will, be it remembered, belongs to man’s intellectual nature; its object is the good which is known by the mind (bonum intellectum). “Sapientia (wisdom, right knowledge as to the highest cause, which is God) signifies rectitude of judgment in accordance with the rationes divinae,” the ideas and reasons which exist in God. Rectitude of judgment regarding things divine may arise from rational inquiry; in which case it pertains to the sapientia which is an intellectual virtue. But it may also spring from affinity to those things themselves; and then it is a gift of the Holy Spirit (II. ii., Qu. xlv. Art. 2).
Says Thomas:
“By the name beatitude is understood the final perfection of the rational or intellectual nature. This consists for this life in such contemplation as we may have here of the highest intelligible good, which is God; but above this felicity is that other felicity which we expect when we shall see God as He is” (Pars I., Qu. lxii Art 1).
But mark: the perfection of the intellectual nature does not consist merely in knowing, narrowly taken. The right action of will is also essential, of the will directed toward the highest good, which is God: and this is caritas, of which the corresponding gift from the Spirit is wisdom. In accord with this full consummation of human nature, comprising the perfection of cognition and will, Thomas outlines his conception of the vita contemplativa, the life of most perfect beatitude attainable on earth:
“The vita contemplativa is theirs whose resolve is set upon the contemplation of truth. Resolve is an act of will; because resolve is with respect to the end, which is the object of will. Thus the vita contemplativa, according to the essence of its action, is of the intelligence; but so far as it pertains to what moves us to engage in such action, it is of the will, which moves all the other faculties, including the intelligence, to act. Appetitive energy (vis appetitiva) moves toward contemplating something, either sensibly or intellectually: sometimes from love of the thing seen, and sometimes from love of the knowledge itself, which arises from contemplation. And because of this, Gregory sets the vita contemplativa in the love of God—in caritate Dei—to wit, inasmuch as some one, from a willing love (dilectio) of God burns to behold His beauty. And because any one is rejoiced when he attains what he loves, the vita contemplativa is directed toward dilectio[614] which lies in affect (in affectu); by which amor also is intended” (II. ii., Qu. clxxx. Art. 1).
The moral virtues, continues Thomas, do not pertain essentially to this vita. But they may promote it, by regulating the passions and quieting the tumult of outside affairs. In principle it is fixed upon the contemplation of truth, which here we see but in a glass darkly; and so we help ourselves along by contemplating the effects of the divine cause in the world.
Thus final beatitude, and its mortal approach in the vita contemplativa of this earth, is of the mind, both in its knowledge and its love. Immateriality, spirituality, is with Thomas primarily intellectual. Yet his beatitude is not limited to the knowing faculties. It embraces will and love. The grace of God and the gifts of the Holy Spirit touch love as well as knowledge, raising one and both to final unison of aim. Thus far in this life, while in the life to come, these grace-uplifted qualities of knowledge, and that choosing love (dilectio) which rises from knowledge of the good, are perfected in gloria.
Further than this we shall not go with Thomas, nor follow him, for example, through his exposition of the means of salvation—the Incarnation and the sacraments. Nor need we further mark the prodigious range of his theology, or his metaphysics, logic, or physics. To all this many books have been devoted. We are but seeking to realise his intellectual interests and qualities, in such way as to bring them within the compass of our sympathy. A more encyclopaedic and systematic presentation of his teaching is proper for those who would trace, or perhaps attach themselves to, particular doctrines; or would find in scholasticism, even in Thomas, some special authoritativeness. For us these doctrines have but the validity of all human striving after truth. Moreover, perhaps a truer view of Thomas, the theologian and philosopher, is gained from following a few typical forms of his teaching presented in his own exposition, than by analyzing his thought with later solvents which he did not apply, and presenting his matter classified as he would not have ordered it, and in modern phrases, which have as many meanings foreign to scholasticism as scholasticism has thoughts not to be translated into modern ways of thinking.