But the way to a sincere and logical system is not easy. Popular sentiment seems to favor the status quo. For the first time in the history of this country, Governor Cox of Ohio in 1913 persuaded the legislature to establish a unified plan of organization for local assessment. Inasmuch as taxation is the prerogative of the state government, he proposed a system of tax assessment which would have made this idea an actual as well as a legal fact. The law would have abolished the locally elected assessor in the counties. Full control would have been placed in the hands of the state government, since the Governor would appoint the local officials. There would probably, in the nature of things, have been an end to log-rolling and to competition between the counties to “beat” the state. The law was passed, but it was so unpopular that Governor Cox’s opponent in the succeeding election used it for political capital. One of the earliest and proudest achievements of his administration was the repeal of this law.
And so our old friend the “average citizen” finds it often acceptable to have a county government that is not built in strict conformance with logic. It is a complicated mechanism to be sure, but what matter, if he can employ a chauffeur to run it? To meet just such specific demands as this the professional politician and his illogical system have arisen and continue to exist.
CHAPTER XII
STATE MEDDLING
Now the other side of the story.
While the county nonchalantly and with seeming impunity has been breaking all the inconvenient statutes, the state in its own peculiar way has been working out a method of “taking it out” of the county for the indignities of nullification. The state’s “big stick” (which it does not always employ to a public purpose) is a policy of meddlesomeness which expresses itself through special legislation. Of which, more herewith.
In times gone by, when counties were almost universally located in the open country, and before the rush for the cities had set apart centers of population which developed their special mechanism of local government, it was doubtless appropriate that constitutions should impose upon legislature the duty to legislate “uniformly” for all counties, even to the point of anticipating some of their more detailed needs.
Practically every state legislature was given a considerable, if not complete, power to bend the county to its will in every particular of government. In the logic of the law, the county was a subdivision of the state before it was an organ of strictly local government. The legislature might erect new counties or change boundary lines at will, with the one limitation in some states that its decision is subject to a local referendum. It might also erect new county offices in addition to those mentioned in the constitution and fix their powers and duties. Long ago it became the accepted principle of law that local authorities might exercise only such powers as were specifically conferred upon them.
The theory was, apparently, that since counties exist to execute the will of the whole state and have the same general duties to perform, all counties can and must perform them in the same manner. It is a plausible theory. If a county is to administer justice it needs a judge, a sheriff, a prosecutor and a court clerk. And each of these officers in the several counties should follow as closely as possible an identical or similar procedure. Every county must have a fiscal agency, a governing board, and be required to observe certain minimum standards in the handling of the funds entrusted to its care.
Uniformity up to this point is doubtless not burdensome but helpful. But by carrying a good idea too far the legislatures have often gone beyond the point of setting up a general organization and procedure and have descended into minor details which would usually best be determined in the light of the more perfect knowledge of local conditions which the people of the locality may be expected to possess.