While we recognize this truth we must also recognize the truth that only by enunciation and acceptance of imperfect generalizations can we progress to perfect ones. The order of Evolution is conformed to by ideas as by other things. The advance is, and must be, from the indefinite to the definite. It is impossible to express the totality of any natural phenomenon in a single proposition. To the primary statement expressing that which is most dominant have to be added secondary statements qualifying it. We see this even in so simple a case as the flight of a projectile. The young artillery officer is first taught that a cannon-shot describes a curve treated as a parabola, though literally part of an extremely eccentric ellipse not distinguishable from a parabola. Presently he learns that atmospheric resistance, causing a continual decrease of velocity, entails a deviation from that theoretical path which is calculated on the supposition that the velocity is uniform; and this incorrectness he has to allow for. Then, further, there comes the lateral deviation due to wind, which may be appreciable if the wind is strong and the range great. To introduce him all at once to the correct conception thus finally reached would be impossible: it has to be reached through successive qualifications. And that which holds even in this simple case necessarily holds more conspicuously in complex cases.
The title of the chapter suggests a metaphor, which is, indeed, something more than a metaphor. There is an embryology of conceptions. That this statement is not wholly a figure of speech, we shall see on considering that cerebral organization is a part of organization at large; and that the evolving nervous plexus which is the correlative of an evolving conception, must conform to the general law of change conformed to in the evolution of the whole nervous structure as well as in the evolution of the whole bodily structure. As the body has at first a rude form, very remotely suggesting that which is presently developed by the superposing of modifications on modifications; so the brain as a whole and its contained ideas together make up an inner world answering with extreme indefiniteness to that outer world to which it is brought by successive approximations into tolerable correspondence; and so any nervous plexus and its associated hypothesis, which refer to some external group of phenomena under investigation, have to reach their final developments by successive corrections.
This being the course of discovery must also be the course of exposition. In pursuance of this course we may therefore fitly contemplate that early formula of embryological development which we owe to von Baer.
§ 128. Already in [§ 52], where the generalization of von Baer respecting the relations of embryos was set forth, there was given the warning, above repeated with greater distinctness, that it is only an adumbration.
In the words of his translator, he "found that in its earliest stage, every organism has the greatest number of characters in common with all other organisms in their earliest stages; that at a stage somewhat later, its structure is like the structures displayed at corresponding phases by a less extensive multitude of organisms; that at each subsequent stage, traits are acquired which successively distinguished the developing embryo from groups of embryos that it previously resembled—thus step by step diminishing the class of embryos which it still resembles; and that thus the class of similar forms is finally narrowed to the species of which it is a member."
Assuming for a moment that this generalization is true as it stands, or rather, assuming that the qualifications needed are not such as destroy its correspondence with the average facts, we shall see that it has profound significance. For if we follow out in thought the implications—if we conceive the germs of all kinds of organisms simultaneously developing, and imagine that after taking their first step together, at the second step one half of the vast multitude diverges from the other half; if, at the next step, we mentally watch the parts of each great assemblage beginning to take two or more routes of development; if we represent to ourselves such bifurcations going on, stage after stage, in all the branches; we shall see that there must result an aggregate analogous, in its arrangement of parts, to a tree. If this vast genealogical tree be contemplated as a whole, made up of trunk, main branches, secondary branches, and so on as far as the terminal twigs; it will be perceived that all the various kinds of organisms represented by these terminal twigs, forming the periphery of the tree, will stand related to one another in small groups, which are united into groups of groups, and so on. The embryological tree, expressing the developmental relations of organisms, will be similar to the tree which symbolizes their classificatory relations. That subordination of classes, orders, genera, and species, to which naturalists have been gradually led, is just that subordination which results from the divergence and re-divergence of embryos, as they all unfold. On the hypothesis of evolution this parallelism has a meaning—indicates that primordial kinship of all organisms, and that progressive differentiation of them, which the hypothesis alleges. But on any other hypothesis the parallelism is meaningless; or rather, it raises a difficulty; since it implies either an effect without a cause or a design without a purpose.
§ 129. This conception of a tree, symbolizing the relationships of types and a species derived from the same root, has a concomitant conception. The implication is that each organism, setting out from the simple nucleated cell, must in the course of its development follow the line of the trunk, some main branch, some sub-branch, some sub-sub-branch, &c., of this embryological tree; and so on till it reaches that ultimate twig representing the species of which it is a member. It must in a general way go through the particular line of forms which preceded it in all past times: there must be what has been aptly called a "recapitulation" of the successive ancestral structures. This, at least, is the conclusion necessitated by the generalization we are considering under its original crude form.
Von Baer lived in the days when the Development Hypothesis was mentioned only to be ridiculed, and he joined in the ridicule. What he conceived to be the meaning of these groupings of organisms and these relations among their embryological histories, is not obvious. The only alternative to the hypothesis of Evolution is the hypothesis of Special Creation; and as he did not accept the one it is inferable that he accepted the other. But if he did this he must in the first place have found no answer to the inquiry why organisms specially created should have the embryological kinships he described. And in the second place, after discovering that his alleged law was traversed by many and various nonconformities, he would have been without any explanation of these. Observe the positions which were open to him and the reasons which show them to be untenable.
If it be said that the conditions of the case necessitated the derivation of all organisms from simple germs, and therefore necessitated a morphological unity in their primitive states; there arises the obvious answer, that the morphological unity thus implied, is not the only morphological unity to be accounted for. Were this the only unity, the various kinds of organisms, setting out from a common primordial form, should all begin from the first to diverge individually, as so many radii from a centre; which they do not. If, otherwise, it be said that organisms were framed upon certain types, and that those of the same type continue developing together in the same direction, until it is time for them to begin putting on their specialities of structure; then the answer is, that when they do finally diverge they ought severally to develop in direct lines towards their final forms. No reason can be assigned why, having parted company, some should progress towards their final forms by irregular or circuitous routes. On the hypothesis of design such deviations are inexplicable.
The hypothesis of evolution, however, while it pre-supposes those kinships among embryos in their early forms which are found to exist, also leads us to expect nonconformities in their courses of development. If, as any rational theory of evolution implies, the progressive differentiations of types from one another during past times, have resulted from the direct and indirect effects of external conditions—if races of organisms have become different, either by immediate adaptations to unlike habits of life, or by the mediate adaptations resulting from preservation of the individuals most fitted for such habits of life, or by both; and if most embryonic changes are significant of changes that were undergone by ancestral races; then these irregularities must be anticipated. For the successive changes in modes of life pursued by successive ancestral races, can have had no regularity of sequence. In some cases they must have been more numerous than in others; in some cases they must have been greater in degree than in others; in some cases they must have been to simpler modes, in some cases to more complex modes, and in some cases to modes neither higher nor lower. Of two cognate races which diverged in the remote past, the one may have had descendants that have remained tolerably constant in their habits, while the other may have had descendants that have passed through widely-aberrant modes of life; and yet some of these last may have eventually taken to modes of life like those of the other races derived from the same stock. And if the metamorphoses of embryos indicate, in a general way, the changes of structure undergone by ancestors; then, the later embryologic changes of such two allied races will be somewhat different, though they may end in very similar forms. An illustration will make this clear. Mr. Darwin says: "Petrels are the most aërial and oceanic of birds, but in the quiet sounds of Tierra del Fuego, the Puffinuria berardi, in its general habits, in its astonishing power of diving, its manner of swimming, and of flying when unwillingly it takes flight, would be mistaken by any one for an auk or grebe; nevertheless, it is essentially a petrel, but with many parts of its organization profoundly modified." Now if we suppose these grebe-like habits to be continued through a long epoch, the petrel-form to be still more obscured, and the approximation to the grebe-form still closer; it is manifest that while the chicks of the grebe and the Puffinuria will, during their early stages of development, display that likeness involved by their common derivation from some early type of bird, the chick of the Puffinuria will eventually begin to show deviations, representative of the ancestral petrel-structure, and will afterwards begin to lose these distinctions and assume the grebe-structure.