Germany has had as much reason, in the development of the present crisis, for regarding Servia as the outpost of Russia as had Great Britain for awarding this rôle to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had as much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent the Russians from securing the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and France to take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension, in 1914, of Russian influence in what was until recently European Turkey would be just as disastrous to the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary—far more so—than it would have been to Great Britain and France sixty years ago. What she has in Asia-Minor to-day is as great a stake for Germany to fight for as what Great Britain had in India in the middle of the nineteenth century.

There is, however, this important difference. Germany, in supporting the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of an enemy. She calculated carefully the cost, waited for a favourable moment, and, when she decided that the favourable moment had come, deliberately provoked the war.

Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike her two powerful neighbours on the east and west, believed that the propitious moment had come in the summer of 1914. Her rivals were facing serious internal crises. Russia was embarrassed by the menace of a widely-spread industrial strike. But Russia did not count for much in the German calculations. It was the situation in France that induced the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The spring elections had revealed a tremendous sentiment against the law recently voted extending military service for three years. The French Parliament had just overthrown the admirable Ribot Cabinet for no other reason than purely personal considerations of a bitter party strife. An eminent Parliamentarian had exposed publicly from the tribune the alarming unpreparedness of France for war. The trial for murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux bade fair to complicate further internal Parliamentary strife.

These were the favourable circumstances of the end of June and the beginning of July.

But the decision had wider grounds than the advantages of the moment. The German Government was finding it more and more difficult every year to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance and increase of her naval and military establishments. Socialism and anti-militarism were making alarming progress in the German Reichstag. On the other hand, the Russian military reorganization, commenced after the Japanese War, was beginning to show surprising fruits. And was France to be allowed time for the spending of the eight hundred and five million francs just borrowed by her in June to correct the weak spots in her fortifications and war material, and for the application of the loi des trois ans to increase her standing army?

Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to intervene on behalf of France and Russia? The crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have developed so seriously that civil war was feared. Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Protestant irreconcilables in the north of Ireland, had formed an army that was being drilled in open defiance of the Government.

The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg came at this advantageous moment. A casus belli against Servia, so provokingly lacking, had at last been given. Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance to crush Servia. If there were any misgivings about the risk of doing this, they were immediately allayed by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she would not allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria-Hungary was given by Germany carte blanche in the matter of her dealings with Servia. It is possible, as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to M. Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had not been submitted beforehand for the approval of Wilhelmstrasse. But the general tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed upon. Germany knew well that the ultimatum would be so worded as to be a challenge to Russia. Either Russia would accept once more the humiliation of a diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or she would intervene to save Servia. In the latter contingency, Germany could declare war upon Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary, had been attacked. The Franco-Russian Alliance would then be put to the test, as well as whatever understanding there might be between Great Britain and France.

Subsequent events proved that Germany left no means, other than complete submission to her will, to France and Russia for avoiding war. Negotiations were so carried on that there would be no loop-hole for escape either to Servia, or to the Great Powers that were her champions. She did not even wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary, or for France to aid Russia. As for Great Britain, it is not yet clear whether Germany really thought that she was making an honest effort to keep her out of the war.

From the very beginning of the Servian crisis, Germany associated herself "for better or for worse with Austria-Hungary." On the day that the ultimatum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd, requesting them to call upon the Foreign Ministers of the governments to which they were accredited and point out that the ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and integrity" of Austria-Hungary, and to state with special "emphasis" that "in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled absolutely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict, because any intercession by another Power would precipitate, on account of the various alliances, inconceivable consequences."

The position of Germany is admirably stated in these instructions, which I quote from Exhibit I of the German official White Book. To this position, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held throughout the last week of July. In the four words "localization of the conflict" the intention of Germany was summed up. There was to be a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. That could not be avoided. The only thing that could be avoided was the intervention of Russia to prevent the approaching attack of Austria-Hungary upon Servia. If the Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the Czar to refrain from interfering, there would be, "on account of the various alliances, inconceivable consequences."