A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 1: Ancient and Mediæval Philosophy

by Herbert Ernest Cushman

In this connection Epicurus shows his comprehensive grasp of the subject in determining what are the lasting pleasures. Although he was a materialist he regarded the pleasures of the mind as superior to those of the body. The inner pleasures, the spiritual joys, the control of the mind so that it could enjoy without indulgence—these were to Epicurus the enduring pleasures. The pleasures of sense are primary, for, in the last analysis, the mental life is a combination of sensations, and sensations are only material motions; nevertheless the secondary and derivative pleasures of the mind were superior, according to Epicurus, because they had duration. This estimate of the superiority of the mental pleasures was probably reinforced by two other reasons: such pleasures were possessed by Epicurus; and such a doctrine was in accord with the Greek æsthetic ideal of self-enjoyment of the refined egoist.

The most permanent state of mind is called by Epicurus independence of the world, on the one hand, and emotionlessness, on the other. These are the positive and negative sides of one and the same thing—the Epicurean ideal of pleasure. In ancient times the conception of the “affections,” “passions,” or “emotions” included all states of feeling and will in which man is dependent on the outer world. To be emotionless is to be independent of the world. The Epicurean word is ataraxia, which is variously translated as serenity, peace, repose, imperturbability. Since man has no controlover the world without him, he must control its effects within himself. These effects are the feelings and desires which are by nature only mental disturbances. In mastering these he becomes independent of the world.

If one will scrutinize his life, he will find, according to Epicurus, that his experiences form a stream of mental disturbances. These may be divided into two classes,—desires and positive pleasures. Desires are wants and want is pain. Pain is therefore exciting. Positive pleasure presupposes desire and want, and such pleasure is also an excitement,—the excitement that accompanies the removal of want. The positive pleasures are not, therefore, the goal of independence of the outer world. There is another kind of pleasure—the pleasure of repose. Epicurus recognizes therefore both the pleasure of motion and the pleasure of repose, but they do not have the same importance in his system. Repose is the goal of all our experiences. It is a neutral state, a state of freedom from bodily pain and mental excitement. There is nothing higher than such a neutral state. We cannot advance beyond it. If we seek new pleasures by gratifying new desires, we are only returning to the old round of want, desire, and the pleasurable excitement of removing the want. The pleasure of repose is the only escape from this round of experiences. Emotionlessness is the maximum pleasure—it is the repose in independence of the world. Any deviation from it may vary but it will not increase our pleasure.

This ideal of Epicurus looks very much like the Cynic doctrine of absence of wants as constituting virtue and happiness. But Epicurus is far from renouncing pleasure. He is no ascetic. On the contrary,the repose of the Epicurean will be the greater in proportion to the compass of his needs that are satisfied. But he needs insight into any given situation to tell him what positive pleasures should be encouraged. Epicurus thus distinguishes three kinds of wants and their attendant positive pleasures: (1) wants natural and indispensable—without the satisfaction of which we cannot exist; (2) wants artificial and dispensable, which ought always to be disregarded; (3) wants natural and dispensable—the great mass of wants which lie between the two other classes. Insight is necessary to decide about this third class. In case of necessity they can be renounced, but since they give happiness, the Wise Man will seek to satisfy them as far as possible.

There are three steps leading to Epicurean happiness: (1) the desire or the pain of unsatisfied craving; (2) the positive pleasure that removes the pain of unsatisfied desire; (3) ataraxia, the repose of the soul or true happiness.

The Place of Virtue in Epicureanism. Epicurus agreed with the strictest Greek moralists that virtue and happiness go together. His opponents had to testify to the beneficial effects of his teaching upon the character of his disciples. Yet his conception of the place of virtue in life is in direct conflict with Stoicism. He felt that the Stoic conception of virtue for its own sake is an ideal so imaginary that it lacks all incentive to action. Pleasure, on the other hand, seemed to him to be a concrete and real object. It can be given a definite content. Virtue had for Epicurus a value only as a means to happiness. Moreover, virtue by itself is not necessarily accompanied by happiness, but only when it is employed as a condition to happiness. Thus wisdom maybe employed to gain the pleasure of liberation from the fear of the gods; self-control may be employed in order to get the maximum of happiness.

The Epicurean Wise Man. To what classes of people could this Epicurean ideal appeal? Is it an ideal possible only to the favorites of fortune, wealth, and rank? As presented by Epicurus it was not conditioned by external circumstances of any sort and its aim was to transcend all conditions. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the theory was restricted to those who had the desire to adopt it. On the whole, the unreflecting common people of that time were not as a matter of fact influenced by the Epicurean philosophy. The proof of this is the ease with which it was degraded into a simple pleasure theory without an ideal. Epicureanism as presented by its author was not an excuse for the voluptuary or the prodigal, although it was easily corrupted into that. It was, however, a philosophy of the individual. The individual must rely upon his own common sense as to what among the particular satisfactions will give him independence of the world. Sometimes repose is attained by the satisfaction of all wants; sometimes the satisfactions needed are few because the wants are few. True pleasure is possible to all reflective souls. “When you come,” says Seneca, “to the gardens where the words are inscribed: Friend, here it will be well for you to abide; here pleasure is the highest good;—there will meet you the keeper of the place, a hospitable kindly man who will set before you a dish of barley porridge and plenty of water and say, Have you not been well entertained? These gardens do not provoke hunger, but quench it; they do not cause a greater thirst by the drinks they afford.... In this pleasure I have grown old.”Man can use much, but he does not need much. Even life itself under extreme circumstances is not necessary. The pleasures to be sought are the permanent and gentle. In one place Epicurus says with a somewhat forced sentiment that the Wise Man on the rack will smile in the midst of torture and say, “How sweet!”

The Wise Man accepts the established order and accommodates himself to it. He is not like the Stoic Wise Man, indifferent to all pleasures, but he is nevertheless independent of them. He is superior to the world, a king and a god. Accidents cannot disturb him, for his virtuous happiness lies within himself. He cannot control the world without, but he can control the world within himself. He can be happy with few or many satisfactions, and he is master over the world if he is master of the effects of the world upon himself. To rest unmoved in one’s inner self—that is the Epicurean ideal of the Wise Man. In contrast to the Cyrenaic happiness, the Epicurean happiness seems passive; in contrast to the Stoic happiness it is satisfaction.

The Epicurean Wise Man in Society. Nevertheless the Wise Man is only a spectator of the world. He does not enter the world’s work nor does he enlist as a soldier to fight its moral battles. His individual independence gives a peculiar character to his social relations. He will have no ties on account of their complications. Moreover, his inner world offers him no compensation for his loss of social relationship, except that the good within is strong and the evil weak. He looks upon political government as a matter of selfish convenience. He is opposed to civic life, and therefore a supporter of absolute government. He refuses the responsibility of marriage, but accepts friendship as the only worthy social relationship,and only because friendship is of mutual advantage. Friendship means intellectual intercourse, compassion, and forgiveness. While there were many famous Epicurean friendships, one must admit that the Epicurean took an unfair advantage of the state. His happiness presupposed a highly developed civilization of refined tastes and noble sentiments. He is a parasite upon the community and appropriates the labor of others. The Epicurean ideal offers much to the individual, but nothing to society as a means of spiritual productivity.

The Great Obstacles to Happiness. To universalize pleasure, however paradoxical it may seem, is to set up an individualism. It is to abandon all the claims of the society of other beings upon us. The logic of any pleasure theory is anarchism. But Epicurus is no anarchist, for anarchism would be too disturbing to repose. Epicurus stopped far short of interfering with political conditions. His teaching did not have as its end a logical theory, but a practical accomplishment. He therefore accommodated his theory to the practical circumstances of his time. He pointed out that in the seething times of the third century B. C. the individual could be happy if he banished from his world two obstacles. These were religion and culture.