CHAPTER XVII
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (1000–1200)
The General Character of the Transitional Period. The first century of the Transitional Period was as different from the last century of the Early Period in its intellectual attitude and emotional tone as can be imagined. It was the century of the new birth of Europe—a century when the beginning of political order was accompanied by a passion for inquiry. The spirit of pietism took possession of all institutions—and in the thirteenth century the mediæval system seemed to have reached its perfect form. The Transitional Period gives meaning to the Crusades.“If ever ideals were carried out in the world and gained dominion over souls, it happened then.”[55] “It was as if the world had cast aside its old garment and clothed itself in the white robe of the church.”[56] The ardor of the Crusades was the specific expression of this religious revival. All the pent-up energies of the previous mediæval life were passing through a rapid period of growth.
Philosophically this period is the time when neo-Platonic mysticism, as elaborated by Erigena, came into conflict with the Christian conception of the individual. These two motives had been held together without controversy in the Early Period; now they develop into controversy. The philosophical theories evolved by this controversy go by the name of scholasticism. Whiletheoretically secular studies were supposed to be discarded and ancient literature was considered to be the temptation of the devil, yet practically one is surprised to find a trained skill in the use of dialectic, and the employment of many of the materials of antiquity as a means of culture and the refutation of heresies. There was a knowledge of the classics, of dialectic, of neo-Platonism, and of Augustine. The spirit of Platonic realism prevailed among the group of schoolmen of these two centuries. The problem before this group is different from that presented to the schoolmen of the next period. The scholastics or schoolmen of this period whom we shall consider in some detail are,—
Anselm, 1033–1109.
Roscellinus, d. 1100 about.
Abelard, 1079–1142.
What is Scholasticism? In a general sense scholasticism is philosophic thought, but historically the term is usually restricted to the philosophic thinking of the Middle Ages. It has been pointed out that scholastic philosophy does not differ from any other philosophy. It had its prejudices, its dependence on authority, its employment of deduction, its use of observation—like all philosophy. The scholasticism of this time, however, is distinguished by its general reference to church dogma as authority and its imperfect use of experience. The scholasticism of the Middle Ages may therefore be defined as the application of dialectic or logical methods to the discussion of theological problems. It was the attempt to present the doctrine of the church in a scientific system of philosophy. Sometimes such an attempt resulted in heresy when the result was a changing of dogma. Generally, however, the scholastic was not soambitious, for he usually sought to keep within the authoritative doctrines of the church. He feared the anathema of the church. Scholasticism therefore, in general, had two characteristics: (1) It assumed that church dogma was unquestionable and infallible; (2) It tried to clarify dogma by rational explanation, or to show that dogma was at least not contrary to reason. Dogma may in some cases be explained by the reason. In some cases it may be so far above reason that the only thing the reason can say is, “The doctrine does not contradict me.” In the words of an eminent churchman, “Dogma says, Deus homo (God became man). Scholasticism asks, Cur deus homo? (Why did God become man?)” Revelation is assumed; scholastic philosophy is permitted; independent rational science is denied. The remainder of the history of the Middle Ages shows no conscious attempt to form a new body of doctrine for the church; and only here and there does there appear an effort to modify the existing doctrine. The thinkers are employed in this scholastic clarifying of the doctrine. In this period scholasticism takes the form of the logical problem of the relation of universals and particulars. In the period of Classic Scholasticism this logical problem changes into the metaphysical one of the respective scopes of reason and faith.
The problem of the relation of universal conceptions to particular experiences had become a central one to the Greeks after Socrates. (See summary, p. [103].) It was natural that the same problem should arise with the new mediæval man and should delight him as an enigmatical question. But conditions were less favorable for the mediæval scholastic than for the Greek. The mediævalhad scanty literary materials, no opportunity of testing his discussions by empirical observations, and his mind was untrained. In the Early Period scholasticism had the character of a mental game in logic. It consisted, on the whole, in the subtle spinning out of logical questions with the few fragments of Aristotle as a guide. This was dangerous to faith, but the church could not prevent it, for it was the only mental diversion open to monks of the schools of Charlemagne. The arguments often reveal great mental acuteness, although they have the appearance of triviality. The schools of the ninth century were given over to barren formalism, and this threatened to submerge the vigorous movement inaugurated by Erigena. “Can a prostitute become a virgin again through divine omnipotence?” “Does a mouse that eats the sacrament eat the body of God?” “How many angels can stand on the point of a needle?” These are examples of the prevailing verbal gymnastics of that time, and such problems can be found even in the works of Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus.
Logically stated the problem is that of the relation of particulars to universals. It is usually called the problem of the reality of general ideas. The question was started by a passage in that universally used text-book of the time—the Isagoge of Porphyry, which was an introduction to Aristotle’s Categories. (See p. [102].) Porphyry divides the problem into three parts: (1) Do genera and species exist in nature, or do they exist as mere products of the intellect? (2) If they are things apart from the mind, are they corporeal or incorporeal things? (3) Do they exist outside the individual things of sense, or are they realized in the latter?Upon the problem involved here the thinkers of the Middle Ages were divided into three schools,—realists, conceptualists, and nominalists.[57] The realist maintained that the general idea had reality, while the particular was only a defective imitation of it. The nominalist, on the contrary, held that the universal is only a name (nomen) or an abstraction derived from the real particular thing. The conceptualist tried to mediate between the two by showing that reality exists only in the particular. To use the mediæval phrases, realism is universalia ante rem; nominalism is universalia post rem; conceptualism is universalia in re. (See p. [103 ]for table of comparison with Protagoras, Plato, and Aristotle.) The question was of great practical importance to the church. Is the universal church real and therefore all its dogma authoritative, or are the particular churches real and authoritative? This was a vital matter to the churchman of that day who was trying to establish the primacy of Rome among the separate churches. Furthermore, to show that humanity was less real than the particular human beings would destroy the church doctrine of sin and redemption, for these dogmas depended on the assumption of the solidarity of the human race. The church universal and its universal dogma were not mere names to the schoolmen, and that is why the orthodox churchmen were nearly always realists. Religious principles were universals, while particulars were secular. Dogma had become fixed, with which traditionally the church had become identified. To emphasize particular experiences would mean the continual correcting of tradition and a substitution of private judgment forchurch decrees. When nominalism is completely worked out, it will be found to conflict with church dogma at every point. The result is skepticism. Still the churchman later saw that there is great danger also in a thorough-going realism like that of Erigena’s. It became pantheism. Both realism and nominalism were dangerous doctrines for the church if they were driven to their logical conclusions.