Upon whom the responsibility for the loss of this post should rest is a question on which divided opinions have been expressed.[221] Greene had urged the retention of the fort as necessary, both to command the passage of the river, and because it would be a threatening obstacle to the enemy's future operations. For them to advance into the country with such a fortification in their rear would be a hazardous move. These reasons were sound, and, as already stated, when the main army evacuated Harlem Heights, Washington's council voted to retain Fort Washington. But on the 7th of November, some British men-of-war again passed the obstructions without difficulty, and Washington wrote to Greene on the 8th from White Plains as follows:
"Sir: The late passage of the three vessels up the North River (which we have just received advice of) is so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions we have thrown into it, that I cannot but think it will fully justify a change in the disposition which has been made. If we cannot prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Col. Magaw to defend it to the last."
General Greene on the following day replied that he did not think the garrison in any danger, and that it could be drawn off at any time. He believed, too, that the stores could be removed at the last moment, in spite of an attack; and again he called attention to the advantage of holding the post as an annoyance to the enemy. No further communications passed on the subject, but Washington rode to the Highlands, and, returning on the Jersey side of the Hudson, reached Greene's headquarters at Fort Lee on the 14th, to find no steps taken to withdraw men or stores from Mount Washington. Had the enemy in the mean time invested and captured the fort, it is pertinent to inquire whether Greene, having been acquainted with the distinct wishes of the commander-in-chief not to hazard the post, could not have been justly and properly charged with its loss. Washington's instructions were discretionary only so far as related to the details or perhaps the time of the evacuation; and to leave Greene free, he revoked the order already given to Magaw to defend the fort to the last. Upon the arrival of Washington at Fort Lee, however, one phase of the question changed. By not renewing his instructions to evacuate the mount when he found that nothing had been done in the case, or not making the instructions peremptory, he entirely relieved Greene of the charge of non-compliance, which could have been brought against him before. The commander-in-chief was now present, and Greene was no longer under instructions, discretionary or otherwise. Washington accepted the situation as he now found it, and was reconsidering the propriety of a total evacuation. Finding Greene, of whose military judgment he had "a good opinion," strong in favor of holding the post, and others agreeing with him, among whom evidently were Putnam, Mercer, and Magaw, and knowing that Congress and the country would not easily be reconciled to its abandonment, Washington hesitated for the moment to enforce his own views and opinions. On the 14th and 15th, he still delayed a final decision. So says Greene. "His Excellency General Washington," he writes, "has been with me several days. The evacuation or reinforcement of Fort Washington was under consideration, but finally nothing concluded on;" and it was not until the morning of the 16th, just at the time of the attack, that they all went over to the fort "to determine what was best to be done." This clearly settles the fact that Greene was not under instructions at the time of the surrender of the post.
But at the same time, upon a review of all the circumstances, it is difficult to escape the conviction that but for General Greene's earnest opposition to an abandonment of the fort, the disaster would not have occurred. It was an error of judgment, an over-confidence in the sufficiency of the preparations made for the defence, and a belief that if matters came to the worst the garrison could be withdrawn in spite of the enemy. That Greene himself felt that he would be held largely accountable for the loss of the post, is evident from his own expressions in the letter he wrote to Knox on the next day. "I feel mad, vexed, sick, and sorry," are his words. "Never did I need the consoling voice of a friend more than now. Happy should I be to see you. This is a most terrible event; its consequences are justly to be dreaded. Pray, what is said upon the occasion?"[222]
There were those who censured Washington for not overruling Greene, but the chief kept his counsels to himself, and it was not until nearly three years later, in August, 1779, that he gave his version of the affair in a private letter to Colonel Reed. In that he frankly admits that Greene's representations and other reasons caused a "warfare" and "hesitation" in his mind, by which the evacuation was delayed until too late. But he indulged in no censures on Greene. His confidence in the latter remained steadfast. The disaster was one of those misfortunes which occur in the career of every great general, and become, indeed, a step by which he rises to greatness. Greene, more than any general of the Revolution, learned by experience. Every battle, whether a defeat or victory, was for him a training-school; and at the close of the war we find him ranking hardly second to the commander-in-chief, in military talents, and enjoying nearly an equal reputation for his achievements.
This disaster at Fort Washington, the heaviest suffered by the Americans during the entire war, closed the campaign in the vicinity of New York. All the western part of Long Island, New York City, and all Manhattan Island, had fallen into the possession of the British, and their fleet came into undisturbed control of the Hudson, the East River, and the waters of the Sound. Every thing that Washington and his soldiers had sought to secure and defend was wrested from their hands. Their losses too, in men and material, were almost irreparable. Much the greater part of their artillery had been captured—two hundred and eighteen pieces of all calibres, according to the enemy's report. Three hundred and twenty-nine officers and four thousand one hundred men had been taken prisoners; nearly six hundred had been killed or wounded; and numbers had been swept off by disease. The enemy suffered more heavily, except in prisoners and cannon, in which their loss was nothing; but they had recovered territory, won victories, and they were now to find before them only a flying and dissolving body of rebels.
The situation at this point presented a gloomy prospect for America. But had the cause been then surrendered, we could still contemplate this struggle around New York and Brooklyn with respect, as a noble effort to gain an end worth fighting for. As success, however, was finally achieved, and achieved through the experience of these events, they challenge our deepest interest.