It is a matter of common knowledge that sympathies in Switzerland were divided at the outbreak of hostilities, the French and Italian speaking cantons having a decided bias in favour of the Allies, and the German cantons one in favour of the other side. After the early successes of the Germans, the opinion was generally held that Germany would press the war to a conclusion so rapidly, that England would not be able to make her weight felt in time to avert a calamity. Swiss military circles, however, did not wholly share this view, as the following account of a conversation, which in August, 1914, I had with a well-known Swiss officer of standing shows. This conversation appeared to me at the time all the more interesting as my informant was a Professor of Military History, and, judging by his name, might have been expected to have his views coloured by German sympathies. He spoke in the following sense:— "Now that England has thrown in her lot with France and Russia, the combination will probably be too great for Germany and her Allies, but the struggle will be a bitter one. Remember the Seven Years' War, and what Prussia was capable of in opposition to a host of enemies. You will have many surprises; Switzerland, however, will welcome the weakening of Germany, provided she is not completely crushed. A weakening of Germany would be useful to us Swiss, for we see a great danger to ourselves in the economic dominance she is obtaining in our country. Any relaxation in that respect will be to our advantage."
The events of the last four years have done much to change feeling in the German-speaking cantons, inasmuch as the invasion of Belgium, the employment of poison gas, the sinking of the Lusitania, the brutality of the submarine campaign, the destruction of Serbia, the harshness shown to Roumania, have made an unfavourable impression on all classes of the population. German propaganda has also thoroughly awakened the country to the danger it was incurring from the stranglehold which German financiers and industrials were establishing upon her economic life.
The revolutionary fiasco in Russia also, in no small degree, affected public opinion. As a republican nation possessed with the ideal of the rights of smaller nations to dispose of themselves, they feared and abhorred the Russian form of government as represented by Czarism; and this, no doubt, had a good deal to do with the way in which they regarded Germany as a protector and a bulwark against the submergence of Europe by a Slav wave. That danger now removed, they probably feel Germany's support may be more easily dispensed with; and with a weakened Germany they foresee the possibility of re-organizing their economic life free from the trammels of an overbearing neighbour. The crushing of Germany, however, would, they think, mean economic ruin to them; and at this they draw the line.
[1] From L'Armée Suisse, by Colonel C. H. Egli, Colonel d'Etat-Major Général, 1913.
CHAPTER III
PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REPATRIATION
AND INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
In the early autumn of 1915 I came to London in connection with certain details of work in Switzerland. During this visit I had the pleasure of meeting Lord Kitchener for the first and, alas! for the last time. I had received orders to report myself to him at the War Office, and at the appointed hour, punctual to the minute, a member of his Staff informed me that he was ready to see me. Lord Kitchener received me very cordially, and plunging into business at once, said he wished to hear my views concerning certain matters dealing with the prospective internment of British prisoners of war in Switzerland, regarding which there was some uncertainty at Headquarters. He then proceeded to give me his own views with some emphasis and at considerable length. After hearing, in answer, what I had to say, he remarked:— "What you tell me is most interesting. You have treated the question at an entirely different angle; I had no idea of the Swiss point of view, and am glad to know that it confirms my own. I will get you in a shorthand clerk, to whom you can dictate what you have just told me. It can then be signed before you leave. I shall be seeing the Cabinet this afternoon, and will present your statement to them." On my suggesting he would have a more carefully compiled statement if I could quietly prepare it, he said: "No, I want it at once; the sooner I get it the better." In an hour's time the statement was in his hands. I know not whether the method adopted by Lord Kitchener in this interview was characteristic of him, but from that standpoint it may be worth recording. My general impression was that of an imposing personality and a great driving force, full of vitality and youth. His manner was altogether charming, and I can well imagine him to have inspired enthusiasm amongst those brought into close contact with him.
Whether this interview had anything at all to do with my later appointment is problematic; but at the end of December, 1915, after a tenure of eighteen months of the Military Attachéship, I was relieved by Colonel Wyndham, 60th Rifles, who had seen service and been wounded in France, and on May 14, 1916, I was appointed "Officer in charge of the arrangements for the British Interned in Switzerland."
The first idea of internment of prisoners of war in a neutral country appears to have been suggested by Monsieur Louis de Tscharner in the Swiss Press nearly a year before the outbreak of war. In an article dated September, 1913, the writer suggested, curiously enough, the conclusion of a Convention between Switzerland and the neighbouring States relative to internment, though why or how the idea happened to occur to him does not appear. He proposed that these States should engage themselves to respect Swiss neutrality, and to provision her during the period of war, whilst Switzerland should, in exchange, take charge of the wounded, and, upon their return to health, restore them to their countries of origin. This new and interesting suggestion became the subject of numerous articles and was much discussed at the time, but the conclusion of a bargain, with a view to obtaining respect for Swiss neutrality in exchange for services rendered, was not agreeable to Swiss national pride, and the subject was allowed to drop.
The following preliminary negotiations embrace two distinct questions: Direct Repatriation and Internment in Switzerland, which, in the process, intersect each other. I give them, therefore, in chronological order.