But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.
The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and rational conception, then the second point will be, to determine whether the will be contingent or necessary.
The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute. Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss contingency, he assumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to necessity, he begins his argument by affirming all cause to be necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause, for example, will, which is contingent.
If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has logically determined nothing in relation to it.
But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be contradictory and absurd.
Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any subject, remains to be determined.
Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it, is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.
What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:—
1. Viewed in relation to will.
2. Viewed irrespective of will.