May 16th.—Your letter is gloomy indeed, and should your forebodings be realised you may be sure that I should be as grieved as yourself. All my life, and now as much as ever, I have looked upon the alliance of France and England as infinitely desirable for both; and if I were so unfortunate as to cause a breach between the two countries, it would be very much against my will, and without my knowledge. Tunis cannot be a source of discord between us, and I hope that public opinion, over-excited at present, will return to a more calm and just appreciation of the case. We have declared to Europe that we wish for no annexations or conquests, and will attempt none; we have quite enough with the two million five hundred thousand Mussulmans in Algeria; it would be madness to add fifteen or sixteen hundred thousand more to them, and a hundred and fifty leagues to our frontier. For Algeria thus extended we should require an army of 100,000 men, who would be much missed in case of any complication in Europe. All that we want in Tunis is a power which will not be hostile to us, and continually threaten our African possessions. We shall only occupy Biserta and the other places as long as appears necessary; but we will not make a port of it; for that, as Sir Charles Dilke has said, would involve a cost of some 200 millions. I have just sent Lord Lyons a despatch upon that special subject, which will appear in the next Blue Book.
Tunis will never belong to France; she does not want it; but should it belong to Italy, who already owns Sicily, the passage to Malta might be made difficult. I know that England has not much to fear from Italy; but circumstances may change; and the gratitude she shows towards us now proves how much she will have for other benefactors. I cannot understand how my despatch of May 9th can have been interpreted as the announcement of our taking possession. In form and intention it was quite the contrary. Our actions will show that we only speak the truth. Neither can I admit that even the conquest of Tunis can ever equal in importance the taking of Constantinople by the Russians, which in my eyes will be the greatest event of modern times, as the taking of it by the Turks in 1453 was an important event in the fifteenth century.
As to the Treaty of Commerce, I am doing all in my power to facilitate the negotiations. I suppose that public opinion in England is at present principally occupied with this; and that, if it is satisfactorily arranged, Tunis will very soon be forgotten. A thousand more interests are engaged in the agreement on a specific tariff than could ever be involved in this unfortunate Regency.
But I content myself with saying with the poet—Di avertant omen; and I desire that England may be as well disposed towards us as we are towards her.
May 23rd.—I knew of the correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Waddington long ago. I should never have thought myself authorised to publish it; but I will take it from the Blue Book and publish it in the Yellow Book. It is quite allowable.
My declarations of our intentions in Tunis are the exact truth. Annexation would be an act of folly. We have quite enough with three million Mussulmans in Algeria without adding another two million in Tunis, and another hundred and fifty leagues to the length of our frontier, which already reaches from Nemours to La Calle. In doing good to the Regency we are serving ourselves, and we only ask one thing in return—that it should be as well disposed to us as we are towards it. But it is not easy to establish the good terms which would be so profitable to all. England ought to be very well pleased that both sides of the passage to Malta are not in the hands of the same Power, which would be the case if Italy, who already possesses Sicily, had possession of Tunis on the other side. Geography demonstrates the fact. As to us, we wish to do nothing at Biserta. Our port is necessarily at Algiers in the centre of our possessions.
Like you, I deplore the scrutin de liste. It will give rise to formidable difficulties in the near future. I am an optimist by nature, but that future seems to me very dark. I do all I can to prevent it by foretelling it to everyone; but I only play the part of Cassandra. In the Council, M. Ferry and myself were the only ones who supported the scrutin d'arrondissement.
July 9th.—I did not think that the Tunis affair was concluded by the treaty of May 12th; that is the first stage if you like; but it was rather difficult. The difficulties which arise are very simple consequences; we will put down rebellion, but this will not incite us to conquest, which we do not want. The interests of the English, and those of other nations, would not suffer by our preponderance; and unless all the advantages of civilisation are ignored, it is certainly better to treat with the French than with the Moors. Europe will soon see [Footnote: Europe has seen; though not quite in the sense that St.-Hilaire wished to convey.] that our promises are not vain, and that we have only good intentions towards Tunis. We wish for nothing but the security of our great African colony.
The commercial negotiations have been transferred to Paris, at the request of the English Cabinet, which had at first expressed a wish that they should take place in London. This seems to me to imply the very opposite of a rupture, which, for our part, I can answer for it, we ardently desire to avoid. We only wish for an equitable treaty, and this I hope we shall manage….
Est-ce qu'on ne vous verra pas durant les vacances? Mistress Ross est passée par Paris il y a huit ou dix jours; elle est venue me voir un instant; elle m'a paru très bien portante. Bonne santé et bien des amitiés.