The Dardanelles campaign

by Henry Woodd Nevinson

SHORTAGE OF ARTILLERY

It was not long before one of the newly arrived brigades was called into action. The artillery, even with French help, was now insufficient for another general advance. The shells were running out; few H.E. shells were left; the howitzers numbered eight, or two to a division (four others which arrived later had seen service at Omdurman in 1898); whereas, even at the beginning of the war, eighteen howitzers went to each division in France. Among the field-guns were batteries of old 15-pounders, which had established their futility in the Boer War (one Vickers gun was reported to have come from a well-known museum); but such things were thought good enough for the Dardanelles. Except the 29th and the Anzacs, the Divisions had no other field-guns, and the R.N.D. had no guns at all. It was, therefore, essential to limit the thrust, and General Hunter-Weston formed a scheme for pushing forward on the left, so as to clear the obstacles which had hitherto checked our advance along the coast, and to reduce the salient in the centre, as the French had reduced it by seizing the “Haricot.” While the centre remained steady about a mile from the sea, the left was to swing forward upon it as upon a pivot, covering less ground as the pivotal point was approached. Thus five Turkish lines had to be captured by the 29th Division on the extreme left, and two by the 156th Brigade (52nd Division), which had been inserted on their right.

THE GULLY RAVINE

The battle began on June 28 with a severe but brief bombardment, limited to the Turkish trenches on our front nearest the coast. The batteries were assisted from the sea by the light cruiser Talbot (5600 tons, 1896) and the destroyers Wolverine and Scorpion, which were able to enfilade such positions as remained visible. But, for want of ammunition, the land bombardment was limited in extent, and lasted only twenty minutes. The 87th Brigade (Major-General W. R. Marshall),[132] supplied with the new drafts which had been gradually coming in, at once advanced on both sides of the Gully Ravine (Saghir Dere). Their part in the attack was to clear a further lap of this long and deep ravine or cañon, which forms one of the most surprising features of the southern Peninsula. Advance along the bottom was impossible. Near the entrance from the sea the cliffs on both sides rise 200 feet. The slope upwards along the Gully is very gradual, and the sides nearly up to the very end remain steep, in parts bare sandy cliff, in parts covered with bush. The ravine curves frequently, twice turning for a short distance almost at right angles. Here and there, along the middle and upper reaches, the bottom was dangerously exposed to snipers creeping down and hiding among the bushes. Up to the last, even after it became the main line of communication with our positions on the left, it was constantly shelled, and beyond a point about two-thirds up its length no horses were allowed to proceed. In spite of screens and sandbag barriers, shrapnel and unaimed or dropping rifle-fire frequently inflicted loss upon the drafts, reliefs, and supply parties continually passing to and fro. There was the greater danger because, under the stress of thirst and extreme heat, men and animals gathered round the water which was in places discovered, especially at one clear and cold spring rising from the foot of a precipitous cliff upon the right. About half-way up, the Turks had barred the valley with a complicated entanglement reaching from side to side, and other entanglements existed farther on. The only possibility of clearing such a ravine was to clear the rough and bush-covered plateau on both sides.

Upon the left, after the brief bombardment, three battalions of the 87th Brigade (South Wales Borderers, K.O.S.B., and Inniskilling Fusiliers) advanced along the strip of land between the sea and the ravine, already the scene of gallantry and loss. By eleven o’clock, forty minutes after the opening of the gun-fire, they had rushed the first three trenches. They were at once followed by the 86th Brigade, which pushed right through them, over the three captured trenches. Led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, and keeping their formations in spite of the scrub and a searching rifle-fire, this renowned Fusilier Brigade stormed onward till two more trenches were taken, and the task of the 29th Division completed. At the same time, the Gurkhas had worked forward along the edge of the sea cliffs, and secured a green knoll projecting from the end of a spur which marked our farthest advance. A few nights after (July 2), the Gurkhas were driven out here, but the position was retaken by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, though with great loss, only two officers being left. On the seacoast west of the ravine our objective was gained, and in honour of the achievement the extreme point won was always known as Fusilier Bluff.

On the right of the Gully the remaining battalion of the 87th Brigade (1st Borderers) within five minutes stormed a redoubt overhanging the ravine, and called the Boomerang from its curved shape. Advancing rapidly, they next carried a stronger redoubt, known as the Turkey Trot, perhaps from the speed of the enemy in abandoning it, though the trenches right up to the redoubt remained in Turkish possession, separated by a sandbag wall. These rapid successes were mainly due to two trench-mortars, lent by General Gouraud and dropping bombs containing some 30 lb., some 70 lb., of melinite, vertically into the trenches at short range. The British force at this time possessed a few Japanese trench-mortars—very effective, but numbering only six, and these short of ammunition. We had no others of any kind. Yet, in the scarcity of howitzers, trench-mortars were more needed than any gun. Our hand-grenades were improvised out of jam-pots.

To the right of the Borderers, the 156th Brigade of the newly arrived 52nd Division came into action for the first time. The 4th and 7th Royal Scots quickly gained the two trenches allotted to them, but the rest of the brigade (7th and 8th Scottish Rifles), owing to severe losses (22 officers and 509 men killed) could hardly advance, and an attempt upon the trenches in front of Krithia that afternoon also failed. Nevertheless, the morning’s work was a victory. It marked the most decisive advance upon the Peninsula hitherto. Three-quarters of a mile along the coast, and about half a mile up the Gully Ravine were won, and the Gully’s lower reaches and beach rendered more secure. Large quantities of stores and ammunition were taken, together with about 100 prisoners. The Gully was for some distance cleaned of the dangerous filth and rubbish characteristic of Turkish lines—the more dangerous owing to the unimaginable hosts of flies which now added to the discomfort of life on the Peninsula, and probably diffused the malignant type of diarrhœa with which almost every one was afflicted. Our casualties for the day were 1750, the Royal, Lancashire, and Dublin Fusiliers suffering most. The losses of the 156th Brigade included their Brigadier, General Scott-Moncrieff, who was killed on “Worcester Flat.”

JUNE 28 AT HELLES

The Turks lost more heavily, especially in their determined counter-attacks during the next few nights, when they attempted to recover the lost trenches by rushing upon them with bayonet and bombs, their supply of which was plentiful. All these attempts were vain, and the useless loss of life severe.[133] They seem to have been prompted by Enver Pasha, in opposition to his German advisers, and the Turkish troops were specially stimulated to the sacrifice by the following divisional order, discovered upon a wounded officer. The trenches referred to were the five captured by the 29th Division on June 28:

“There is nothing causes us more sorrow, increases the courage of the enemy, and encourages him to attack more freely, causing us great losses, than the losing of these trenches. Henceforth commanders who surrender trenches, from whatever side the attack may come, before the last man is killed, will be punished in the same manner as if they had run away. Especially will the commanders of units told off to guard a certain front be punished if, instead of thinking about their work, supporting their units, and giving information to the Higher Command, they only take action after a regrettable incident has occurred.