Had the left wing of the Austrian army not been ordered to remain along the eastern borders of Switzerland, it would seem that it might have marched north along the east side of Lake Constance, and have struck the flank and rear of the French as they proceeded from Stokach towards Ulm. Doubtless such a manœuvre would have produced great results; but it must be remembered that the French, still in Switzerland, might then have crossed the Rhine above Lake Constance, and have attacked the flank and rear of the Austrian left wing.
Says General Hamley:—
"In former years the base of the Republican armies operating in Germany had been some part of the straight course of the Rhine, from its corner at Bâle to Dusseldorf. Their eminent adversary, the Archduke Charles, says that the strong line of the Rhine, and the line of French fortresses behind it, can only be assailed by the Austrians in circumstances unusually favorable. All that can be done is to approach and choose a position where the plans of the enemy may be defeated, his advance stopped, and the country behind covered.
"The armies on the Rhine had hitherto been on parallel fronts; the Austrians generally on the defensive, since the exceptionally favorable circumstances which could alone enable them to assume the offensive by passing the Rhine had not existed. The French, breaking out at one or the other of the bridge-heads which they possessed on the river, would try to press forward into Germany; the Austrians, drawing together on the threatened points, would oppose them: and the result was that, in 1800, the river still formed the frontier line between them.
"But in 1800 a new condition had entered into the problem of a campaign on the Rhine. The French had occupied Switzerland, an act which entailed military results such as few generals of that time had the foresight to appreciate. One was to carry the French base onward from Bâle, round the angle to Schaffhausen. Thus that base, originally straight, was now rectangular, and enclosed within it a part of the theatre of war."
Herein is to be found in part the explanation of Kray's faulty arrangement of his forces. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, his reserve and magazines at Stokach would not have been within striking distance of the French. Had Switzerland been neutral territory, the French could not have made a flank movement against his forces in the Black Forest, and thus have been given the opportunity of severing his communications with Ulm. In fact, the possession of Switzerland gave many advantages to Moreau, and enabled him to force the Austrians back to Ulm, notwithstanding the fact that he committed many errors and gained no great victory.
It will now be apparent that Kray had taken up a position too far to the front; and that, by so doing, he had allowed the French to take advantage of the angular base of operations formed by northern Switzerland and eastern France. "Although Kray showed himself superior to Moreau," says Colonel Macdougall, "his faults were serious. He disseminated his army along the line of the Rhine in too forward a position, since his rear was exposed to attack by a French force operating from Schaffhausen. He established his magazines at Stokach, Engen, and Mosskirch, close to a part of the French base. If Switzerland had been friendly or neutral, his magazines in those places would have been well placed, since they would in that case have been covered by the defiles of the Black Forest; as it was, they were quite at the advanced posts."
Moreau's plan of campaign did not differ greatly from that of Bonaparte. In fact, both he and the First Consul aimed to concentrate the French in force between Schaffhausen and Lake Constance. In order to effect the concentration, however, Moreau purposed to cross the Rhine at four points, then by a series of complicated manœuvres to unite the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. On the other hand, Bonaparte's plan was to assemble the French corps on the south side of the Rhine opposite Schaffhausen, to cross the river in force near that place, and thence proceed against Kray. In an able and interesting discussion of these two plans, General Hamley says:—
"The plans of campaign of Napoleon and of Moreau had this in common, that both aimed at the communications of the Austrians by an advance from the extreme point of the angular base; but in the mode of effecting the common object they differed materially, and the difference was the result of the individual characters of the projectors. When Napoleon's glance was once fixed on the point where decisive success lay, the obstacles in his way lost, in his mind, much of their importance, and were viewed merely as difficult steps to his object. Hence, though he neglected no provision nor precaution which prudence and experience could suggest for overcoming them, yet he never allowed them to assume an importance sufficient to deprive his plan of campaign of its fullest significance. Disregarding, therefore, the fact that he must throw his army entire at one point across a great river which was observed by the enemy, he looked only to the great results that must flow from the advance of that army, concentrated, upon the vital point of an enemy whose forces would still be in greater or less degree dispersed.
"Moreau, cautious and forecasting by nature, saw in his mind's eye the Austrian army assembled opposite Schaffhausen to oppose his passage,—baffling the whole plan. All his precautions, therefore, were framed to obviate the danger of crossing in the face of the enemy. Only one corps was to cross at Schaffhausen,—another, the reserve, was to cross at Bâle to cover the passage; this entailed the movement of a third through the mountains to cover the long flank march of the reserve along the river; and a fourth was to make a false attack in order to detain the Austrian troops in the defiles as long as possible, and prevent them from re-enforcing the left.
"It is probable that Napoleon's plan would have miscarried in the hands of Moreau; but looking at other achievements of Bonaparte,—his descent on the Austrian rear in Italy a few weeks later,—his decisive march to the Danube in 1805 on the other side of the present theatre,—it is not to be denied that, executed by himself, the design might have fulfilled all his expectations."
It is certainly an interesting fact that, notwithstanding the objections of Bonaparte to Moreau's plan, nevertheless the commander of the Army of the Rhine succeeded in assembling the bulk of his forces in the vicinity of Schaffhausen. In his own way he executed the manœuvres which, even to Bonaparte, seemed fraught with danger. As a matter of fact, the assembling of the French corps in this position was the most critical part of the whole campaign; and it mattered not whether the concentration was made by marching on the German side of the Rhine, or by marching on the Swiss side; in either case, skill and generalship were required to carry out successfully these manœuvres. It will now be interesting to compare the plans of these two soldiers.