During the afternoon the real object of the move was explained to the C.O. by the Divisional Commander. He stated that the evacuation of the Peninsula had commenced, and that Colonel J. Paton had been selected to command the rear guard.
For the previous two months rumours of pending advances and retirements had been rife. All ranks had gleaned from the newspapers that the wisdom of further prosecuting the campaign had been openly debated in the British Parliament. That it seemed impossible to expect any further substantial support from England or her Allies, and that the defection of Bulgaria in October had opened the way for German aid to the Turks, who had been in a critical situation up to that time. Further, the heavy losses sustained during the August fighting, and the alarming inroads of disease, had so weakened the force as to raise the question of whether it would be able to hold on should the enemy take the offensive. On top of all came the prospect of the long winter with its rains and blizzards, against which there was such little protection available, and which would turn the ravines and hollows into veritable death traps.
On the other hand, the departure of Sir Ian Hamilton in October, the publication of his farewell order, the appointment of his distinguished successor—who also had a reputation for doing things—the visit of Lord Kitchener, the increased naval force and gun activity noticeable after the three days' silence of November, and the removal of troops to rest stations, all pointed to a renewal of the policy of action as soon as circumstances permitted. Nor was this theory discounted by the obvious departure of troops from Suvla, and guns and wagons from Anzac, "to reinforce Salonika"—the allied force at that time being hard pressed.
The first suspicion that all was not going well was caused the day before the 28th Battalion left Russell's Top, by the spectacle of men hurling boxes of rifle ammunition into deep pits and the receipt of the order that rations must be drawn from the reserve located on the position.
Now when the truth was known, all ranks were exercised by feelings partly of relief and partly of disappointment. Relief at the thought that the apparently useless sacrifice of life was to cease, and disappointment that in spite of the streams of blood that had been shed, and notwithstanding the performance of feats of arms not previously equalled in history, Australia had failed to achieve complete success in her first undertaking as a nation.
In this state of mind the Battalion quietly completed its arrangements for embarkation. It had been ordered that an officer and 17 other ranks of the Machine Gun Section were to be left to man the guns on Russell's Top. Lieut. Shaw, on calling for volunteers for a "stunt," received responses from the whole of his men and had difficulty in choosing the right number from so much excellent material.
After dark the Battalion, which had assembled in the main saps, moved down to Williams' Pier. Through over-anxiety on the part of the Divisional Staff to avoid delay, the arrival of the unit was premature. The 27th Battalion, having been ordered to embark earlier, was only just commencing the operation. About 1,200 to 1,500 men were now crowded at a point that the Turk constantly shelled. By one of those coincidences which had been witnessed when Lord Kitchener landed at the same spot, and was frequently noticeable when General Birdwood visited the front line trenches, not a shot was fired by the enemy.
By 10 p.m. the last man had been taken off by the "beetles" and transferred to the Khedivial Mail Steamer "Osmanieh." This vessel was of some 4,000 tons and was now packed with the 27th, 28th, and some of the 26th Battalions. The baggage had been left behind on the beach under guard, and was to follow the unit. Ultimately it was placed on another transport and never seen again by its owners. Some valuable regimental records and very interesting personal souvenirs were thus lost.
The policy in regard to the evacuation, as a tactical operation, was the gradual withdrawal of the troops over a period of several days. Each day the garrisons of posts would become weaker, and each day would make a corresponding extra demand upon those remaining to keep up a display of strength and activity. On the last day would be left a mere screen of men and guns, known as the "C Party," who themselves were again subdivided into three divisions. The men of the "C3" party were to be the last to leave—were to be all volunteers—and were known as the "Die-hards." To Lieut. G. D. Shaw and his men fell the task of defending with their machine guns one of the last posts to be vacated in the Anzac sector.
The guns were four in number and four men constituted the crew of each gun. Each man did two hours on duty and two off. In this latter period he had to cook his food and get what rest was possible. In contrast with the previous three months the men were fed well and given many kinds of articles extra to the rations. They received socks which were worn over the boots so as to deaden the sounds of movement.