In making a choice between these two methods of attack, the able general will be guided in great measure by the positions occupied by the enemy's forces. But, as a rule, if he adopt one method, he must abandon the advantages to be derived from the other. Thus, should he decide to attack the centre of the enemy's line, he may reasonably expect to divide the forces of the enemy, and afterwards to defeat them in detail; but he cannot expect to threaten at the same time their communications, and cut them from their base of operations. On the other hand, if he make a flank attack, he may reasonably expect to sever the communications of the enemy, and thus force him to fight a battle under disadvantageous circumstances; but he cannot expect to defeat in turn the several parts of the enemy's army.
But in the campaign between Moreau and Kray, it is a remarkable fact that the positions of the Austrian forces were such that the advantages of both a front and flank attack could be obtained by the French. By crossing the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and by attacking the flank of Kray in the Black Forest, the French would not only separate the Austrian left from the Austrian centre and right, but would threaten the Austrian communications with Ulm. From the beginning Bonaparte saw clearly this fact. His eye took in the entire situation. Thus it was that he was anxious to have Moreau undertake this movement. Thus it was that he himself had thought seriously at one time of uniting the Army of Reserve with the Army of the Rhine, and of moving against the left flank of Kray's forces in the Black Forest.
From this discussion, it is evident that, had Moreau made no errors, even after he assembled his three corps near Schaffhausen, he could have brought superior numbers upon every battle-field in Germany, and thus have won more decisive victories and have accomplished far greater results. What, then, might not Bonaparte himself have accomplished had he directed in person one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers against the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany? When it is remembered that he never lost a battle in which he was superior to his adversary in numbers, it cannot be doubted what the result would have been.
FOOTNOTES:
MARENGO.[8]
Anxiously Bonaparte at Paris awaited the success of the Army of the Rhine. Matters were urgent and time was precious, for Masséna could hold out but a few days longer at Genoa. Until the French should be victorious in Germany, the First Consul could not expect Moreau to send a detachment across Switzerland into Italy. As soon as word should be brought that this re-enforcement was on its way, Bonaparte purposed to lead the Army of Reserve across the Alps against Melas, who was fighting the French so vigorously at Genoa and along the Var.