The enemy throughout fought with great courage and determination, but it must be remembered that they had the advantage of strong entrenchments. They displayed particular restraint and coolness in sitting quiet under a tremendous bombardment, and in allowing General Buller's men to advance to relatively close quarters before fire was opened. What is wonderful is that the British Intelligence Department in the field seems to have known very little of the enemy's disposition and entrenchments. The day was a day of tragic blunders issuing in great and unnecessary sacrifice of men. That the loss was not far heavier is surprising in view of the intensity and volume of the enemy's fire. The casualty list at least proved that the Boers were not the marksmen they had been supposed to be.
COLONEL C. J. LONG, R.A.
Obtained his Lieutenancy in 1870; served in the Afghan War of 1878-80, and in the Soudan under Lord Kitchener in 1897-8 as commandant of the Egyptian artillery. He was present at the battle of Khartoum, and for his services on that occasion was mentioned in despatches. Colonel, September, 1899; in command of the Royal Artillery at Colenso, where his anxiety to get within effective range of the enemy led to the loss of ten guns. In that action he was severely wounded.
IN A BOER LAAGER: COOKS PREPARING A MEAL.
Why the attack failed.
Dec. 15, 1899.] Causes which Led to our Defeat.
As has been pointed out already, General Buller's army was from the first insufficient—insufficient in numbers, and especially weak in artillery. In the opinion of most correspondents on the field—an opinion justified by the final success in February—there could be no chance of success unless Mount Hlangwane, upon the British right, were captured. In Boer hands this position gave an excellent sallying-point whence to direct counter attacks upon the British flank and line of communications. Judging by the measure of success which a small force of Colonials obtained in their assault upon this hill, it would have been possible with greater strength, which was available, to have carried it. General Barton's brigade, 3,500 strong, was hardly engaged in the battle, yet, when appealed to for assistance, the general refused to send it. Mr. Bennet Burleigh, who does not write hastily, considers that half a battalion put into the fight at this point might have turned the scale. With Hlangwane in British hands the Colenso lines would have become untenable for the Boers, and the enemy must have fallen back upon Pieters. But at Pieters, if they had fought in December, they would have had to face the great risk of the Ladysmith garrison breaking in upon their rear. For at that date Sir George White's army was capable of moving, and had its cavalry and artillery in fair condition. So that the capture of Hlangwane on December 15 might well have brought with it the immediate relief of Ladysmith.
Again, it is curious that seemingly no one in the British Army was aware that the Boers had entrenched positions to the south of the Tugela. Yet their dispositions in the Modder River fight, which had occurred more than a fortnight previously, so that the Staff had had full time to acquaint itself with the details, should have led to the conclusion that it was at least probable there were such entrenchments to the south of the river.