They hold that the use of the torpedo greatly strengthens an inferior but enterprising enemy, and that the tendency of torpedo warfare is to reduce the maritime forces of states differing considerably in power to the level of equals.
The opinions of a few of the most ardent believers in submarines among Frenchmen may be given here.
A French naval writer commenting on the sums expended by the French Government on the construction of submarines writes—
“The cruiser which can guard itself from the ordinary torpedo-boat will be without defence against the invisible enemy slowly creeping up to it to discharge its torpedo. It will be no longer possible for it to enter narrow waters and to approach the enemy’s coast. Its only safety will be in flight, and it will become a relic of the past. The naval battles of the future will take place not on the surface but in the depths of the ocean.”
M. Lockroy, in 1899, speaking in explanation of the French navy estimates, said that whilst formerly France had but one naval rival, she now had four, and the Triple Alliance could muster but sixty-seven battleships, while England had ninety-four, and France sixty. Could France ensure superiority over her rivals? Yes; submarine navigation ensured her a considerable advantage. The achievements of the Zédé might lead to a revolution in naval equipment and warfare. Meanwhile France had a terrible weapon—just what she wanted. “Everything,” said Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, “which threatens les colosses and tends to emancipate les moucherons should be warmly welcomed by the French Navy, for by such means we can double in a few years our forces and our power.” One might be forgiven for supposing that all French writers were on the side of the smaller fighting vessel. There are, however, quite as many who are opposed to this policy and who believe that France would be better with more battleships and cruisers and less torpedo craft, but they do not state their views in the emphatic and picturesque language of the other party, and as a consequence their influence is less felt. In 1888 Admiral Bourgois in his book on Torpedoes emphatically stated that the torpedo and the torpedo-boat could not take the place of the ironclad.
Says another writer: “Qu’on se rappelle les mitrailleuses de 1871. Nous souhaitons sincerement que le sous-marin après avoir inspiré la meme confiance exagerée ne cause pas les mêmes déceptions que les mitrailleuses de 1870!”
Again the same writer reminds his countrymen that a naval battle cannot be compared to a manœuvre when everything is arranged beforehand. The submarine cannot venture to sea in foul weather without exposing itself to dire accidents, but will the enemy wait until the sea is calm before commencing battle? What would happen if he chose the moment to attack when a troubled sea forces the submarine to remain in port and no other defence can be utilised?
The submarine, he says, is still in the rudimentary condition, and the problem of submarine navigation has not yet been solved.
“Other navies possess submarines and have made experiments, and we cannot be certain that we are ahead of them, although we make the most fuss.
“A means of defence from the attack of submarines, if ever they become really dangerous weapons, will assuredly be found, and the country which is so imprudent as to rely chiefly on such vessels will be quickly disarmed by a stronger foe.