"Thus, as their development shows, a marked antithesis exists between the substance of the undying reproductive cells and that of the perishable body-cells. We cannot explain this fact except by the supposition that each reproductive cell potentially contains two kinds of substance, which at a variable time after the commencement of embryonic development, separate from one another, and finally produce two sharply contrasted groups of cells." (p. 74)
And a little lower down the page we meet with the lines:—
"It is therefore quite conceivable that the reproductive cells might separate from the somatic cells much later than in the examples mentioned above, without changing the hereditary tendencies of which they are the bearers."
That is to say, it is "quite conceivable" that after sexless Cercariæ have gone on multiplying by internal gemmation for generations, the "two kinds of substance" have, notwithstanding innumerable cell-divisions, preserved their respective natures, and finally separate in such ways as to produce reproductive cells. Here Professor Weismann does not, as in a case before noted, assume something which it is "easy to imagine," but he assumes something which it is difficult to imagine; and apparently thinks that a scientific conclusion may be thereon safely based.
* * * * *
Associated with the assertion that the primary division of labour is between the somatic cells and the reproductive cells, and associated with the corollary that the primary differentiation is that which arises between them, there goes another corollary. It is alleged that there exists a fundamental distinction of nature between these two classes of cells. They are described as respectively mortal and immortal, in the sense that those of the one class are limited in their powers of multiplication, while those of the other class are unlimited. And it is contended that this is due to inherent unlikeness of nature.
Before inquiring into the truth of this proposition, I may fitly remark upon a preliminary proposition set down by Professor Weismann. Referring to the hypothesis that death depends "upon causes which lie in the nature of life itself," he says:—
"I do not however believe in the validity of this explanation: I consider that death is not a primary necessity, but that it has been secondarily acquired as an adaptation. I believe that life is endowed with a fixed duration, not because it is contrary to its nature to be unlimited, but because the unlimited existence of individuals would be a luxury without any corresponding advantage." (p. 24)
This last sentence has a teleological sound which would be appropriate did it come from a theologian, but which seems strange as coming from a man of science. Assuming, however, that the implication was not intended, I go on to remark that Professor Weismann has apparently overlooked a universal law of evolution—not organic only, but inorganic and super-organic—which implies the necessity of death. The changes of every aggregate, no matter of what kind, inevitably end in a state of equilibrium. Suns and planets die, as well as organisms. The process of integration, which constitutes the fundamental trait of all evolution, continues until it has brought about a state which negatives further alterations, molar or molecular—a state of balance among the forces of the aggregate and the forces which oppose them.[[108]] In so far, therefore, as Professor Weismann's conclusions imply the non-necessity of death, they cannot be sustained.
But now let us consider the above-described antithesis between the immortal Protozoa and the mortal Metazoa. An essential part of the theory is that the Protozoa can go on dividing and subdividing without limit, so long as the fit external conditions are maintained. But what is the evidence for this? Even by Professor Weismann's own admission there is no proof. On p. 285 he says:—