[32] In Chemistry we regard the antecedents (elements) as still existing in and constituting the consequent (compound) because the latter is exactly similar to the former in weight, and because we can generally cause this compound to disappear and obtain the elements in its place. But we find nothing at all like this in the growth of mental phenomena: the psychical consequent is in no respect exactly similar to its antecedents, nor can it be resolved into them. I should explain that I am not here arguing the question whether the validity of moral judgments is affected by a discovery of their psychical antecedents. This question I reserve for subsequent discussion. See Book iii. chap. i. § [4].
[33] I do not even imply that any combination of individuals could completely realise the state of political relations which I conceive ‘ought to’ exist. My conception would be futile if it had no relation to practice: but it may merely delineate a pattern to which no more than an approximation is practically possible.
[34] We do not commonly say that particular physical facts are apprehended by the Reason: we consider this faculty to be conversant in its discursive operation with the relation of judgments or propositions: and the intuitive reason (which is here rather in question) we restrict to the apprehension of universal truths, such as the axioms of Logic and Mathematics.
[35] By cognition I always mean what some would rather call “apparent cognition”—that is, I do not mean to affirm the validity of the cognition, but only its existence as a psychical fact, and its claim to be valid.
[36] A further justification for this extended use of the term Reason will be suggested in a subsequent chapter of this Book (chap. viii. § [3]).
[37] This is the sense in which the term will always be used in the present treatise, except where the context makes it quite clear that only the wider meaning—that of the political ‘ought’—is applicable.
[38] As will be seen from the next chapter, I do not grant this.
[39] Chap. [ix.] of this Book.
[40] The relation of the æsthetic to the moral ideal of conduct will be discussed in a subsequent chapter ([ix.]) of this Book.
[41] I here, as in chap. [i.], adopt the exact hedonistic interpretation of ‘happiness’ which Bentham has made current. This seems to me the most suitable use of the term; but I afterwards (Book i. chap. vii. § [1]) take note of other uses.