A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"

by Henry Philip Tappan

But how are we to know whether the motive of every volition has this characteristic of agreeableness, or of most agreeableness, as the case may be? We can know it only by consulting our consciousness. If, whenever we will, we find the sense of the most agreeable identified with the volition, and if we are conscious of no power of willing, save under this condition of willing what is most agreeable to us, then certainly there remains no farther question on this point. The determination of consciousness is final. Whether such be the determination of consciousness, we are hereafter to consider.

Does Edwards appeal to consciousness?

He does,—but without formally announcing it. The following passage is an appeal to consciousness, and contains Edwards’s whole thought on this subject: “There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say that they do what pleases them, but yet what is not agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say, they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not what they please.” (p. 25.) Motives differ widely, intrinsically considered. Some are in accordance with reason and conscience; some are opposed to reason and conscience. Some are wise; some are foolish. Some are good; some are bad. But whatever may be their intrinsic properties, they all have this characteristic of agreeableness when they cause volition; and it is by this characteristic that their strength is measured. The appeal, however, which is made to sustain this, is made in a way to beg the very point in question. Will not every one admit, that “when men act voluntarily and do what they please, they do what suits them best, and what is most agreeable to them?” Yes. Is it not a palpable contradiction, to say that men “do what pleases them,” and yet do “what is not agreeable to them,” according to the ordinary use of these words? Certainly.

But the point in question is, whether men, acting voluntarily, always do what is pleasing to them: and this point Edwards assumes. He assumes it here, and he assumes it throughout his treatise. We have seen that, in his psychology, he identifies will and desire or the affections:—hence volition is the prevailing desire or affection, and the object which moves the desire must of course appear desirable, or agreeable, or pleasant; for they have the same meaning. If men always will what they most desire, and desire what they will, then of course when they act voluntarily, they do what they please; and when they do what they please, they do what suits them best and is most agreeable to them.

Edwards runs the changes of these words with great plausibility, and we must say deceives himself as well as others. The great point,—whether will and desire are one,—whether the volition is as the most agreeable,—he takes up at the beginning as an unquestionable fact, and adheres to throughout as such; but he never once attempts an analysis of consciousness in relation to it, adequate and satisfactory. His psychology is an assumption.

3. The will is necessarily determined.

How does Edwards prove this? 1. On the general connexion of causes and effects. Causes necessarily produce effects, unless resisted and overcome by opposing forces; but where several causes are acting in opposition, the strongest will necessarily prevail, and produce its appropriate effects.

Now, Edwards affirms that the nature of the connexion between motives and volitions is the same with that of any other causes and effects. The difference is merely in the terms: and when he calls the necessity which characterizes the connexion of motive and volition “a moral necessity,” he refers not to the connexion itself, but only to the terms connected. In this reasoning he plainly assumes that the connexion between cause and effect in general, is a necessary connexion; that is, all causation is necessary. A contingent, self-determining cause, in his system, is characterized as an absurdity. Hence he lays himself open to all the consequences of a universal and absolute necessity.

2. He also endeavours to prove the necessity of volition by a method of approximation. (p. 33.) He here grants, for the sake of the argument, that the will may oppose the strongest motive in a given case; but then he contends that it is supposable that the strength of the motive may be increased beyond the strength of the will to resist, and that at this point, on the general law of causation, the determination of the will must be considered necessary. “Whatever power,” he remarks, “men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite.” If the power of the man is finite, that of the motive may be supposed to be infinite: hence the resistance of the man must at last be necessarily overcome. This reasoning seems plausible at first; but a little examination, I think, will show it to be fallacious. Edwards does not determine the strength of motives by inspecting their intrinsic qualities, but only by observing their degrees of agreeableness. But agreeableness, by his own representation, is relative,—relative to the will or sensitivity. A motive of infinite strength would be a motive of infinite agreeableness, and could be known to be such only by an infinite sense of agreeableness in the man. The same of course must hold true of any motive less than infinite: and universally, whatever be the degree of strength of the motive, there must be in the man an affection of corresponding intensity. Now, if there be a power of resistance in the will to any motive, which is tending strongly to determine it, this power of resistance, according to Edwards, must consist of a sense of agreeableness opposing the other motive, which is likewise a sense of agreeableness: and the question is simply, which shall predominate and become a sense of the most agreeable. It is plain that if the first be increased, the second may be supposed to be increased likewise; if the first can become infinite, the second can become infinite likewise: and hence the power of resistance may be supposed always to meet the motive required to be resisted, and a point of necessary determination may never be reached.

If Edwards should choose to throw us upon the strength of motives intrinsically considered, then the answer is ready. There are motives of infinite strength, thus considered, which men are continually resisting: for example, the motive which urges them to obey and love God, and seek the salvation of their souls.