Europe Since 1918

by Herbert Adams Gibbons

Two days after the Treaty of Sèvres was signed, an attempt was made to assassinate Venizelos as he was taking the train in Paris to return to Greece. He was in poor physical condition when he got back to Athens and found internal conditions in a very bad state. The head of a Government cannot be away two years on an end and have things run smoothly at home. His subordinates had abused their authority. There was profound dissatisfaction, which was not allayed when the Greek people discovered that the net result of the treaty was the Entente Powers’ permission for Greece to work out her own salvation in Asia Minor. Several classes in the army had already been in active service for eight years. A wave of war weariness swept the country, of which the partizans of the banished Constantine took full advantage. When Venizelos was struggling against these handicaps, which were enough to tax his ability and enthusiasm to the utmost, King Alexander suddenly died. His younger brother Paul refused to return and take the throne. The issue at the General Election thus became a personal one between Constantine and Venizelos. The ex-king’s party won at the polls on November 14, 1920. Venizelos left Greece. On December 19 King Constantine and Queen Sophie, sister of ex-Kaiser Wilhelm, returned to Athens.

Before the return of the King the British, French, and Italian Governments issued a proclamation stating that the recall of King Constantine could only be regarded as ratification by the Greek people of the actions of the King, which had been hostile to the Allies, and that the recall of the King would create an unfavorable situation between Greece and the Entente Powers. After this proclamation a plebiscite was held on December 5. There were a million votes, virtually all in favor of the King.

Great Britain, France, and the United States refused to recognize Constantine.[23] Notwithstanding the fearful handicap the return of Constantine imposed upon Greece in her struggle to retain what the Treaty of Sèvres had given her, Constantine persisted in his determination to remain on the throne. Only after the revolution that followed the collapse of the Greek armies in Asia Minor in September, 1922, did Constantine withdraw. Then he abdicated in favor of his oldest son, George, who had recently married Princess Elizabeth of Rumania, and went into exile in Sicily, where he died a few months later.

Speculation as to what would have happened in Greece had Venizelos remained in power is profitless. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to the story of what actually happened.

On January 4, 1921, in the absence of all Liberal or Venizelist members, King Constantine opened the newly elected Chamber of Deputies and stated that the war in Asia Minor would continue. As a matter of fact, the Greeks could not have withdrawn; and at the same time, in order not to withdraw, they had to go forward. On January 10, the Greeks advanced over the mountains to Biledjik on the Anatolian Railway, cutting off Angora from the Bosphorus. In a conference at London on March 9, the Athens Government rejected a proposal of the British and French Governments to modify the Treaty of Sèvres by the Greek evacuation of Asia Minor in return for Turkish Nationalist assent to the cession of Thrace to Greece. A new offensive was launched on March 23, which succeeded in giving the Greeks possession of two important junction-points of the Anatolian Railway, Afium-Karahissar and Eski Sheïr, which they were afterward compelled to abandon. In the early part of July, however, they returned to the attack, reoccupied the ground lost in the spring, and won decisive victories at Kutahia and Eski Sheïr. Encouraged by these victories, the Greek General Staff made the mistake of believing that it was possible to march on to Angora and put an end to Turkish resistance. The offensive was renewed in the middle of August, was carried along the Sakaria River nearly to Angora, but could not be maintained on the last lap of a march that had cost them dear. The Greeks retreated to positions east of the Anatolian Railway and dug themselves in for the winter in strong natural positions.

Several efforts were made to mediate between Greece and Turkey by the Supreme Council, the League of Nations, and the Conference of Ambassadors. The last proposal, formulated in March, 1922, was virtually the same as that of March, 1921, i. e., that the Turks should have Asia Minor, while the Greeks should keep Thrace. In recognition of the growing power of the Turkish Nationalists, the Entente Powers offered modifications in the Sèvres provisions concerning Constantinople and the Straits that would salve the pride of the Turks and leave them nominal masters in their own house. The Turks were also offered membership in the League of Nations.

The successive efforts of the Entente Powers to bring about a peaceful liquidation of the Greek venture in Asia Minor by a voluntary revision of the Treaty of Sèvres proved that the San Remo agreement of 1920 had failed, and that the victorious powers, unable to arrive at an understanding, preferred to sacrifice the aspirations of Hellenism and to allow the Turks to go unpunished rather than risk seeing one of themselves best the others in a division of the Turkish spoils. Other factors also entered into the Near Eastern question to make it as complicated in 1922 as it had always been. The rôle of Russia at Angora was disquieting. The Turkish Nationalists were menacing Great Britain and France in Mesopotamia and Syria. London was suspected by Paris and Rome of planning to use the Greeks as agents to hold Western Asia Minor and the Straits in the interest of the mistress of the seas. French statesmen felt that backing the Turks might prove to be an excellent means of keeping the British in line to continue putting the screws down on Germany. In vain the Greek Government protested that the Treaty of Sèvres was an integral part of the Paris settlement and as sacred as the other treaties. Had not the Greeks acted in good faith in going into Asia Minor at the request of the great powers? Could they be expected to withdraw and leave the Anatolian Christians, the Circassians, and the anti-Kemalist Turks, who had coöperated in the occupation, at the mercy of the Angora Nationalists?

From a purely military point of view the Greeks were in an excellent position in Asia Minor. Behind most of their front lay railway lines. They had had a year in which to fortify their front and organize lines of communication. The Turks had not molested them. They had been able to pick out the strongest natural defenses. But they had no money. The boycott of the Constantine Government prevented them from contracting loans or obtaining large credits for supplies abroad. They knew that France and Italy had made treaties with the Turks and were supplying them with artillery and munitions. They knew, too, that Soviet Russia was giving substantial aid to their enemies. France and Italy did not allow the Greeks to establish an effective blockade of the coast of Asia Minor. The blockade rules which the French and Italians had proclaimed in the Mediterranean, when they were fighting Turkey, and had imposed upon Greek commerce, were declared intolerable when Greece tried to use them to prevent the Turks from receiving war materials.

The Athens Government grew desperate. Every month the Turks were becoming stronger, and yet it seemed impossible to order the evacuation of Asia Minor. The British Government, and British public opinion in general, encouraged the Greeks but only with words! In July the Greek Government transferred 40,000 of its best troops from Asia Minor to Thrace, and massed them, together with the Thracian army of occupation, near Constantinople. A note was sent to the Entente Governments, demanding permission to occupy Constantinople. It was a grand-stand play, conceived as a supreme effort to avert impending disaster. The Entente Powers refused to accede to the Greek request.

At the end of August, realizing that they could not last through another winter in their positions east of the Anatolian Railway, the Greeks prepared to fall back on a line within the limits of the zone defined in the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turks got wind of the plan and attacked at the most vulnerable point in the Greek front, where the railway from Smyrna joined the Anatolian Railway at Afium-Karahissar. Panic started and spread, as panic always does. The Greeks became demoralized and abandoned their strong positions without fighting. They retreated to the Ægean coast, burning towns and villages as they went. Most of the army got away to the Ægean islands and to Thrace. But they lost all their artillery and stores, and left the native Christians and Mohammedan Circassians, who had made common cause with the Greeks, to the mercy of the Turkish Nationalists. The demoralization of the Greek army was not so great as that of the Italian army at Caporetto, and, in numbers of troops affected, no greater than that of the British and French in the last German offensive in France in the spring and early summer of 1918. Had there been reserves to fall back upon, had there been strong allies to come to the rescue, the Greeks could easily have retrieved their fortunes. We must remember this in judging them. But years of facing great odds alone, with no hope of a change, had ended by taking the heart completely out of them.