The equality of free institutions was never more aptly illustrated than by a scene which occurred in a courthouse we used to frequent, in boyhood, in order to hear the impassioned rhetoric of a gifted criminal lawyer. A trial of peculiar interest was to come on; the room was crowded with spectators and officials; the judge, a venerable specimen of the stern and dignified magistrate, took his seat; the sheriff announced the opening of the court, and the clerk called over the names of those summoned to act as jurors. We were startled to hear, among those of grocers, draymen, and mechanics, the well-known name of an aristocratic millionaire. It was thrice repeated, and no answer given. ‘Has that juror been duly summoned?’ inquired the judge. ‘Yes, your honour,’ was the reply. ‘Let two constables instantly bring him before us,’ said the magistrate. One can imagine the vexation of the rich gentleman of leisure, when dawdling, in a flowered robe de chambre, over his sumptuous breakfast, to be disturbed by those rude minions of the law; however, there was no alternative, and he was obliged to despatch his meal and accompany the distasteful escort. He entered the court, where a deep silence prevailed, with a supercilious smile and complacent air of well-bred annoyance. ‘How dare you keep the court waiting, sir?’ was the indignant salutation of the judge, who, perhaps, when last in the gentleman’s company, had sipped a glass delectable of old Madeira to his health. ‘I intended to pay my fine and not serve,’ stammered the millionaire. ‘And do you suppose, sir, that wealth exonerates you from the duties of a citizen, and is any apology for your gross incivility in thus detaining the court for over an hour? No excuse will be accepted; either take your seat in the jury-box or stand committed.’ Through the silent crowd the luxurious man of fortune threaded his way, and sat down between a currier and wood-merchant, with whom he had to listen to the law and the evidence for a fortnight.
The author of the Lives of the English Chancellors refers to the usual explanation of the origin of the term ‘wool-sack,’ as intended in compliment to the staple product of the realm; and adds his own belief that, in ‘the rude simplicity of early times, a sack of wool was frequently used as a sofa.’ In the colonial era of our history, when ceremony and etiquette ruled the public hall as well as the private drawing-room, American judges wore the robe and wig still used in the Old Country. These insignia of authority inspired an awe, before the era of legal reform and of philosophical jurisprudence, which comported with the tyrannous exercise of juridical power, when it was little more than the medium of despotism, and when the calm reproach of Stafford was a literal truth: ‘It is better to be without laws altogether, than to persuade ourselves that we have laws by which to regulate our conduct, and to find that they consist only in the enmity and arbitrary will of our accusers.’
The Conveyancer, Writer to the Signet, Attorney, Barrister, and other divisions of the legal profession, indicate how, in this, as in other vocations, the division of labour operates in England; while on this side of the water, the contrary principle not only assigns to the lawyer a degree of knowledge and aptitude in each branch of his calling, but lays him under contribution in every political and social exigency, as an interpreter or advocate of public sentiment; hence his remarkable versatility and comparatively superficial attainments. In the history of English law, the early struggles and profound acquirements of her disciples form the salient points; while in that of America, they are to be found rather in the primitive resources of justice and the varied career of her ministers. With regard to the former, our many racy descriptions of the process of Western colonization abound in remarkable anecdotes of the unlicensed administration of justice. After the Pioneer comes the Ranger, a kind of border police, then the Regulator, and finally the Justice of the Peace. In the primitive communities, when a flagrant wrong is committed, a public meeting is called, perhaps under an oak-clump, or in a green hollow, the oldest settler is invited to the chair, which is probably the trunk of a fallen tree; the offence is discussed; the offender identified; volunteers scour the woods, he is arraigned, and, if found guilty, hung, banished, or reprimanded, as the case may be, with a despatch which is not less remarkable than the fair hearing he is allowed, and the cool decision with which he is condemned.
There is a peculiar kind of impudence exhibited by the lawyer—it is sometimes called ‘badgering a witness,’—and consists essentially of a mean abuse of that power which is legally vested in judge and advocate, whereby they can, at pleasure, insult and torment each other, and all exposed to their queries, with impunity. It is easy to imagine the relish with which unprofessional victims behold the mutual exercise of this legal tyranny. A venerable Justice, in one of our cities, was remarkable for the frequent reproofs he administered to young practitioners in his court, and the formal harangues with which he wore out the patience of those so unfortunate as to give testimony in his presence. On one occasion, it happened that he was summoned as a witness, in a case to be defended by one of the juvenile members of the bar, whom he had often called to order with needless severity. This hopeful limb of the law was gifted with more than a common share of the cool assurance so requisite in the profession, and determined to improve the opportunity, to make his ‘learned friend’ of the bench feel the sting he had so often inflicted. Accordingly, when his Honour took the stand, the counsel gravely inquired his name, occupation, place of residence, and sundry other facts of his personal history—though all were as familiar to himself and every one present as the old church, or main street of their native town. The queries were put in a voice and with a manner so exactly imitated from that of the judge himself, as to convulse the audience with laughter; every unnecessary word the hampered witness used was reprimanded as ‘beyond the question;’ he was continually adjured to ‘tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;’ his expressions were captiously objected to; he was tantalized with repetitions and cross-questioning about the veriest trifles; and, finally, his tormentor, with a face of the utmost gravity, pretended to discover in the witness a levity of bearing, and equivocal replies, which called for a lecture on ‘the responsibility of an oath;’ this was delivered with a pedantic solemnity, in words, accent, and gesture so like one of his own addresses from the bench, that judge, jury, and spectators burst forth into irresistible peals of laughter; and the subject of this clever retaliation lost all self-possession, grew red and pale by turns, fumed, and at last protested, until his young adversary wound up the farce by a threat to commit him for contempt of court.
When Chief Justice Coleridge retired from the bench, his farewell address deeply affected the members of the bar present: ‘These are not your severest trials,’ said he, referring to the more familiar difficulties of the profession; ‘they are those which are most insidious; which beset you in the ordinary path of your daily duty; those which spring from the excitement of contest, from the love of intellectual display, and even from an exaggerated sense of duty to your clients. Gentlemen—especially my younger friends,—suffer me, without offence, to put you on your guard against these. We can well afford to bear traditional pleasantries upon us from without, but we cannot afford that, underlying these, there should exist among thoughtful persons a feeling that our professional standard of honour is questionable—that we, as advocates, will say and do in court what we, as gentlemen, would scorn to do in the common walks of life. Sometimes, I confess, it seems to me that we lend support to such a feeling by the lightness with which we impute ungenerous conduct or practices to each other. Surely no case is so sacred, no client so dear, that ever an advocate should be called upon to barter his own self-respect. If that be our duty, our great and glorious profession is no calling for a gentleman.’
The relation of law to poetry is proverbially antagonistic; and the attempt to bind imagination to technicalities has usually proved a hopeless experiment; and yet it is curious to note how many of the brotherhood of song were originally destined for this profession, and how similar their confessions are, of a struggle, a compromise, and, finally, an abandonment of jurisprudence for the sake of the Muses. Ovid, Petrarch, Tasso, Milton, Cowper, Ariosto, and others, are examples; Scott was faithful awhile to a branch of the law; Blackstone’s only known poem is a Farewell to the Muse; Marshall and Story wooed the Nine, in their youth; Talfourd deemed it requisite to declare, in the preface to Ion, that he ‘left no duty for this idle trade,’ and Proctor only weaves a song in the intervals of his stern task as a Commissioner of Lunacy. With philosophy the law is more congenial: Bacon and Mackintosh are illustrious examples of their united pursuit. Sir Thomas More wrote verses on the wall of his prison with a coal, and Addison compliments Somers on his poetry in his dedication of the Campaign. Lord Mansfield’s name appears in history a successful competitor for the Oxford prize poem. Lyndhurst and Denham were given to rhyme, and Sir William Jones is popularly known by his nervous lines on What constitutes a State? Lord Jeffrey is one of the most characteristic modern examples of the union of legal and literary success,—his taste of the latter kind having, with the aid of a felicitous style, made him the most famous reviewer of his day, while the mental traits of the advocate unfitted him to appreciate the ideal, as they rendered him expert and brilliant in the discussion of rhetoric, facts, and philosophy.
Its connection with the most adventurous and tragic realities of life often brings law into the sphere of the dramatic and imaginative. Popular fiction has found in its annals all the material for profound human interest and artistic effect. Scott’s most pathetic tale, the Heart of Mid-Lothian, Ten Thousand a Year, and Bleak House, are memorable examples. The trials of Russell, Strafford, Vane, and other noble prisoners charged with high treason, have furnished both plot and incidents for popular novelists. Uriah Heep, Oily Gammon, and Gilbert Glossin, are familiar types of legal villany. Thackeray’s best work, artistically speaking—Henry Esmond—is largely indebted to the State Trials of Queen Anne’s time for its material. Have you ever seen Portia enacted by a woman of genius? Then has the romance of law been impersonated for ever to your mind. That demoniac plaintiff, so memorably represented by Kean, with his haunting expression and voice,—the noble wife of Bassanio, uttering, in tones of musical entreaty, her immortal plea for Mercy, and, when it failed to touch the Jew’s heart of adamant, cleaving his hope of vengeance by a subtle evasion,—the joy of Antonio, the fiat of the judge, the merry reunion and gay bridal talk at Belmont that night, whose moonlit gladness lives for ever in the page of Shakspeare,—Queen Katherine’s defence, and Othello’s argument before their judges, equally show how effective is a tribunal under the hand of the poet of Nature; and every barrister of long experience can relate episodes in his career ‘stranger than fiction.’
Although one would naturally turn to the State Trials, Causes Célèbres, Memoirs of Vidocq, and similar works, for the dramatic materials developed by process of law, yet, to the initiated, there is an equal fund of interest in those researches of the profession which appear to deal only with technicalities. How many effective situations have playwrights, and such observers of human nature as Hogarth, drawn from, or grouped around the formal act of making or reading a Will! There is positive romance in the task of the Conveyancer, when he traces the title of an estate far back through the ramifications of family history, often bringing to light the most curious historical facts and remarkable personal incidents. Questions of property, of heirship, of fraud, and of divorce, involve manifold relative facts, that only require the sequence and arrangement of literary art, to make them dramas. Perhaps no field of character has yielded types as memorable to the writers of modern fiction as that of the Law. Think of Balzac’s diagnosis of the French statutes regulating burial and marriage settlements, in his psychological Tales; of Brass, Tulkinghorn, and Peyton. Libel cases vie with police reports in unveiling the tragedy and comedy of life. That a trial involves scope for the broadest humour, or the most facetious invention, is evident from the Moot Court having become a permanent form of public entertainment in London.
No profession affords better opportunities for the study of human nature; indeed, an acute insight of motives is a prerequisite of success; but unfortunately it is the dark side of character, the selfish instincts, that are most frequently displayed in litigation, and hence the exclusive recognition of these which many a practised lawyer manifests. In its ideal phase, among the noblest—in its possible actuality, among the lowest—of human pursuits, we can scarcely wonder that popular sentiment and literature exhibit such apparently irreconcilable estimates of its value and tendencies. English lawyers of the first class are scholars and gentlemen. Classical knowledge and familiarity with standard modern literature are indispensable to their equipment; and such attainments are usually conducive to a humane and refined character. In the programme suggested by eminent lawyers for a general training for the Bar, there is, however, an amusing diversity of opinion as to the best literary culture; one writer recommends the Bible, another Shakspeare, one English history, and another Joe Miller, as the best resource for apt quotation and discipline in the art of efficient rhetoric. Coke was remarkable for his citations from Virgil. But there is no doubt that general knowledge is an essential advantage to the lawyer, if he understand the rare art of using it with tact. The mere fact that the highest political distinction and official duty are open to the lawyer, ought to incline him to liberal studies and comprehensive acquaintance with literature, science, and philosophy.
How distinctly in social life the phases of the legal mind have become, is evident from such allusion as that of a Quarterly Reviewer, who, in a political discussion, remarks that ‘Mr. Percival was only a poorish nisi prius lawyer, and there is no kind of human being so disagreeable to the gross Tory nation;’ while De Quincey, with that philosophic benignity which sometimes inspires his weird pen, observes that ‘he had often thought that the influence of a portion of the acrid humours, which seem an element in the human mental constitution, being drained off, as it were, in forensic disputation, raised the lawyer above the average of mankind, in the qualities that give enjoyment to society.’