[Cannes] May 18th.—I really begin to feel anxious about the peace of Europe, and not without some alarm as to our own position. There can be no doubt that for the present (if not more permanently) this man [the Emperor], working on the French feeling, has got the mob, military and civil, with him. The war has ceased to be unpopular, and all reckon upon victory. If they succeed, he will, for a while, be satisfied with the gratification of his vanity and the strengthening of his power; but soon after he will be pushed by his unruly supporters, and will try a deeper game. Of this they are as much convinced in Germany as of his existence, and even Prussia will not persist holding back. If she does, and if the Russian alliance continues, she will be destroyed as soon as Austria is weakened. I, therefore, expect to see Prussia take timely precautions. They are prepared at Frankfort to split with her if she does not.
I am now satisfied that the Austrians intended only a razzia to Turin, and then to carry on only a defensive contest; and having been prevented—partly by the floods, and partly by our untimely intermeddling, and partly by their old error of having one head at Vienna, and another with the army—they have now given up the razzia, and will act on the defensive. This will not prevent them taking advantage of any opportunity of attacking, should they be able to do so with a certainty of success; but for any such dash I look rather to the French than to them. Certainly the Man is in a great difficulty if the Austrians steadily pursue this plan; for the expectations are wound up to a high pitch in France—especially in Paris and the great towns—of his doing something speedily, and the French nature is not to wait with calmness and patience. Even in this remote quarter, the thousands of fine troops passing raises a great feeling for the war.
_To Lord Brougham
C. O., May 21st_.—To the very best of my belief, the Queen's Speech will not be delivered till June 7th, but I speak without authority…. I have the greatest doubt whether it will be possible to unite all those sections of the H. of C. which are not to be regarded as Lord Derby's supporters, in a direct adverse vote—on the address or otherwise; and if the attempt is made—as it probably will be I think it will fail. [Footnote: The attempt was made, and did not fail. The Ministry was defeated on the amendment to the address by 323 to 310.] The Government say they have 307 men on whom they can rely, and a fair chance that fifteen or twenty more men will not consent to take part in an active, offensive campaign. Indeed the country gentlemen say pretty generally that they will not attempt to turn the Government out, until they are satisfied that a more stable Government can be formed. But how is this possible when the numbers are—on one side a compact body of more than 300, and—on the other side, a divided body of 350? What we hope, therefore, is this: that John Russell and the Radicals will take a course on the subject of Reform which will be resisted by the moderate Liberals; and that the result will be a fusion between the moderate Liberals and the large Conservative phalanx. For it is clear that without some degree of support from the Conservatives, no other government can be carried on. As for any lasting or sincere union between Lord Palmerston and Lord John, it is quite hopeless, [Footnote: The event falsified this forecast. In the Ministry which Palmerston now formed Lord John was Foreign Secretary, and continued so till Palmerston's death in 1865.] and the desire to keep the latter out of office is so general and intense, that it is probable he would fail to make a Cabinet, even if the Queen sent for him—which she will certainly not do until the last extremity. On the other hand, there is the great objection to Palmerston that he holds language about the Italians and the French—to whom he is entirely devoted—which is quite at variance with the convictions of every man of sense in the country. There can be very little doubt that the war will spread. The whole of Germany is burning with ardour to support Austria; and if the French gain a battle on the Po, nothing will prevent the whole strength of Germany from coming to the rescue. [Footnote: Louis Napoleon's fear of this is a sufficient explanation of his ambiguous policy after Solferino.] The position of France is, in reality, most critical, for all her best troops are in Italy, and she would have great difficulty in placing 100,000 men on the Rhine, where she may have to confront half a million of combatants.
Hortensius' [Footnote: William Forsyth, Q.C., for many years standing counsel to the India Office. As the author, among other works, of Hortensius, and residing, as he still resides, at 61 Rutland Gate, Lord Brougham, in writing to Reeve, invariably refers to him as either 'Hortensius' or 'your neighbour.' In 1872 he published Letters from Lord Brougham to William Forsyth, with some facsimiles to show his 'extraordinary hand.' 'I think,' wrote Mr. Forsyth, 'the hieroglyphics will puzzle most readers;' but the samples he has given are as copper-plate compared with some of the letters to Reeve of about the same date.] appointment was, I believe, purely an act of Lord Stanley's, and I dare say your kindness in mentioning his name had due effect. Hortensius applied, by letter, for the appointment, and about three weeks after came a letter to say he was appointed.
From Lord Brougham
[Cannes] May 24th. I have been reading over again your excellent article on the subject of the day, and I may say of the place; and the more I reflect on it, I come the nearer to your view in all respects. Really the more we consider this abominable man's conduct (and his accomplice Cavour is quite as bad, though not so foolish), the greater indignation we feel at the unprovoked breach of the peace. The audacity of the pretence from a despot and usurper exceeds precedent. What can be said too of Russia, which keeps her hold of Poland only ten years longer than the settlement of 1815! It really would be important, now that the attempt has been made to represent [the first] Napoleon as the friend of oppressed nationalities, that we should direct men's attention a little more to the enormities in that man's whole history. Party motives arising out of our English divisions to a certain degree prevented the real truth from being generally felt respecting him. There was the usual exaggeration on both sides. One party painted the devil blacker than he was, crediting to him crimes which he never committed. The other, because their adversaries thus painted him, would allow nothing against him, and exaggerated his merits—though it were difficult to overrate his capacity, and his military genius especially. But the more his moral guilt is examined the blacker it will appear, and the late publication, which you call candid, I believe has been true and full owing to careless superintendence. When I say publication I mean printing, for it is not really published, though copies are freely given. The publication of Joseph's memoirs is also full of important matter.
Now from these and the existing materials, a full and plain account of the man ought to be prepared, [Footnote: This is what M. Lanfrey began to do, and was going on with at the time of his lamented death, at the age of forty-nine, in 1877.] and you may rely on it that great effect against the present man would be produced; for he ostentatiously connects his policy with the former one's, and there is the greatest care taken to suppress attacks on Napoleon I. in the periodical publications—at least in the newspapers. But if the English and German and Belgian press are full of the facts, and repeatedly lay them before the world, no policy of the French press can long keep the truth from reaching the public. However, I am drawn away from what I had intended to mention—the present state of the public mind on the war question in this country. The giddy and warlike nature of the people, and his going to the army, has produced an effect not only in removing the unpopularity of the war, but in raising a warlike spirit—at least for the present. If victory comes, this will be increased. It is probable he may for the present be satisfied with the strength which he will derive from it; but the army will probably join with the mob in wishing for further proceedings, and then we shall find that Germany will be attacked, and I must even say that we shall do well to be prepared in England. I believe, however, that the Austrians in Italy will make it a lingering affair by defensive operations, and this will exhaust the French patience. The lies of the Sardinian press, and indeed official accounts, make it impossible to tell how far they have at the beginning suffered a check. But I plainly perceive that, if something brilliant is not done, L. N. will be shaken.
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From Count Zamoyski