Of all the plans which, through a long course of years, were submitted to Pitt for the improvement of the posts this was the only one to which he demurred. He did not, indeed, deny its efficacy; but it would involve a cost of at least £6000 a year, and, pressed as he was for money, he declined to say more than that the plan might be carried out if the persons interested were willing to bear the additional expense, but not otherwise. For us with our present knowledge it is easy enough to see that the surest and most popular way of transferring the expense to the public would have been to cheapen the postage. In 1796 no other way appeared feasible than to make the postage dearer. To this object the postmasters-general now devoted themselves, and before many months were over they had prepared a bill which, with some modifications, was adopted by the Government and passed into law.

In the new Act, which came into operation on the 5th of January 1797, the ambiguous term "stage" was dropped, and the whole of the rates were fixed according to distance, thus—

On and After the 5th of January 1797.

SingleDoubleTreble
Letter. Letter. Letter. Ounce.
d.d.d.d.
Not exceeding 15 miles36912
Exceeding 15 and not exceeding
30 miles481216
Exceeding 30 and not exceeding
60 miles5101520
Exceeding 60 and not exceeding
100 miles6121824
Exceeding 100 and not exceeding
150 miles7142128
Exceeding 150 miles8162432
To and from Edinburgh8162432

Within Scotland the rates were raised by 1d. for a single letter, by 2d. for a double letter, and so on. Another important change was made. Hitherto, in the case of letters from Portugal and America, the packet postage had carried them to their destination. For the future these letters were to be subject to the inland rates as well as the packet rates. Thus the packet rate from Lisbon had been, on a single letter, 1s. 6d. It was now to be 1s.; but if for London the letter would be charged with the inland rate of 8d.—this being the postage from Falmouth—and if for Edinburgh with 8d. more, or 2s. 4d. altogether. As the packet postage from America remained unchanged, namely, 1s. for a single letter, the inland rate was in this case a pure addition.

The postmasters-general were now doomed to a serious disappointment. Their proposal to raise the rates of postage was, there can be no doubt, dictated, at all events in part, by a desire to carry out the project of guarding the horse and cross-post mails. Pitt had stated that he would approve this project if the persons interested would bear the expense of it; and unquestionably the expense, and much more than the expense, was thrown upon the persons interested by the higher sums which they had now to pay for their letters. The postmaster-generals' object, however, had not been avowed, and no understanding had been arrived at. Their proposal to raise the rates of postage had met with ready acceptance. Their proposal to guard the horse and cross-post mails, though repeated again and again, continued to be rejected.

Although much had been done during the last few years to introduce order and regularity among the packets, some little mystery still surrounded their proceedings. In March 1798, out of twenty packets on the Falmouth station there was not one in port to carry the mails to Jamaica and the Leeward Islands; and this was the second time within twelve months that the same thing had occurred. The West India merchants waited on the postmasters-general to complain. On this occasion an armed cutter was borrowed from the Admiralty to take out the mails; but the fact remained that between the 5th of April 1793 and January 1798 no less than nineteen packets, all of them belonging to the Falmouth station, had been captured by the enemy, and that the Post Office had had to replace them at a cost of close upon £50,000.

The merchants demanded, as they had done a year before, that the packets should be armed. Armed indeed in some sort they were already, but only with six four-pounders apiece, and with small arms so as to be able to resist row-boats and small privateers. The merchants urged that this was not enough. The postmasters-general replied that they could do no more, that the true policy was not to arm the packets with a view to their engaging the enemy, but so to construct them that they might outsail him. The merchants met to consider the reply which had been given, and, as the result of their deliberations, they prepared a memorial, copies of which were sent to the postmasters-general and the minister. In this memorial misgivings were expressed which, even at this distance of time, it is impossible not to share. During the last three years the average duration of voyage had been, from Falmouth to Jamaica, forty-five days, and from Jamaica to Falmouth, fifty-two days. These, as the memorialists pointed out, were not quick voyages; still less were they quick voyages for vessels which had been specially constructed with a view to expedition. It was extraordinary, too, built and equipped as the packets were, that out of nine that had been recently captured eight should have fallen a prey to private ships of war, which presumably enjoyed far less advantages in point of sailing. The conclusion at which the merchants felt constrained to arrive was that "in the mode of loading or navigating the packets some abuses exist sufficient to counteract the advantages of their construction."

And yet, mysterious as their proceedings were, ample evidence is at hand that the packets were both willing and able to fight as occasion required. Indeed, to this period belong some of their smartest engagements. We will give one or two instances. On the evening of the 17th of October 1797 the Portland packet, Captain Taylor, was lying becalmed off the island of Guadeloupe when a French privateer, the Temeraire, bore down upon her. The privateer carried sixty-eight men and the packet thirty-two. A light breeze springing up, the Portland's head was got off shore, and for the time she contrived to elude her antagonist, who followed her all night under easy sail. At daybreak the same distance separated the two ships as on the preceding evening; but as the Temeraire began to overtake the Portland, Taylor fired the first shot. The shot was returned, and the privateer hoisting the bloody flag grappled the Portland and boarded her on the lee quarter. Laying hold of the jib-stay Taylor ordered it to be lashed to the packet, and called upon the passengers and crew to open their musketry. A fierce engagement ensued, which ended in favour of the Portland. Out of sixty-eight men on board the privateer no less than forty-one were either killed or wounded. A treacherous shot fired after she had struck her colours carried off the captain of the packet in the moment of victory, and as he was endeavouring to allay the carnage.