[583] It has been suggested to me by an able friend, that there is a class of persons who will misunderstand this expression; and that there is another class who, without misunderstanding it, will intentionally misrepresent its meaning. Hence, it may be well to state distinctly what I wish to convey by the word ‘scepticism.’ By scepticism I merely mean hardness of belief; so that an increased scepticism is an increased perception of the difficulty of proving assertions; or, in other words, it is an increased application, and an increased diffusion, of the rules of reasoning, and of the laws of evidence. This feeling of hesitation and of suspended judgment has, in every department of thought, been the invariable preliminary to all the intellectual revolutions through which the human mind has passed; and without it, there could be no progress, no change, no civilization. In physics, it is the necessary precursor of science; in politics, of liberty; in theology, of toleration. These are the three leading forms of scepticism; it is, therefore, clear, that in religion the sceptic steers a middle course between atheism and orthodoxy, rejecting both extremes, because he sees that both are incapable of proof.
[584] What a learned historian has said of the effect which the method of Socrates produced on a very few Greek minds, is applicable to that state through which a great part of Europe is now passing: ‘The Socratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced an immediate effect, like the touch of the torpedo. The newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected, painful, and humiliating,—a season of doubt and discomfort, yet combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Socrates not merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable condition of future progress.’ Grote's Hist. of Greece, vol. viii. pp. 614, 615, 8vo, 1851. Compare Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kant's Werke, vol. ii. pp. 572, 577. ‘So ist der Skeptizismus ein Ruheplatz für die menschliche Vernunft, da sie sich über ihre dogmatische Wanderung besinnen und den Entwurf von der Gegend machen kann, wo sie sich befindet, um ihren Weg fernerhin mit mehrerer Sicherheit wählen zu können, aber nicht ein Wohnplatz zum beständigen Aufenthalte…. So ist das skeptische Verfahren zwar an sich selbst für die Vernunftfragen nicht befriedigend, aber doch vorübend, um ihre Vorsichtigkeit zu erwecken und auf gründliche Mittel zu weisen, die sie in ihren rechtmässigen Besitzen sichern können.’
[585] Dr. Arnold, whose keen eye noted this change, says (Lectures on Modern History, p. 232), ‘What strikes us predominantly, is, that what, in Elizabeth's time, was a controversy between divines, was now a great political contest between the crown and the parliament.’ The ordinary compilers, such as Sir A. Alison (Hist. of Europe, vol. i. p. 51), and others, have entirely misrepresented this movement; an error the more singular, because the eminently political character of the struggle was recognized by several contemporaries. Even Cromwell, notwithstanding the difficult game he had to play, distinctly stated, in 1655, that the origin of the war was not religious. See Carlyle's Cromwell, vol. iii. p. 103; and corroborative evidence in Walker's History of Independency, part i. p. 132. James I. also saw that the Puritans were more dangerous to the state than to the church: ‘do not so far differ from us in points of religion, as in their confused form of policy and parity; being ever discontented with the present government, and impatient to suffer any superiority; which maketh their sects insufferable in any well-governed commonwealth.’ Speech of James I., in Parl. Hist. vol. i. p. 982. See also the observations ascribed to De Foe, in Somers Tracts, vol. ix. p. 572: ‘The king and parliament fell out about matters of civil right; … the first difference between the king and the English parliament did not respect religion, but civil property.’
[586] See Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion, p. 716. Sir W. Temple, in his Memoirs, observes, that the throne of Charles II. was strengthened by ‘what had passed in the last reign.’ Temple's Works, vol. ii. p. 344. This may be illustrated by the remarks of M. Lamartine on the execution of Louis XVI. Hist. des Girondins, vol. v. pp. 86–7: ‘Sa mort, au contraire, aliénait de la cause française cette partie immense des populations qui ne juge les événements humains que par le cœur. La nature humaine est pathétique; la république l'oublia, elle donna à la royauté quelque chose du martyre, à la liberté quelque chose de la vengeance. Elle prépara ainsi une réaction contre la cause républicaine, et mit du côté de la royauté la sensibilité, l'intérêt, les larmes d'une partie des peuples.’
[587] The energy with which the House of Commons, in 1646, repelled the pretensions of ‘the Assembly of Divines,’ is one of many proofs of the determination of the predominant party not to allow ecclesiastical encroachments. See the remarkable details in Parl. Hist. vol. iii. pp. 459–463; see also p. 1305. As a natural consequence, the Independents were the first sect which, when possessed of power, advocated toleration. Compare Orme's Life of Owen, pp. 63–75, 102–111; Somers Tracts, vol. xii. p. 542; Walker's Hist. of Independency, part ii. pp. 50, 157, part iii. p. 22; Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion, pp. 610, 640. Some writers ascribe great merit to Jeremy Taylor for his advocacy of toleration (Heber's Life of Taylor, p. xxvii.; and Parr's Works, vol. iv. p. 417); but the truth is that when he wrote the famous Liberty of Prophesying, his enemies were in power; so that he was pleading for his own interests. When, however, the Church of England again obtained the upper hand, Taylor withdrew the concessions which he had made in the season of adversity. See the indignant remarks of Coleridge (Lit. Remains, vol. iii. p. 250), who, though a great admirer of Taylor, expresses himself strongly on this dereliction: see also a recently published Letter to Percy, Bishop of Dromore, in Nichols's Illustrations of Lit. History, vol. vii. p. 464.
[588] However, Bishop Short (History of the Church of England, 8vo, 1847, pp. 452, 458) says, what is undoubtedly true, that the hostility of Cromwell to the church was not theological, but political. The same remark is made by Bishop Kennet. Note in Burton's Diary, vol. ii. p. 479. See also Vaughan's Cromwell, vol. i. p. xcvii.; and on the generally tolerant spirit of this great man, see Hallam's Const. Hist. vol. ii. p. 14; and the evidence in Harris's Lives of the Stuarts, vol. iii. pp. 37–47. But the most distinct recognition of the principle, is in a Letter from Cromwell to Major-General Crawford, recently printed in Carlyle's Cromwell, vol. i. pp. 201, 202, 8vo, 1846. In it Cromwell writes, ‘Sir, the state, in choosing men to serve it, takes no notice of their opinions; if they be willing faithfully to serve it—that satisfies.’ See additional proof in Carwithen's Hist. of the Church of Engl. vol. ii. pp. 245, 249.
[589] No one can understand the real history of the Puritans, who does not take this into consideration. In the present Introduction, it is impossible to discuss so large a subject; and I must reserve it for the future part of this work, in which the history of England will be specially treated. In the mean time, I may mention, that the distinction between fanaticism and superstition is clearly indicated, but not analyzed, by Archbishop Whately, in his Errors of Romanism traced to their Origin in Human Nature, p. 49. This should be compared with Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. iii. pp. 81–89, Edinb. 1826, on the difference between enthusiasm and superstition; a difference which is noticed, but, as it appears to me, misunderstood, by Maclaine, in his Additions to Mosheim's Ecclesiast. Hist. vol. ii. p. 38.
[590] Compare Barrington's Observations on the Statutes, p. 143, with Burton's Diary of the Parliaments of Cromwell, vol. i. pp. xcviii. 145, 392, vol. ii. pp. 35, 229. In 1650, a second conviction of fornication was made felony, without benefit of clergy; but, after the Restoration, Charles II. and his friends found this law rather inconvenient; so it was repealed. See Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. iv. p. 65.
[591] See Life of Ken, by a Layman, edit. 1854, vol. i. p. 51. At p. 129, the same writer says, with sorrow, ‘The church recovered much of her temporal possessions, but not her spiritual rule.’ The power of the bishops was abridged ‘by the destruction of the court of high-commission.’ Short's Hist. of the Church of England, p. 595. See also, on the diminished influence of the Church-of-England clergy after the Restoration, Southey's Life of Wesley, vol. i. pp. 278, 279; and Watson's Observations on the Life of Wesley, pp. 129–131.
[592] Buckingham and Halifax, the two men who were perhaps best acquainted with Charles II., both declared that he was a deist. Compare Lingard's Hist. of Engl. vol. viii. p. 127, with Harris's Lives of the Stuarts, vol. v. p. 55. His subsequent conversion to Catholicism is exactly analogous to the increased devotion of Louis XIV. during the later years of his life. In both cases, superstition was the natural refuge of a worn-out and discontented libertine, who had exhausted all the resources of the lowest and most grovelling pleasures.