And this he did at considerable length, suggesting several confirmations, modifications, or additions.
So long as this article was to be considered as an ordinary contribution to the 'Edinburgh Review,' it bore merely the authority of the 'Review,' which, however great, was in no sense official; but now that the share of Lord Clarendon in its authorship is revealed, it assumes an extreme importance, as an original, though necessarily partial, account of what took place, and may be held as definitely settling the fate of some of the extraordinary misstatements which—foisted on the credulity of the public by the literary skill, the brilliant language, and the unblushing audacity of Mr. Kinglake—have been accepted as history, and have passed into current belief. Perhaps nothing concerning the Russian war is more commonly repeated than the statement that we were tricked into it by the Emperor of the French for his own selfish ends, and in his desire to be received into the brotherhood of sovereigns; that our ministers were blindly following the lead of Louis Napoleon, and were guilty of a very gross blunder. It is unnecessary and would be out of place to enter here on the examination and demolition of all this, as given in the pages of the 'Edinburgh Review;' and equally would it be out of place to discuss the question—as unknown to Kinglake or to Reeve in 1863 as it was to Palmerston or Clarendon ten years earlier—whether we were not then, whether we have not been ever since, 'putting our money on the wrong horse.' If we were, if we have been—a thing which many among us are still unwilling to believe—it is at least certain that in 1853, as in 1840, it was all but universally held in this country that it would be prejudicial and dangerous to our most important interests for either Russia or France to obtain sovereign control over the Ottoman dominions, and that all the resources of diplomacy or of war ought to be exerted to prevent it. In the joint article before us, the condition of affairs in 1853 is thus stated in a few words:—'Russia had formed the design to extort from Turkey, in one form or another, a right of protection over the Christians. She never abandoned that design. She thought she could enforce it. The Western Powers interposed and the strife began…. England has no call to throw off the responsibility of the measures taken on any other Power. Those measures were taken because they were demanded by her own conception of the duty she had to perform; and by far the largest share of that responsibility rests with this country. We see no reason to deny it; and if the case occurred again, we should see no reason to act with less determination.' And again as to the prosecution of the war after the raising of the siege of Silistria—which, according to Kinglake, was unnecessary; or the invasion of the Crimea—which was unjustifiable, to be accounted for, not by any large views of politics or of war, but by paltry personal passions and influences of the most contemptible kind:—England and France declared by their despatches of July 22nd, that the sacrifices already imposed on them were too great, and the cause they had taken in hand too important, for them to desist, unless they obtained from Russia adequate securities against the renewal of hostilities. They therefore demanded:—l. That the protectorate claimed by Russia over the Principalities by virtue of former treaties now abrogated, should cease. 2. That the navigation of the mouths of the Danube should be free. 3. That the treaty of July 13th, 1841, should be revised in the sense of a restriction of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea. 4. That no Power should claim an official protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. On August 8th, Austria entirely adopted these principles, and on the 10th she urged Russia to accede to these demands. On the 26th Russia positively rejected these terms. Had they been accepted, it is needless to add that the Crimean expedition would not have taken place. Here, then, is the clear and precise ground on which the war assumed an offensive character against Russia—viz. to compel her to submit to terms of peace, which England and France held to be necessary to the future safety of Turkey, and which Austria had fully adopted. This is the political explanation of the war, and it was fully justified, as each preceding step of the allies had been justified, by a fresh refusal on the part of Russia to agree to the terms proposed by the allies. It is unnecessary to carry this examination further. It has been introduced here merely as an illustration and a proof of the historical importance of the article now that Lord Clarendon's share in it is understood, and we are made acquainted with the peculiar opportunities which Reeve possessed—not only as Clarendon's friend, but as in actual, confidential conversation with Lord Stratford when he ordered up the fleets. [Footnote: See ante, vol. i. p. 312.]
The fine old motto of the 'Edinburgh Review,' Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur, is, when reduced to practice, apt to strain the relations between the 'judex' and the 'nocens;' and in this case the very outspoken review, published under Reeve's sanction, caused a coolness between the two men, the editor and the author, who had previously been on friendly terms. It is, in fact, easily conceivable that, in earlier years or in other lands, powder would have burnt or small swords flashed. Being when and where they were, they dropped out of each other's circle. And this continued for upwards of three years, when a chance meeting opened the door to reconciliation.
From Mr. Kinglake
9 St. George's Terrace, Marble Arch,
November 14th, 1866.
Dear Reeve,—I think I perceived yesterday that my malice—malice founded, I believe, on a couple of words, and now of some three years' standing—had not engendered any corresponding anger in you; and if my impression was a right one, I trust we may meet for the future upon our old terms. Shall it be so?
Faithfully yours,