The different ways of appropriating other people's invention without giving any equivalent for it, are made possible by our existing laws which are notoriously defective for insuring justice and equity to those who labor with their brains, who, in the opinion of most people, are as deserving of protection, in the enjoyment of the fruits of their labor, as they who work with their hands.

If the man who cultivates the soil, raises a crop and when the same is ripe, some one should come and boldly reap and harvest the same, and carry it off to his barn and enjoy the proceeds thereof, the law would immediately lay its hands on that person, deprive him of his stolen goods, to return the same to the rightful owner. The community would also be wrought up in righteous indignation and add its ostracism of the malefactor, even after he has been deprived of his stealings, suffered the penalty, and is probably penitent.

But it is different, oh! how different, if the stolen property is a mental instead of a hand product. It ought to be apparent that there is a defect somewhere in the profound reasoning of our august law-makers and honorable jurists in framing and interpreting our laws for protection of property that makes it possible for a man to arrest another man that he has found in possession of his plow, while allowing a man to steal another man's invention, for the improvement of all plows, and to throw the inventor out of his office for attempting to remonstrate with him for appropriating his property.

[ CHAPTER 22
Comparative Legal Protection Afforded to Mental and Physical Property]

The law is very partial in protecting the rightful owner in possession of that which to produce requires but manual labor and very little preparation, but it gives no practical protection to the rightful owner in securing to him even a part of the benefits of his production, if the same is the result of the labors of the brain, after spending many years in hard and careful study in making it possible for him to accomplish it.

Dame Justice with unsheathed sword stands guard over the cellar of potatoes that took three months for the ox and his owner to produce, but she is entirely indifferent if an intelligent and educated engineer is robbed of the results of his labors of several years, after collecting a fee from him for doing that which it does not do, and which it ought to do freely. It is manifestly a peculiar logic, entirely at variance with the rules, that govern the ideas of equity.

The man who produces a field of corn that will feed a dozen cows is directly protected in the possession thereof by the paid officers of the law of the community, while the man who, by his exertions, lightens the burdens of millions of human beings has no claim upon the services of the community's enforcers of the law of property rights.

[ CHAPTER 23
The Utter Helplessness of a Poor Inventor to Obtain Justice]

It is confessedly an enigma to many a man, why if an inventor is so unlucky as not to possess the large sums of money required to engage the services of competent attorneys, he must be content to see the despoiler of the fruits of his labor enjoy it. And should he, the inventor, be so indecorous as to accuse him of it, the law will immediately fly to the assistance of his despoiler, and clap the unlucky inventor in jail for libel.

Again, if a man, as member of a corporation, appropriates another man's property the law does not permit him to retain it, or exempt him from the consequences of this unlawful action by reason of any limitation of responsibility as a member of a corporation. But, should the corporation appropriate another man's invention, and after expensive and long drawn-out litigations, the inventor should be awarded damages from the company for exploiting his invention, all the company has to do to avoid paying the award is to fail, and the same individuals can re-organize to do the same business under a new charter and name, and may steal the same inventor's patent again, providing it pays it to do so, and the inventor would have to commence to fight again in court.