General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (page 209), says his army retreated east, to Brandon, where some soldiers, who had been asleep when he evacuated Jackson rejoined him late in the day, "and reported that at the time they left Jackson, at seven or eight o'clock, the enemy had not discovered his [Johnston's] retreat." This is incorrect. In the report of the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, 1863, the Thirty-fifth Massachusetts reports as follows: "At about daylight, discovering that the enemy's works were evacuated, moved forward," etc. The writer of these pages recorded, in a diary written on the spot, the following: "At daylight this morning the Second Division, being in front, heard loud cheering, and learned that the rebels had evacuated Jackson." In a letter written home at the time, I also find these words: "At six o'clock this morning it was found that the enemy had abandoned Jackson, and General Ferrero's brigade at once entered the city." Certainly this should dispose of the charge of lack of vigilance on our part. It seems that these men did not report how they got across Pearl river, the bridges of which were destroyed by Johnston's rear guard before daylight, and if they were not aroused by their own comrades movements it is not very strange that the retreat was not discovered by our pickets. In this engagement Johnston had about 28,000 by his own admission,[3] though the rebel Secretary of War reported his force at 34,000. Johnston reported his army drawn from different commands, as follows: From Pemberton, 9,831; Bragg, 7,939; Beauregard, 6,283; in all, 24,053. He also had a force of about 2,500 cavalry under General Jackson. These figures are no doubt nearly correct. The lines around Jackson were defended by these troops in four divisions,—the right, under General Loring, extending from Pearl river to the Canton road; General Walker's division, from the Canton road to across the Clinton road; General French's division, from the Clinton road to the New Orleans Railroad, and the left, under General Breckenridge, extended from the railroad to the river. That part of the line held by General Walker was in front of the Thirty-sixth Massachusetts.
[3] Johnston's "Narrative," page 195.
General Johnston reported his loss in the battle 71 killed, 504 wounded, and 25 missing. As we captured 138 prisoners, there seems to be a wide discrepancy between their missing and our captures. It is, therefore, quite probable that the rebel losses were much greater than their general admits in killed and wounded.
The losses on our part, according to General Sherman's report, were as follows: Thirteenth Corps, 762 killed wounded, and missing; Ninth Corps, 37 killed, 258 wounded, 33 missing; Fifteenth Corps, a few; number not stated. General Sherman also adds that he captured, in all, over 1,000 prisoners during the battle. These captures must have been made by the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps. The latter, Sherman's own corps, consisted of the First and Third Divisions, under Generals Steele and Tuttle, and held the centre; the Thirteenth Corps, as before remarked, being on the right. Why this fine corps, the Fifteenth, was held back, and allowed to take so little part in this battle, as is evident from their slight loss, is among the mysteries of the war. The battle seemed to be one of disjointed attacks, first in one place and then another. It was the general opinion among the officers that a simultaneous and vigorous assault of Johnston's lines on the first day of the fight would have carried them. It is possible that General Sherman feared to risk the consequences of a repulse so far from any base or reinforcements. The movement up to the attack upon Jackson was a bold one, and boldly pushed. Much dissatisfaction was expressed that an affair that might have been settled in a day should have dragged along a week in this most trying season of the year for such work. General Johnston felt well satisfied to be able to draw off his army safely from what might have been made a second Vicksburg.
It was hoped that the capture of Jackson would be the close of the campaign, the impolicy of pursuing a demoralized enemy further at this season being apparent to all. But there was hard work yet to do. Scarcely was it known that the city was in possession of our forces ere marching orders were received, and together with the other regiments of the First Division the Thirty-sixth marched about eight miles north, to a place called Grant's Mills, where we bivouacked for the night. Early on Saturday, the 18th, we marched five miles and struck the Mississippi Central Railroad. During this day and until ten A.M. of the 19th the regiment was engaged in destroying this railroad. Tough work it would have been, even in the coolest weather and under the most favorable circumstances; but under a burning July sun, with no shelter, the work was terribly exhausting. The method of proceeding was to tear up the rails and lay them crosswise with alternate rows of sleepers. When a pile was built as high as the rails could be lifted, a fire was kindled beneath, and the rails, red-hot, were warped and ruined by the weight of the mass of rails and sleepers above. Another way was to heat the middle of a rail red hot and twist it around a tree. In this way about ten miles of this railroad were destroyed by the division in two days, rendering a main line of transportation useless and seriously crippling the rebel communications.
At noon of the 19th, after setting fire to a depot which burned like a tinder-box, we commenced the return march to Jackson. The fatigues and sufferings of this march were partially forgotten in the glad tidings which there awaited us, that the Ninth Corps was under orders to proceed North at once.
At three A.M., July 20th, the regiment was on the march, and with the exception of a halt from eleven A.M. to three P.M. marched till dark, in all a distance of eighteen miles.
In recalling this day and the one following no man of the Thirty-sixth can fail to be overcome with the memories to which it will give rise. The regiment was a mere wreck. When it halted for the night, on the 20th, one man of Company E dropped down and died of exhaustion, and while on the march one of Company H died from the same cause in an ambulance. When the regiment halted at noon of the 21st it did not stack one hundred guns, and, for no apparent reason whatever, on these two days, the regiment marched a distance of thirty-two miles. The heat and dust were overpowering, and officers forgot all discipline and straggled with the rest. The ambulance and teams were crowded with exhausted men. At nine P.M. of the 21st the regiment halted about a mile from the Big Black river, bivouacking in a cornfield; a delightful place in some respects, because lying between the hills one could not easily roll out of bed, and the savory diet on which the regiment had regaled for about three weeks could be picked in all its luxuriance from the bed-posts. The single objection to cornstalks two or three inches in diameter for bedding is that they have a depressing influence upon the bones of the hips and back.
July 22d the regiment did not move until noon, and then only four miles, crossing the Big Black river, and camped in a shady wood, with plenty of water at hand. It appeared to have dawned upon some one in command of this division or corps that there is a limit to man's endurance. July 23d reveillé was sounded at two A.M. and, marching at four, we pushed on rapidly, the day being unusually comfortable, and at eleven o'clock A.M., after a march of fourteen miles, arrived at the old camp at Milldale.
The condition of the regiment at this time was miserable indeed. Sixteen cases of small-pox and varioloid, three being officers, were under treatment, and the regimental hospital was filled with sick. The adjutant's morning report of July 24th was as follows: 6 officers and 98 men present sick, and 63 men absent in hospitals, 25 officers and 343 men present for duty.