4. To remove from military service and public office in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and whose names, with a communication of the evidence which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government;
5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of members of the official machinery (organes) of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian territorial integrity;
6. To commence a judicial investigation (enquête judiciaire) against the participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory—members of the official machinery (organes) delegated by the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the researches (recherches) relative thereto;
7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Vorja Tankositch and a certain Milan Ciganovitch, a functionary of the Servian State, who have been compromised by the result of the preliminary investigation at Sarajevo;
8. To prevent, by effective measures, the participation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the functionaries at the frontier at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided the authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating their crossing of the frontier;
9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government explanations concerning the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and abroad, who, in spite of their official position have not hesitated, after the crime of June 28th, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;
10. To notify without delay to the Austro-Hungarian Government the execution of the measures included in the preceding points.
Annexed to the note was a memorandum which declared that the investigation of the police, after the assassination of the Archduke and his wife, had established that the plot had been formed at Belgrade by the assassins with the help of a commandant in the Servian army, that the six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition had been given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian functionary and the Servian army officer whose names were cited in the note, that the bombs were hand grenades which came from the Servian army headquarters at Kragujevac, that the assassins were given instruction in the use of the arms by Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bosnia and Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms was facilitated by the connivance of three frontier captains and a customs official.
The wording of this note seemed to have been entirely unexpected. The intention of the ultimatum was clear. It was understood that Russia would not accept an attack upon the integrity of Servia. Six years had passed since 1908, and two since 1912. Russia had recuperated from the Japanese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain had borne much fruit. She was sure of France. Was this not a deliberate provocation to Russia?