A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"

by Henry Philip Tappan

1. The beauty of the object, “viewing it as it is in itself,” independently of circumstances.

2. “The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the consequence of it,” or the object taken with its “concomitants” and consequences.

3. “The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears with respect to distance of time. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed.” (p. 22.)

II. In relation to mind, the sense of agreeableness will depend, first, upon the manner of the mind’s view; secondly, upon the state of mind. Edwards, under the first, speaks of the object as connected with future pleasure. Here the manner of the mind’s view will have influence in two respects:

1. The certainty or uncertainty which the mind judges to attach to the pleasure;

2. The liveliness of the sense, or of the imagination, which the mind has of it.

Now these may be in different degrees, compounded with different degrees of pleasure, considered in itself; and “the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgement, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good.” (p. 23.)

Secondly: In reference to objects generally, whether connected with present or future pleasure, the sense of agreeableness will depend also upon “the state of the mind which views a proposed object of choice.” (p. 24.) Here we have to consider “the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced or established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion.” (ibid.)

Edwards here suggests, that it may be unnecessary to consider the state of the mind as a ground of agreeableness distinct from the two already mentioned: viz.—the nature and circumstances of the object, and the manner of the view. “Perhaps, if we strictly consider the matter,” he remarks, “the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects in any other way, than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently; beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness, to be more or less lively.” (ibid.) In this remark, Edwards shows plainly how completely he makes mind and object to run together in choice, or how perfect a unition of the two, choice is. The state of the mind is manifested only in relation to the nature and circumstances of the object; and the sense of agreeableness being in the correlation of the two, the sense of the most agreeable or choice is such a perfect unition of the two, that, having described the object in its nature and circumstances in relation to the most agreeable, we have comprehended in this the state of mind. On the other hand, the nature and circumstances of the object, in relation to the most agreeable, can be known only by the state of mind produced by the presence of the object and its circumstances. To give an example,—let a rose be the object. When I describe the beauty and agreeableness of this object, I describe the state of mind in relation to it; for its beauty and agreeableness are identical with the sensations and emotions which I experience, hence, in philosophical language, called the secondary qualities of the object: and so, on the other hand, if I describe my sensations and emotions in the presence of the rose, I do in fact describe its beauty and agreeableness. The mind and object are thus united in the sense of agreeableness. I could not have this sense of agreeableness without an object; but when the object is presented to my mind, they are so made for each other, that they seem to melt together in the pleasurable emotion. The sense of the most agreeable or choice may be illustrated in the same way. The only difference between the agreeable simply and the most agreeable is this: the agreeable refers merely to an emotion awakened on the immediate presentation of an object, without any comparison or competition. The most agreeable takes place where there is comparison and competition. Thus, to prefer or choose a rose above a violet is a sense of the most agreeable of the two. In some cases, however, that which is refused is positively disagreeable. The choice, in strictness of speech, in these cases, is only a sense of the agreeable. As, however, in every instance of choosing, there are two terms formed by contemplating the act of choosing itself in the contrast of positive and negative, the phrase most agreeable or greatest apparent good is convenient for general use, and sufficiently precise to express every case which comes up.

It may be well here to remark, that in the system we are thus endeavouring to state and to illustrate, the word choice is properly used to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in relation to its immediate effects,—as when I say, I choose to walk. The sense of the most agreeable, is properly used to express the same action, when the action is viewed in relation to its own cause. Choice and volition are the words in common use, because men at large only think of choice and volition in reference to effects. But when the cause of choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed to lie in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, then the sense of the most agreeable becomes the most appropriate form of expression.