The British Interned in Switzerland

by Henry Philip Picot

THE BRITISH INTERNED IN
SWITZERLAND

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

Driving off with my daughter and just a couple of portmanteaux to the London Chatham and Dover Railway, on July 16, 1914, en route for Thoune, our usual headquarters when contemplating a few weeks' wandering in Switzerland, I little thought of the events the Fates were weaving, and which, I suppose, have not left unaffected any individual destiny either in Europe or in the whole world. It was a bright and sunny morning, with a light cool breeze, upon which we congratulated ourselves in view of the crossing of that narrow but often uncomfortable strip of sea isolating us from the great continent at hand. Nothing, so far, to warn us of any impending upheaval. The sea was blissfully asleep, enveloped in a golden haze; and Paris as gay, nonchalant, and unsuspecting of any approaching danger, as a child at play.

The papers which reached me, however, on arrival at Thoune, interfered somewhat with the first enjoyment of mountain and lake. I remember watching, one afternoon on the lake, the gathering of a storm over the Interlaken valley, the mists sweeping up the lower slopes of the mountains to unite with the gloomy, threatening clouds above, the whole rent by sudden forked flashes and resonating peals. Was it a counterpart of what was happening in the politically surcharged atmosphere of Europe?

I knew the German Government had long since planned war to hasten and to crown their country's hitherto peaceful economic penetration abroad. Her military writers had treated us to an exposition of the ways and means by which world dominion could be secured; and her diplomats and intellectuals had been at much pains to secretly enlighten their own people as to the meaning of the "Welt-politik" they were so fond of proclaiming. In England, individual lucubrations such as these would, in the natural order of things, be set aside as of no special import; but in Germany, where every class was drilled and schooled to the idea of "Deutschland über alles," did they not foreshadow a national, even racial impulse, gathering force as it developed?

Personally, I had all the less reason for anticipating any sudden upheaval, as I had just assisted in London (February-March, 1914) at a Conference between representatives of British navigation interests and German delegates of the Bagdad Railway Company and the Deutsche Bank, with the object of establishing the relative positions of our respective interests, in so far as the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers was concerned. Daily, even twice daily, sittings were solemnly carried on, with but one interruption of a week to allow the German delegates to refer to Berlin for further instructions. About the end of February a final understanding was actually reached, and embodied in an Agreement duly initialed previous to ratification. These meetings received a good deal of publicity at the time, and I only refer to them in view of certain features which appear of psycho-historical value, as further revealing German character and mentality.

The members taking part in the proceedings (presided over by a member of the Foreign Office) represented the several interests involved, and in addition Herr v. Kühlmann, then Counsellor of the German Embassy in London, attended as representative of German diplomacy. It was the first time I had met Herr v. Kühlmann, and I had no experience, therefore, of his outlook or mentality. His attitude was curiously interesting and ambiguous. He intervened but seldom in the debates, though, when he did, it was to throw oil on troubled waters and expedite the business on hand, whilst his remarks showed a certain grasp of the questions at issue, which were mostly of a very detailed nature. The general impression he made upon me, however, was one of supreme boredom on his part. His attitude may be described as one of supercilious tolerance and indifference, which puzzled me at the time, but which, in the light of subsequent events, becomes perfectly clear and natural. As an official in the confidence of the German Foreign Office, he was doubtless aware of the intentions of his Government with regard to coming events.

It is now known as an established fact that, at the Imperial Conference summoned at Potsdam, on July 5, 1914, at which representatives of German Diplomacy, the Army and Navy, the great Banks, and well-known captains of industry took part, a final decision was taken in favour of war. Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, gives an account of this Conference as related to him by Baron Wangenheim, his German colleague; and on the subject of the question of responsibility for the war, writes as follows: "My conclusions as to the 'responsibility' are not based on suspicion or belief or the study of circumstantial data. I do not have to reason or argue about the matter. I know. The conspiracy that caused this greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his Imperial crew at this Potsdam Conference, on July 5, 1914." Every leader and captain of industry evidently had his orders to be in readiness for war, as the result of the decision of the 5th of July. That Herr v. Kühlmann, like others, had confidential information of what was maturing, admits, I believe, of little doubt; and the negotiations at the Foreign Office for the regulation of so small an affair as the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers, when compared with the issues of peace and war, must indeed have appeared to him as farcical and particularly boring, given his knowledge of their probable aim and purpose. Just as the departure of the Kaiser on his yacht for Norway after the Potsdam Conference was calculated to give the Chancellories of Europe a feeling of confidence, so the meetings in London must have been calculated to lull our Foreign Office into a sense of security.

The general tension during the last few days of July brought to my mind a conversation I had had with Colonel Trench, our former Military Attaché in Berlin, in the summer of 1912, the memory of which did not serve to minimize my growing uneasiness. I had, at the time, just read works by Bernhardi and Naumann, in which the question of Germany's future is argued in the frankest possible manner; in so frank a manner, indeed, and with so little attempt at concealment, that both authors had been classed by outside critics as hot-heads and fire-brands, in the belief that they, like others of similar tendencies, were unsupported by the more level-headed and responsible leaders of German policy. Some colour was lent to this view by articles appearing simultaneously in the German Press, specially written, as the sequel revealed, for foreign consumption, setting forth that this militant school was led by extremists who should not be taken seriously. Now, Colonel Trench had had unusual opportunities of weighing in the balance the value of the influence exercised by these so-called "extremists." His linguistic accomplishments and attractive personality had made him a persona grata at the German Court, and had given him ample facilities for approaching men of every cast of thought. He had, moreover, seen service in South Africa with the German Expeditionary Force during the Herero campaign, and had thus obtained a near view of the German military machine and German methods of thought.