[12] See the Preface to Butler’s Sermons on Human Nature.
[13] The phrase is Butler’s.
[14] See the [last paragraph] of chap. iii. of this Book.
[15] See chap. [ix.] of this Book, and Book iii. chap. [xiv.]
[16] For a full discussion of this question, see Book ii. chap. [v.] and the concluding [chapter] of the work.
[17] Bentham, Memoirs (vol. x. of Bowring’s edition), p. 560.
[18] Bentham again, Memoirs, p. 79. See [note] at the end of Book i. chap. vi. The Utilitarians since Bentham have sometimes adopted one, sometimes the other, of these two principles as paramount.
[19] I use the terms ‘Excellence’ and ‘Perfection’ to denote the same ultimate end regarded in somewhat different aspects: meaning by either an ideal complex of mental qualities, of which we admire and approve the manifestation in human life: but using ‘Perfection’ to denote the ideal as such, while ‘Excellence’ denotes such partial realisation of or approximation to the ideal as we actually find in human experience.
[20] It may be said that even more divergent views of the reasonable end are possible here than in the case of happiness: for we are not necessarily limited (as in that case) to the consideration of sentient beings: inanimate things also seem to have a perfection and excellence of their own and to be capable of being made better or worse in their kind; and this perfection, or one species of it, appears to be the end of the Fine Arts. But reflection I think shows that neither beauty nor any other quality of inanimate objects can be regarded as good or desirable in itself, out of relation to the perfection or happiness of sentient beings. Cf. post, chap. [ix.] of this Book.
[21] Kant roundly denies that it can be my duty to take the Perfection of others for my end: but his argument is not, I think, valid. Cf. post, Book iii. chap. iv. § [1].