[428] Introductio ad theologiam, lib. ii. (Migne 178, col. 1039).
[429] See Denifle, “Die Sentenzen Abaelard’s und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia,” Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte, i. p. 402 sqq. and p. 584 sqq. Also Picavet, “Abélard et Alexander de Hales, créateurs de la méthode scholastique,” Bib. de l’école des hautes études, sciences religieuses, t. vii. p. 221 sqq.
[430] Two extracts, one from the Sentences and one from the Summa, touching the same matter, will illustrate the stage in the scholastic process reached by Peter Lombard, about the year 1150, and that attained by Thomas Aquinas a hundred years later.
The Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences are divided into Distinctiones, with sub-titles to the latter. Distinctio xlvi. of the first Book bears the general title: “The opinion (sententia) declaring that the will of God which is himself, cannot be frustrated, seems to be opposed by some opinions.” The first subdivision of the text begins: “Here the question rises. For it is said by the authorities above adduced [the preceding Distinctio had discussed “The will of God which is His essence, one and eternal”] that the will of God, which is himself, and is called His good pleasure (beneplacitum) cannot be frustrated, because by that will fecit quaecumque voluit in caelo et in terra, which—witness the Apostle—nihil resistit. [I leave the Scriptural quotations in Latin, so as to mark them.] It is queried, therefore, how one should understand what the Apostle says concerning the Lord, 1 Tim. 2: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. For since all are not saved, but many are damned, that which God wills to take place, seems not to take place (become, fieri), the human will obstructing the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel reproaching the wicked city, Matt, xxiii., says: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alis, et noluisti. Thus it might seem from these, that the will of God may be overcome by the will of men, and, resisted by the unwillingness of the weakest, the Most Strong may prove unable to do what He willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in coelo et terra, according to the Prophet, omnia quaecumque voluit fecit? And how does nothing withstand His will, if He wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not? For these sayings seem indeed to oppose what has been stated.”
The second paragraph proceeds: “But let us see the solution, and first hear how what the Lord said should be understood. For it was not intended to mean (as Augustine says, Enchiridion, c. 97, solving this question) that the Lord wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not do what He willed because she would not; but rather she did not wish her children to be gathered by Him, yet in spite of her unwillingness (qua tamen nolente) He gathered all He willed of her children.... And the sense is: As many as I have gathered by my will, always effective, I have gathered, thou being unwilling. Hence it is evident that these words of the Lord are not opposed to the authorities referred to.”
(Paragraph 3) “Now it remains to see how the aforesaid words do not contradict what the Apostle said of the Lord: Vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Because of these words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God willed many things which did not come to pass. But the saying is not thus to be understood, as if God willed any to be saved, and they were not. For who can be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men to good when and where He will? Surely what is said in Psalm 113, Quaecumque voluit fecit, is not true, if He willed anything and did not accomplish it. Or,—(and this is still more shameful) for that reason He did not do it, because what the Omnipotent willed to come to pass, the will of man obstructed. Hence when we read in Holy Scripture velit omnes homines salvos fieri, we should not detract from the will of omnipotent God, but understand the text to mean that no man is saved except whom He wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but that no man may be saved except whom He wills should be saved.... Thus also is to be understood the text from John i.: Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; not as if there is no man who is not lighted, but that none is lighted save from Him....”
The next and fourth paragraph takes up the problem whether evil, that is sin, takes place by the will of God, or He unwilling (eo nolente). “As to this, divers men thinking diversely have been found in contradiction. For some say that God wills evils to be or become (esse vel fieri) yet does not will evils. But others say that He neither wills evils to be nor to become. Yet these and those agree in declaring that God does not will evils. Yet each with arguments as well as authorities strives to make good his assertion.” We will not follow the Lombard through this thorny problem. He cuts his way with passages from his chief patristic authority, Augustine, and in the end concludes: “Leaving this and other like foolish opinions, and favouring the sounder view, which is more fully sanctioned by the testimonies of the Saints, we may say that God neither wills evils to become, nor wills that they should not become, nor yet is He unwilling (nolle) that they should become. All that He wills to become, becomes, and all that He wills not to become does not become. Yet many things become which He does not will to become, as every evil.”
Thus the Lombard. Now let us see how Thomas, in his Summa theologiae, Pars Prima, Quaestio xix. Articulus ix. expounds the point: utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum.
“As to the ninth articulus thus one proceeds. (1) It seems [Videtur, formula for stating the initial argument which will not be approved] that the will of God is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (i.e. comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Although those things which are evils, in so far as they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (bonum) that there should be not only goods (bona) but evils.’ Therefore God wills evils.”
“(2) Moreover [Praeterea, Thomas’s regular formula for introducing the succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap. de divinis nominibus: ‘There will be evil making for the perfection of the whole.’ And Augustine says in the Enchiridion: ‘Out of all (things) the admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly; since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared with evil.’ But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation. Therefore God wills evils.”