[649] ‘Our continual observations upon the conduct of others, insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to be done or to be avoided.’ … ‘It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed by finding from experience that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved of or disapproved of.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 219, 220. At p. 153: ‘We either approve or disapprove of our own conduct according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it.’
[650] ‘Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty and deformity of his own face.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 154. ‘Our first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people.’ p. 156.
[651] ‘As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 2.
[652] ‘That imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is founded, is but momentary.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 21. Compare vol. ii. p. 206.
[653] ‘I will venture to affirm that, when there is no envy in the case, our propensity to sympathize with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathize with sorrow.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 58. ‘It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty.’ p. 65.
[654] ‘Upon this disposition of mankind to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good will.’ Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 69. See also vol. ii. p. 72.
[655] See the striking remarks in Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. p. 70–72.
[656] Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 23 seq.
[657] Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. ii. pp. 131–244. This sketch of the different systems of philosophy is perhaps the ablest part of the book, notwithstanding two or three errors which it contains.
[658] Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, vol. i. pp. 89, 92, 115, 116. The utmost which he will concede to the notion of social convenience, is that ‘we frequently have occasion to confirm our natural sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how necessary it is for preserving the order of society.’ p. 122.