Camden.—A British force had collected at Camden and Cornwallis hastened from Charleston to take command. Gates decided to attempt a surprise attack on the British force at Camden, thirteen miles away. Cornwallis contemplated a similar movement against Gates and the two armies left their encampments about the same hour on the night of August 15. At daybreak they met, but the militia proved to be no match for the British soldiers and fled almost without firing a shot. The regulars stood firm for a time, but when DeKalb fell mortally wounded and Tarleton's cavalry swept along their flank and rear, the line gave way and the retreat turned into a rout. Gates fled from the field and such was his haste that three days later he was at Hillsborough, nearly two hundred miles away. Shortly afterward Tarleton surprised and dispersed Sumter's band, and resistance seemed completely broken.
The War in the South (1778-1781) (Based on E.G. Foster, Illustrative Historical Chart).
Partisan warfare.—British arms had defeated the American armies, but the people of South Carolina were not conquered. The merciless raids of Tarleton's cavalry and Ferguson's Loyalists kept the spirit of resistance alive. Marion, Sumter, and Shelby gathered bands of patriots, who from swamp and forest pounced down on isolated detachments, captured the escorts of supply trains, intercepted messengers, and broke up companies of Loyalists. Between July and December, 1780, twenty-seven battles or skirmishes were fought on Carolina soil.
King's Mountain.—Next to Tarleton, Major Ferguson was probably the most hated and most feared of Cornwallis's officers. His camp at Ninety-Six became a center of Loyalist recruiting, and his band of partisans grew to a thousand strong. They lived on the country, and the property of no man was safe. Ferguson boasted that if the frontiersmen from over the Alleghanies troubled him, he would cross the mountains, lay waste their valleys, and hang their leaders. On September 20, 1780, the borderers under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Sevier, and Shelby gathered at Sycamore Shoals on the Watauga River and started across the mountains. Ferguson heard of their coming and decided to teach the frontiersmen a lesson. He pitched his camp on the crest of King's Mountain, a position which would have been impregnable had his opponents been drilled in the tactics of European battlefields. But the Watauga men had been schooled in Indian warfare. Three times they charged up the steep mountain sides. After an hour of hot fighting the resistance began to weaken, and when Ferguson was killed, his troops threw down their arms and asked for quarter. The victory of the mountaineers is justly looked upon as the turning point in the war in the South, for it gave new fife to the waning cause in the Carolinas.
Greene in command.—The difficult task of reconquering the South was assigned to General Nathanael Greene. On December 2 he arrived at Charlotte where Gates handed over to him a poorly disciplined and half-starved force of about two thousand men. With this insignificant army and aided by local militia and the partisan bands, Greene was confronted with the task of reconquering a province which was occupied by a skillful general whose veteran army outnumbered him four to one. His plan of campaign was matured with rare judgment. He proposed to use a mobile force of about two thousand men to keep Cornwallis busy, while Marion and Sumter harassed the enemy, prevented foraging, and broke up convoys.
The Cowpens.—Early in January, 1781, the main British army was at Winnsborough. Hoping to divide it, Greene sent Morgan with about a thousand men to threaten Augusta and Ninety-Six. The rest of the American army was stationed at Cheraw, sixty miles east of Winnsborough. When Cornwallis heard of Morgan's raid, he sent Tarleton in pursuit with eleven hundred men. Tarleton came in touch with Morgan at The Cowpens. The battle at first was stoutly contested, but Colonel Washington's cavalry turned the scale and Tarleton's force was almost annihilated.
Greene's retreat.—Morgan had accomplished his purpose and immediately started to rejoin the main army. When Greene heard of the victory, he realized that Cornwallis would retaliate, and a pitched battle with the larger British army meant disaster. Furthermore reinforcements were on their way from Virginia and Maryland. Greene's decision was a vital one. He determined to fall back to make a juncture with Morgan and to draw Cornwallis away from his base into a hostile and difficult country. Turning over the command of the main army to Huger with orders to march northward with all speed, Greene rode nearly a hundred and fifty miles in a pouring rain and joined Morgan in his bivouac on the Catawba. He had judged Cornwallis rightly. The British general divested his army of all unnecessary baggage and pressed forward, but in spite of his efforts, the American army escaped him. From river to river Greene retreated while Huger fell back rapidly, the two lines gradually converging until on February 8 they united at Guilford. From there the retreat was continued across the Dan into Virginia. The Fabian policy had succeeded, for Cornwallis had been drawn over two hundred miles from his base and had gotten in such a position that, even if he won a battle, a victory would be barren.