Europe Since 1918

by Herbert Adams Gibbons

In themselves the arguments were powerful. Holland could not have resisted a united demand of the Entente Powers to consent to the revision of the old Treaty of London in favor of Belgium. But, even with Germany eliminated from the problem, the motives that had actuated the treaty-makers of 1839 were still alive. British and French statesmen could not build for the future on the dangerous assumption that their countries were to remain forever friends. Maestricht was a barrier that worked both ways, while the North Sea policy of Great Britain dictated more than ever, now that submarines were in vogue, the advisability of keeping Antwerp bottled up. With the Dutch East Indies at the mercy of the British fleet, Great Britain had a powerful argument that could be always used to compel Holland to maintain the neutrality of the estuary of the Scheldt.

The Entente Powers, therefore, refused to consider any revision of the Treaty of 1839 detrimental to Holland as within the province of the treaty to be imposed upon Germany, but left the matter to direct negotiations between the two countries. This, of course, amounted to a refusal to consider the Belgian suggestions at all. The Franco-Belgian frontier was also left to the French and Belgians. The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was detached from the German customs union, of which it had been a member since 1842, and from the German railway control, which had been exercised since 1870. The political status of the duchy and its future economic connections were to be decided by a referendum to the Luxemburg electorate.

The fourteen so-called Walloon cantons of the Rhineland had become thoroughly Germanized during the nineteenth century. Possibly this fact in itself would not have deterred the Paris Conference from giving favorable consideration to Belgian claims. But the British, uncertain of the future affiliations of Belgium, did not want to undertake the burden of defending her against German irredentism, should she become their ally; and they did not want to make Belgium too powerful, should she become the ally of the French. The French, on the other hand, had their own program for the Rhineland. Belgium, therefore, was given only two of the fourteen cantons.

The Treaty of Versailles provided that Malmédy and Eupen should be occupied by Belgium, and that the Council of the League of Nations should decide the final disposition of these two border districts. The inhabitants were given a certain time in which to record on registers provided for that purpose their desire to remain with Germany. Few of them dared to risk this step, which would have meant confiscation of their homes and expulsion, although none of them wanted to become Belgians. This farcical scheme for preventing a plebiscite was successful. The council gravely decreed that Malmédy and Eupen, in view of the fact that no serious protestation was offered in the way provided for by the Treaty of Versailles, should be allotted to Belgium “by the will of the inhabitants”!

Aside from Malmédy and Eupen, Belgium gained the right to connect Antwerp with the Rhine by canal, and her war debts to the Allies were transferred to Germany’s account. In the reparations payment, a priority of two and a half billion gold marks was granted Belgium, representing the reimbursement of the extortions designated as war taxes that had been exacted by Germany during the four years of military occupation. The Belgians also received admirable help from the Entente Powers in getting back the machinery, railway rolling-stock, cattle, and other booty taken out of the country during the war.

Another great disappointment was the failure of the Peace Conference to recognize the right of Belgium to retain the territories conquered by her soldiers in German East Africa. Here President Wilson’s mandate idea was used to deny the Belgian claim. German East Africa was to be administered as a sacred trust for civilization by Great Britain. No African annexations were countenanced by the Treaty of Versailles. By dint of vigorous protest and the personal intervention of King Albert, Belgium secured a rectification of frontiers in the Kongo colony. But this was a matter of private negotiation with Great Britain and did not enter into the Peace Conference bargains.

The credit due to Belgium for having resisted the Germans in 1914 and for having carried on throughout the war, maintaining an army at the front despite all obstacles, was not denied by the Entente Powers, and they believed that they had done her full justice, within the limits of possibility during the Peace Conference and in the subsequent negotiations. Release from war debts, priority of reparations payments, and generous aid in getting back from Germany the loot of the war can be cited as tangible evidences of gratitude and good will. The failure to recognize the equality of Belgium in post-bellum councils rankled, however, and made it easy for politicians to turn the bitter experiences of the Peace Conference to their own benefit. Consequently we have seen in Belgium since the war the evolution of an unhappy foreign policy opposed to the political and economic interests of the country. This policy has jeopardized, almost nullified, the excellent results of the marvelous progress toward rehabilitation accomplished by the entire people in 1919 and 1920.

After the World War all the belligerents sorely needed peace, the small states even more than the great powers, and the countries that had suffered by enemy military occupation most of all. The Belgian Government had lived entirely on credit during an exile of four years. The normal revenues of the country had been appropriated by the enemy. The blockade had disorganized industry. Belgium’s foreign markets had been lost to the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The carrying and transit trade had become wholly disorganized. The country was flooded with German marks, and was partly looted; 40 per cent of its inhabitants were out of work. The years of German occupation had fostered the Flemish language movement, had increased trade-unionism 300 per cent, had introduced the impersonal element in production on a large scale, and had made the people profoundly unwilling to go back to an almost feudal régime in politics and in many of the leading industries.

If ever a country needed to have a period of non-partisan government at home, freedom from military burdens, and respite from playing the game of world politics, Belgium was that country. Economic interests demanded productive activity on a large scale, unhampered access to world markets, and the revival of the wealth accruing from the transit trade through the port of Antwerp. Partly dependent on the prosperity of Germany, and geographically inhibited from playing either Great Britain or France as a favorite, the sensible policy for Belgium was speedy reconciliation with Germany and the reaffirmation of her old neutrality, appealing her case to the League of Nations and the United States.

Belgium was in no way in the position of France, and she could not afford to adopt toward Germany the attitude and the policy of France. France is a large and virtually a self-sustaining country, not dependent primarily upon her factories and mines, and possessing close at hand vast colonies rich in food-stuffs and raw materials and capable of being drawn upon for a standing army. On the other hand, the problem of security, in her policy toward Germany, is a prime consideration for France. Belgium is a small and thickly populated country, wholly dependent upon her industries and world markets for her existence. Much of her prosperity comes from the prosperity of western Germany because of her geographical position in relation to the Rhineland. By her own efforts Belgium can never hope to make herself militarily secure against Germany. A policy of force, applied to Germany, has the double disadvantage, then, of hurting Belgium economically and of compelling her to become politically dependent upon France. This, in turn, makes Great Britain antagonistic to her. Her economic interests, seeing that France is a highly developed protectionist country, seem to demand a Rhineland free of French domination, while her political interests seem to demand steering clear of dependence upon French military power for her security.