Fortunately, the demoralizing effect of the panic of the 15th was to be merely temporary. Indeed, before the details of the affair had time to circulate through the camps and work further discouragement or depression, there occurred another encounter with the enemy on the following morning, which neutralized the disgrace of the previous day and revived the spirits of our army to an astonishing degree. So much importance was attached to it at the time as being a greatly needed stimulant for the American soldier that it becomes of interest to follow its particulars. It has passed into our history as the affair or
Battle of Harlem Heights.[194]
Never for a moment relaxing his watch over the enemy's movements, Washington, before daylight on the morning of the 16th, ordered a reconnoitring party out to ascertain the exact position of the British. The party consisted of the detachment of "Rangers,"[195] or volunteers from the New England regiments, which had been organized for scouting service since the battle of Long Island, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton, of Connecticut. No better man could have been found in the army to head such a corps, for he had proved his courage at Bunker Hill, and on more than one occasion since had shown his capacity for leadership. The detachment started out, not more than one hundred and twenty strong, and passing over to the Bloomingdale heights, marched for the Bloomingdale Road, where the enemy were last seen the night before.
The ground which Knowlton reconnoitred and which became the scene of the action remains to-day unchanged in its principal features. What was then known as Harlem Heights is that section of the island which rises prominently from the plain west of Eighth Avenue and north of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street. Its southern face extended from an abrupt point, called "Point of Rocks," at One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Street, east of Ninth Avenue, northwesterly to the Hudson, a distance of three quarters of a mile. At the foot of these heights lay a vale or "hollow way," through the centre of which now runs Manhattan Street, and opposite, at distances varying from a quarter to a third of a mile, rose another line of bluffs and slopes parallel to Harlem Heights. This lower elevation stood mainly in the Bloomingdale division of the city's out-ward, and is generally known to-day as Bloomingdale Heights. In 1776 there were two farms on these heights, owned and occupied by Adrian Hogeland and Benjamin Vandewater, which were partly cultivated, but mainly covered with woods. The Bloomingdale Road, as stated in a previous chapter, terminated at Hogeland's lands about One Hundred and Eighth or Tenth streets, and from there a lane or road ran easterly by Vandewater's and joined the King's Bridge road near One Hundred and Twentieth Street. East of the Bloomingdale and south of Harlem Heights stretched the tract of level land called Harlem Plains.
After the retreat of the 15th, Washington's army encamped on Harlem Heights, with their pickets lining the southern slope from Point of Rocks to the Hudson. The British, as we have seen, lay at Bloomingdale and across the upper part of Central Park to Horn's Hook. An enemy, posted at the lower boundary of Harlem Plains, around McGowan's Pass, where the ground again rises at the northern end of the Park, might be easily observed from the Point of Rocks, and any advance from that quarter could be reported at once. Nothing, however, could be seen of movements made on the Bloomingdale Road or Heights, and it was in that direction that the "Rangers" now proceeded to reconnoitre at dawn on the 16th.
Knowlton, marching under cover of the woods, soon came upon the enemy's pickets, somewhere, it would appear, between Hogeland's and Apthorpe's houses on the Bloomingdale Road, more than a mile below the American lines. This was the encampment of the Light Infantry, and their Second and Third Battalions, supported by the Forty-second Highlanders, were immediately pushed forward to drive back this party of rebels who had dared to attack them on their own ground. Anticipating some such move, Knowlton had already posted his men behind a stone wall, and when the British advanced he met them with a vigorous fire. His men fired eight or nine rounds a piece with good effect, when the enemy threatened to turn his flanks, and he ordered a retreat, which was well conducted. In this brief encounter the Rangers lost about ten of their number, and believed that they inflicted much more than this loss upon the Infantry.[196]
At his headquarters in the Morris Mansion, Washington, meantime, was writing his despatches to Congress. The unwelcome duty fell to him to report the scenes of the previous day which had so deeply stirred his indignation. He made a plain statement of the facts, described the retreat from New York, acknowledged the loss of baggage and cannon, and despondently expressed his misgivings as to the soldierly qualities of a majority of his troops. "We are now," he wrote, "encamped with the main body of the army on the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet with a defeat in case of an attack, if the generality of our troops would behave with tolerable bravery. But experience, to my extreme affliction, has convinced me that this is rather to be wished for than expected. However, I trust that there are many who will act like men, and show themselves worthy of the blessings of freedom." Not unfounded was this trust, for at the very time the commander-in-chief was writing the words, the Rangers were bravely fighting in the Bloomingdale Woods, and many others soon after, including one of the very regiments which fled from Kip's Bay twenty-four hours before, were likewise to act "like men" and prove their real worth in the open field. Just as the letters were sent off word came in to headquarters that the enemy had appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, and Washington rode down to the picket-posts to make the necessary dispositions in case of an attack. Adjutant-General Reed and Lieutenant Tilghman, who had also been writing private letters describing Sunday's panic, and other members of the staff, went to the front about the same time. Knowlton's men had not yet come in, and their fire was distinctly heard from the Point of Rocks, where the commander-in-chief was now surveying the situation. Anxious to learn whether the British were approaching in force on the Bloomingdale Heights, no attack being threatened from the plains, Colonel Reed received permission to go "down to our most advanced guard," namely, to the Rangers, whom he found making a momentary halt on their retreat. The enemy soon came up again in large numbers, and the Rangers continued to retire. Colonel Reed, describing his experience at this point, states that the British advanced so rapidly that he had not quitted a house (which may have been Vandewater's) five minutes before they were in possession of it. "Finding how things were going," to use Reed's words, he returned to Washington "to get some support for the brave fellows who had behaved so well." Knowlton, however, fell back to our lines, and the enemy halted in their pursuit on the north-east edge of Bloomingdale Heights, opposite the Point of Rocks, where a part of them appeared in open sight, and "in the most insulting manner" sounded their bugle-horns as if on a fox chase. "I never felt such a sensation before," says Reed; "it seemed to crown our disgrace." But the chase was not yet over.
Learning from Knowlton that the British Infantry who had followed him in were about three hundred strong, and knowing that they were some distance from their main army, Washington determined, if possible, to effect their capture. Knowlton's men, who had done nobly, were ready for another brush, and there were troops at hand who could be depended upon to behave well under any circumstances. The opportunity for a brisk and successful skirmish presented itself, and the general proposed to improve it. Accordingly he formed the plan of engaging the enemy's attention in their front, while a flanking party should attempt to get into their rear and cut off their escape. The troops that were stationed nearest to the Point of Rocks at this time appear to have been Nixon's brigade, of Greene's division, Weedon's newly arrived regiment of Virginians, General Beall's Marylanders, Colonel Sargent's eastern brigade, Clinton's and Scott's brigades, and other regiments belonging to Putnam's and Spencer's divisions. For the flanking detachment, the general selected Knowlton's Rangers, to whom he added a reinforcement of three of the Virginia companies, about one hundred and twenty men, under Major Andrew Leitch. These were directed to make their way or "steal around" to the rear of the enemy by their right flank. To make a demonstration against the enemy in their front, while the flanking party effected its object, a detachment of volunteers was organized from Nixon's brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Crary, of Varnum's Rhode Islanders,[197] who marched down into the "hollow way" directly towards the British on the opposite ridge. As Washington hoped, this move had the desired effect. The British, seeing so small a party coming out against them, immediately ran down the rocky hill into an open field, where they took post behind some bushes and a rail fence that extended from the hill to the post road about four hundred yards in front of the Point of Rocks.[198] This field was part of the old Kortwright farm, lying just west of the present Harlem Lane, above One Hundred and Eighteenth Street, in which the line of that fence had been established for more than half a century before this engagement, and where it remained the same for more than half a century after. It is possible to-day to fix its exact position, for the march of modern improvements has not yet disturbed the site.
In order to keep the enemy engaged at that point, Crary's party opened fire at long range, to which the British replied, but not much execution was done on either side. Meanwhile Knowlton and Leitch moved out to get in the rear. Colonel Reed accompanied the party, and as he had been over the ground he undertook the lead, with the Virginians in advance. It was probably his intention to march down under cover of the bushes, cross the Kortwright farm unobserved some little distance below the enemy, and reach the top of the Bloomingdale ridge before they were discovered. Once there, the British would be effectually hemmed in. Unfortunately, however, some "inferior officers," as it would appear, gave unauthorized directions to the flanking party; or the party forming the "feint" in front pushed on too soon, in consequence of which Leitch and Knowlton made their attack rather on the British flank than in their rear.[199] The latter now finding a retreat necessary, left the fence and started back up the hill which they had descended. Our men quickly followed, Crary in front, Knowlton and Leitch on the left, and with the Virginians leading, joined in the pursuit with splendid spirit and animation. They rushed up the slope, on about the line of One Hundred and Twentieth Street, and, climbing over the rocks, poured in their volleys upon the running Light Infantry.