See Westminster Review for April, 1852.—Art. IV. "A Theory of Population." See Appendix A.
This paragraph replaces a sentence that, in The Principles of Psychology, referred to a preceding chapter on "Method;" in which the mode of procedure here indicated was set forth as a mode to be systematically pursued in the choice of hypotheses. This chapter on Method is now included, along with other matter, in a volume entitled Various Fragments.
Speaking of "the general idea of life" M. Comte says:—"Cette idée suppose, en effet, non-seulement celle d'un être organisé de manière à comporter l'état vital, mais aussi celle, non moins indispensable, d'un certain ensemble d'influences extérieures propres à son accomplissement. Une telle harmonie entre l'être vivant et le milieu correspondant, caractérise evidemment la condition fondamentale de la vie." Commenting on de Blainville's definition of life, which he adopts, he says:—"Cette lumineuse définition ne me paraît laisser rien d'important à désirer, si ce n'est une indication plus directe et plus explicite de ces deux conditions fondamentales co-relatives, nécessairement inséparables de l'état vivant, un organisme déterminé et un milieu convenable." It is strange that M. Comte should have thus recognized the necessity of a harmony between an organism and its environment, as a condition essential to life, and should not have seen that the continuous maintenance of such inner actions as will counterbalance outer actions, constitutes life.
[When the original edition was published Dr. J. H. Bridges wrote to me saying that in the Politique Positive, Comte had developed his conception further. On p. 413, denying "le prétendu antagonisme des corps vivants envers leurs milieux inorganiques," he says "au lieu de ce conflit, on a reconnu bientôt que cette relation nécessaire constitue une condition fondamentale de la vie réelle, dont la notion systématique consiste dans une intime conciliation permanente entre la spontanéité intérieure et la fatalité extérieure." Still, this "conciliation permanente" seems to be a "condition" to life; not that varying adjustment of changes which life consists in maintaining. In presence of an ambiguity, the interpretation which agrees with his previous statement must be chosen.]
In further elucidation of this general doctrine, see First Principles, § 25.