General Parke received orders on Thursday afternoon, the 30th, to assault the enemy's works at some point in his front, at four o'clock, the following morning. The point of attack was left to his discretion. He had already selected the position in front of Fort "Hell" (Sedgwick), on the Jerusalem Plank road, and at nightfall Hartranft's division and Potter's division, except the Thirty-sixth and the other regiments garrisoning the forts, were massed in rear of Fort Sedgwick. Before midnight, however, orders were received suspending the assault, the troops were returned to their camps, and, although everything was constantly on the qui vive, there was no movement for the ensuing two days.
Shortly before five o'clock on Saturday, the 1st of April, General Parke received orders to assault at four o'clock the next morning, and the same dispositions were made as before. At ten minutes before ten in the evening came a telegram from General Meade, directing Parke to open all his artillery at once, push forward skirmishers, and follow them up with columns of assault. Before the necessary arrangements were completed these orders were modified by instructions that the assault in force should be contingent on developments of weakness on the part of the enemy. The artillery opened, and the skirmishers demonstrated all along the line. The enemy was found to be in force and everywhere prepared except opposite the line between Forts Hays and Howard, where Griffin's brigade of our division surprised and captured two hundred and fifty pickets. The original plan was accordingly adhered to, and preparations for assaulting at four o'clock the next morning were made.
At three o'clock General Parke entered Fort Rice, and established his head-quarters for the coming battle. Potter's and Hartranft's divisions, and Harriman's brigade of Willcox's,—all of which had been lying massed behind Fort Sedgwick for two hours,—moved forward at the same hour and formed a column between our main line and picket line. The enemy's pickets were in close proximity to ours, but the movement was executed so quietly as to give no warning to them. The formation was in column of regiments. On the right of the Jerusalem Plank road, its left resting on the road, was Hartranft's division of Pennsylvanians, six regiments, the Two hundred and seventh leading; the Two hundredth and Two hundred and ninth were held in reserve. On the right of Hartranft was a second column, consisting of Harriman's brigade, of Willcox's division, five regiments, with the Thirty-eighth Wisconsin leading, and the Twenty-seventh Michigan and Thirty-seventh Wisconsin in reserve. On the left of the Jerusalem Plank road, right resting on the road, was a third column, our own division, minus the Thirty-sixth and five other regiments which were in the forts. Griffin's brigade, six regiments, led by the One hundred and seventy-ninth New York, had the advance, supported by our own brigade, Curtin's, with the Thirty-ninth New Jersey in front, followed in order by the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, and Fifty-eighth Massachusetts. At the head of each of these three columns was a storming party, flanked by pioneers with axes to cut away abatis, etc.; and a detail of one hundred men from the First Connecticut Heavy Artillery accompanied them to serve captured guns. Ely's brigade, of Willcox's division, occupied our line from the Appomattox to near Fort Morton, opposite the Crater, and the Fifty-first Pennsylvania, of Harriman's brigade, was stretched along the part of the line at the Crater vacated by its brigade on the moving to the left to join in the main assault. To mislead the enemy as to the real point of attack, these troops on the right were ordered to make a strong demonstration at four o'clock, which was to be followed by the advance of the three columns along the Jerusalem Plank road.
Such was the situation in the trenches at Petersburg just before dawn on that eventful April day. Only a few hundred yards in our front, veiled partly by darkness and partly by the morning mist, stood the grim fortifications which had so long defied us that they had begun to seem impregnable. Behind them lay the left wing of that army whose right had been driven the day before, reeling and bleeding, from the field of Five Forks. Upon the valor of this unscathed remnant depended the salvation of Lee, and, knowing the quality of that valor, there were few in Fort Rice whose hearts did not beat anxiously for the columns in blue out there in front of Fort Hell, silently awaiting the signal to advance. Along the opposing line our chief of artillery counted ninety-one guns, ranging from six-pounders to eight-inch columbiads (one of which we remember as making some very poor practice at our signal station in the rear of Fort Rice), and thirty-five mortars, from Coehorns to ten-inch. Against them we had four four and one-half inch Parrotts, eleven thirty-pounder Parrotts, forty-two light twelve-pounders, thirty-four three-inch Rodmans, four ten-inch, fourteen eight-inch, and twenty-two Coehorn mortars,—in all ninety-one guns and forty mortars. Just what troops were in our front it is impossible to tell. The prisoners brought into Fort Rice during the day were Alabamians; and a rebel colonel, who was interviewed at Farmville by a member of the Thirty-sixth, said he commanded an Alabama brigade occupying the line opposite Fort Rice. The salient opposite us (Miller's or Reeves') appears to have been manned by a battery from Mobile. Our old friends of the Thirty-fourth Virginia (Bushrod Johnson's division) were relieved several days before the assault, and were at Five Forks. The difficulty is that the rebels made no official reports of the closing engagements of the war, and such unofficial accounts as are accessible are meagre in details.
At four o'clock the artillery opened and fired vigorously for several minutes. Then Willcox made his demonstrations on the right. The Fifty-first Pennsylvania captured some of the pickets at the Crater, and Ely's brigade carried about two hundred yards of the enemy's main line; but were finally compelled to fall back. At half-past four the main attack began. The columns moved at quick time and very little cheering. The picket line was broken instantly. As we stood at the parapet in Fort Rice, peering into the mist, we could see little or nothing of the assault; but we could hear the blows of the pioneers' axes on the chevaux de frise, and the shouts of command. The musketry fire of the enemy increased, and following the flash of their cannon we could distinguish the "whish" of the double charges of canister. Presently new sounds came over the field. Exultant Yankee cheers told us our boys were inside the works. Then we heard short, sharp summons to surrender, coupled with epithets and rifle-shots, as the "Johnnies" took the chances of flight. The first gray-back we saw was a short, jaunty chap, who trudged across the field, toward the fort, alone and quite unconcerned, passed through a little gap in the abatis, climbed the parapet, and, coolly bidding us good-morning, asked if we had some hard bread and coffee. As he sat in the bomb-proof and regaled himself he told us he belonged to a Mobile battery in position opposite us, and that when he heard the Yanks coming he prudently retired to the magazine, only to emerge after his battery had been cleaned out, and the Yanks were in full possession. Afterward a considerable party of prisoners were brought in,—Alabamians, a sullen, indomitable-looking crowd, boasting of how they would have whipped us if they had had nearer our numbers. The captures in this charge were twelve guns and eight hundred prisoners. Describing the assault, General Parke says in his official report:—
"The stormers and pioneers rushed on, and under a most galling fire cut away and made openings in the enemy's abatis and chevaux de frise. They, now closely followed by the assaulting columns, which, undeterred by an exceedingly severe fire of cannon, mortar, and musketry from the now aroused main line, pressed gallantly on, capturing the enemy's works in their front. Colonel Harriman's column, reinforced by the two reserve regiments, swept up to the right until the whole of what was called by the enemy 'Miller's salient' was in our possession. Potter's column swept down to the left. This part of the enemy's line was heavily traversed, affording him a strong foothold, and he fought from traverse to traverse with great tenacity. We drove him slowly back for about a quarter of a mile, when, being reinforced and aided by strong positions in the rear, he checked our further progress in that direction. A most gallant, but unsuccessful, attempt was made to carry his rear line. The captured guns were at once turned upon the enemy, served at first by Infantry volunteers, and then by details from the First Connecticut Heavy Artillery volunteers from the batteries in the rear.
"Just after we broke through the enemy's lines, and at a most critical time, I was deprived of the valuable services of Brevet Major-General Potter, who was severely and dangerously wounded. I directed Brigadier-General S. G. Griffin to assume command of his division, and by him the division was ably and gallantly commanded during the rest of the day. It being by this time fully daylight, no further attempt was made to advance; but attention was turned to securing what we had gained, and restoring the organization of the troops, unavoidably much shattered by the heavy fighting and the advance over broken ground in the darkness.
"This was rendered the more difficult by the great loss we had sustained in officers, especially field officers, and by the very exposed position occupied by our troops. The captured line was promptly recovered, and made tenable as possible, the difficulty being increased by the forts and batteries on that line being open in the rear.
"By reason of these untoward circumstances much time elapsed before I considered the troops in sufficiently good shape for another forward movement, and in the meantime I received, at 7.30 A.M., the following despatch:—