Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by Mr. Churchill to act on “his independent and separate judgment,” and not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on the pre-arranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might injure our prestige in the Near East; and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he regarded as an order. “The order was to carry out a certain operation,” he said, “or try to do it, and we had to do the best we could.” If the ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807.[72] In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the mine-fields after silencing the forts.
Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable—no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively. The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships—Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon—which poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the Triumph and Prince George bombarded Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula. This bombardment lasted from about 11 a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both shores. At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability to manœuvre in such narrow waters, thus presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy’s guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy’s forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of them, at all events, had been destroyed.
THE MAIN NAVAL ACTION
Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six British ships (Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic, and Albion), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through the Narrows, so as to ensure a clear passage for the greater ships which made the first attack. At the same time the four French ships, together with the Triumph and Prince George, were ordered to withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this manœuvre, all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells. Most of the ships suffered, and as the Bouvet moved down channel with her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a mine drifting down the current. In two or three minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream, sounded over the strait.
At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o’clock the Irresistible drew away with a heavy list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained afloat for nearly two hours, and nearly all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves, since they offered a crowded target. A quarter of an hour after she sank, the Ocean was struck in a similar manner (6.5 p.m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shell. The Inflexible and Gaulois suffered especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of the waters, which brought the ships within range of howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right across the channel in successive rows. The mines of the second row were opposite the intervals in the first, and so on, until the passage was covered as with a net, each row containing twenty-six mines. Whether shore-torpedoes were also used is still uncertain. But, without them, the fleet suffered under sufficient disadvantages to explain the failure. The first serious attempt to force the Straits was the last.[73]
Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. After all, the loss of even three battleships is far surpassed by the loss of lives and calculable wealth in one day’s ordinary fighting in France, and the objective in the Dardanelles was at least as vital.[74] Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson agreed that the action should be continued, and the London and Prince of Wales, in addition to the Queen and Implacable, were actually sent to reinforce. The French also sent an old battleship (the Henri IV.) to replace the Bouvet. At first Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said:
“If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks’ time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns.”[75]
PURELY NAVAL ACTION ABANDONED
That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. On March 22 Admiral de Robeck and Admiral Wemyss consulted with Sir Ian Hamilton (who on the very day before the engagement had arrived at Tenedos to take command of the land forces) and with General Birdwood; and as their decision to await the concentration of the army was accepted by Lord Fisher and the other Admiralty advisers, Mr. Churchill reluctantly yielded. General Birdwood, it is true, wished to land at once, even with such troops as were at hand. Sir Ian “thought there was a good deal to be said for it,” and as to the fleet, he urged the Admiral to keep on hammering the forts. But his orders from Lord Kitchener were “not to land if he could avoid it,” and in any case to await the arrival of the 29th Division.[76]
And where was the 29th Division? On March 23 its first transport was just reaching Malta, where nearly all the officers attended a special performance of Faust.[77]