[106] Ibid. Book iii. chap. i. § 8.
[107] It was before observed that by saying that one pleasure is superior in quality to another we may mean that it is preferable when considered merely as pleasant: in which case difference in kind resolves itself into difference in degree.
[108] See chap. [v.] of this Book, chap. [xiv.] of Book iii., and the concluding chapter of the treatise.
[109] See Green’s Introduction to vol. ii. of Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, § 7. The statement is substantially repeated in the same writer’s Prolegomena to Ethics.
[110] Prolegomena to Ethics, § 158.
[111] E.g. Butler, Sermon xi. says, “Every man hath a desire for his own happiness ... the object [desired] is our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction.”
[112] Introduction to Hume, l.c.
[113] Prolegomena to Ethics, § 221.
[114] Ibid. § 359.
[115] This Green in several passages seems expressly to admit e.g. (§ 332) he says that certain measures “needed in order to supply conditions favourable to good character, tend also to make life more pleasant on the whole”: and, elsewhere, that “it is easy to show that an overbalance of pain would result to those capable of being affected by it” from the neglect of certain duties.