The appearance of the Osmanlis on the Aegaean Sea, and their sacking of Chios, Negropont,[494] and Attica, greatly alarmed the Senate. Fear was expressed for the safety of the Venetian fortresses in Negropont and Crete.[495] All garrisons were ordered, provisioned, and reinforced.[496] In 1393, forgetting their sincere love for Bayezid, the Senate decided to treat with Sigismund for an offensive alliance against the Osmanlis.[497] So it cannot be believed that the Venetians did not see the growing danger.
In September of the next year they responded favourably, although vaguely, to a letter in which Sigismund notified them that in the coming springtime he would ‘go against the Turks to their loss and destruction’.[498] But when, in May 1396, a Hungarian embassy arrived in Venice to announce the readiness for a forward movement, and to secure the promised aid, Venice pledged herself only to the extent of four galleys, and that on condition that Rhodes, Chios, and Mytilene would co-operate with the Venetians.[499] A high-sounding letter was sent to Tommaso Monicego, ordering him to move against the Osmanlis ‘for the preservation of the city of Constantinople and for the honour of the republic’.[500] Too weak and too inexperienced to withstand the hardened mariners of Italy, the Osmanlis disappeared from the sea for the moment. Their navy was only six years old, and could not yet match itself against the ghiaours. Monicego fought no battle, for there was no enemy to oppose him. But he made no effort to hinder the passage of the Osmanlis from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia. The sincerity of the naval co-operation in the Nicopolis crusade is open to the gravest suspicion.[501]
While the Senate was putting off Sigismund with assurances and promises that never materialized, they continued to treat with Bayezid and Manuel. In September 1394, the Osmanlis appeared in the Adriatic at the mouth of the Boyana, and seized Venetian subjects there. The danger to Durazzo was imminent, for the Osmanlis were now masters of the valley of the Drin. When the Senate deliberated on measures for securing the release of the prisoners and for the defence of Durazzo, they decided to make representations rather than threats to Bayezid.[502] He naturally paid no attention to the Venetians. They did not intend to apply force, so he continued the subjugation of Albania and Greece.
To Manuel the Senate wrote a letter in 1394, recommending him ‘to trust in God, to trust in the measures which the Christian princes would know how to take, to write to the pope and to these (the Christian princes), promoting a general alliance’.[503] But one finds in the deliberations of the Senate no speech or motion or letter from which one could infer that they themselves had any hope whatever of the efficacy of the procedure suggested to Manuel. In fact, within six months, in spite of the imminence of the Hungarian offensive campaign that was to ‘drive the Turks out of Europe’, the Senate actually decided to send ambassadors to Bayezid to urge upon him the advisability of an accord with the Byzantine emperor.[504] It was only because the crusade of Sigismund was already launched, and they realized the uselessness of it, that they gave up this questionable démarche, and discussed measures for the safety of the Venetian fleet, and for preventing Constantinople from falling into Bayezid’s hands without coming into any open rupture with the Osmanlis.[505] Did Venice, while ostensibly co-operating with the crusaders, fear that a victory at Nicopolis would bring about the hegemony of Hungary in the Balkan peninsula, and secretly wish for the success of the Osmanlis?
As for Genoa, no other policy was considered than that of outbidding Venice for Bayezid’s favour. Fulsome congratulations upon his succession were sent to Bayezid. In the autumn of 1390, a Genoese embassy appeared at Adrianople to remind Bayezid of the traditional friendship of the Consulta for his father and grandfather. Their assurances were backed up by valuable gifts.[506] While cultivating the friendship of the Osmanlis, the Consulta levied a compulsory tax upon all the communes where they could enforce their authority for the purpose of increasing the Genoese fleets in the Aegaean Sea and at Constantinople.[507] A watchful eye was kept on the Venetians and the Osmanlis. Neither Sigismund nor Manuel received real aid from Genoa.
For the necessary outside support and assistance in the crusade which appeared to him indispensable for the safety of Hungary, Sigismund had to look elsewhere than to the divided papacy, and to the republics of Venice and Genoa. Whether Sigismund’s fears of the ability of the Osmanlis to destroy Hungary were well founded is open to question. But there is no doubt that his activity prevented the capture of Constantinople in the early years of the reign of Bayezid.
VII
As early as 1384, the French Court was aware of the remarkable progress of the Ottoman conquest. The character and ambitions of Murad were presented to the boy-king Charles VI in a striking way. He was told that Murad, in a dream, had seen Apollon, one of his false gods, who offered him a crown of gold before which were prostrated thirteen princes of the Occident.[508] This childhood impression was revived in 1391, when Charles was at the zenith of his emancipation under the Marmousets. He received an embassy of pilgrims from the Holy Land, who brought news of a defeat they had experienced while fighting with the King of Hungary ‘against the Turks of Lamorat Baxin’. When Charles asked them about the genealogy and antecedents of the prince, whose name they confused with that of his father, they knew nothing of him except that he was ‘a vassal of the King of Persia’.
But of his character and ambitions they made a statement which we are justified in quoting, because it throws light upon the notions prevailing in the minds of the French aristocracy who went to their death at Nicopolis. ‘He was’, said the pilgrims, ‘a man of wisdom and discretion, who feared God according to the superstitious traditions of the Turks ... humane towards the conquered, because he oppressed them very little with exactions, and did not expel them from their lands so long as they were willing to promise allegiance under an annual tribute, however small. He kept his promises, and permitted them to live under their own laws.... His seal was so respected in his army that whoever saw it fell upon his knees. He had interpreters and spies in Europe to instruct him about the kings and their policies. He told the pilgrims that he would come to France after he had finished with Austria.’[509]
The chronicler from whom this report is taken added that Charles was much excited by this threat. He was anxious to make peace with England, in order that he could accept the challenge of Bayezid, and go to fight him in single combat at the head of his army. But Charles, in the following year, so completely lost his mental balance that he could no longer maintain any personal power, and fell under the influence of the princes of the lilies. But his sympathies remained steadfastly attached to every scheme for fighting the Osmanlis.