Movements of the armies.—When the news of Trenton reached New York, it roused the British from their fancied security. Lord Cornwallis at the head of eight thousand men proceeded by forced marches toward the west. Washington had determined to hold a position east of the Delaware, and on December 30 he again crossed the river and by January 2, 1777, had assembled five thousand men and forty pieces of artillery just below Trenton. As Cornwallis approached the American position, he realized the costliness of a frontal attack, and decided that as soon as his forces assembled he would attempt a flanking movement from Allentown.
Princeton, January 3, 1777.—Washington saw the danger and decided on a daring plan. On the night of January 2 all was activity in the American camp. Sentinels challenged, infantry moved about in the light of the camp fires, and the sound of pick and shovel was plainly audible to the British. But in the darkness to the rear another kind of activity was in progress. Cannon, stores, and baggage were being silently moved to Bordentown and Burlington, and at one in the morning the bulk of the army began a stealthy march which at daybreak brought them out within a mile and a half of Princeton. Three of Cornwallis's regiments had remained there during the night and were now under way. Suddenly the first of these troops under Colonel Mawhood found themselves confronted by the American advance guard. The British charged bravely, scoring an initial success, but Washington's presence in front of his lines steadied the troops and they soon forced a retreat. Sullivan then led the advance against the two remaining regiments, which were driven through and beyond Princeton, leaving three hundred prisoners in Washington's hands. The roar of the guns brought the unwelcome tidings to Cornwallis that the American army had escaped, had cut across his rear, and had defeated three of his crack regiments.
Morristown.—Five miles beyond Princeton Washington turned to the north and soon established his army in a powerful position at Morristown where they remained in security the rest of the winter. Howe made no attempt to dislodge his opponent, but concentrated ten thousand troops in camps at New Brunswick and Perth Amboy. The Jersey people had been cured of their Toryism; supplies poured into the American camp, while the British experienced the greatest difficulty in securing fuel and food, and by March 1 were reduced to a ration of salt provisions and "ammunition bread." When Washington reached Morristown he had about four thousand men and during the winter his army did not increase, but he made the most of the opportunity to drill his men and perfect his organization. Throughout the country men were drilling for the spring campaign, powder mills were being built, and lead mines were being opened. The greatest shortage was in muskets, but fortunately these were obtained from France.
Middlebrook.—In May, 1777, everything was in readiness and Washington led his army to a powerful position at Middlebrook, only a few miles from the British camp at New Brunswick. On June 13 Howe transferred large forces to the southern bank of the Raritan, but he failed to draw Washington from his point of vantage and on the nineteenth he began the withdrawal of his army to Staten Island, having had the satisfaction only of a rear guard action with Stirling's division.
THE STRUGGLE WITH BURGOYNE
British plans for 1777.—Howe's plan for the campaign of 1777 called for fifteen thousand more troops. With this addition he believed that he could crush Washington and conquer Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. The subjugation of the southern colonies would then be attempted, followed by operations in New England. But Lord Germaine thought otherwise. Ignoring the general in the field, he planned to send a force under St. Leger down the Mohawk Valley, a second army under Burgoyne to penetrate New York by the Lake Champlain route, while Howe was to proceed up the Hudson Valley. The three armies were to meet at Albany. The plan looked good on paper, but it failed to take into account the long distances to be traversed and the difficulties of transportation on the frontier. When Germaine planned the campaign, he should have sent precise orders to Howe, but this he failed to do, and on May 18 he even wrote acquiescing in the proposed expedition against Philadelphia and expressing the hope that the business might be concluded in season so that Howe could coöperate with Burgoyne.
Ticonderoga and Ft. Independence.—On June 15, 1777, General Schuyler learned that Burgoyne's army was in motion and that St. Leger was concentrating forces on the upper Mohawk. The American army was in a sorry plight for smallpox and dysentery were still the bane of the northern department. Congress had done much to destroy efficiency by temporarily removing Schuyler. At a time when all should have been working in harmony, Gates was intriguing with members of Congress to overthrow his superior. The advance part of the army was at Ticonderoga. Across the narrow bay Fort Independence had been erected and a bridge connected the fortifications, which were commanded by General St. Clair who had only twenty-five hundred men to man works which demanded ten thousand defenders.
The Region of Burgoyne's Invasion (The large map is based on E.G. Foster's Historical Chart; the inset is from Trevelyan, The American Revolution, Part II, Vol. I).