With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War of 1899-1900. Volume 1

by Herbert Wrigley Wilson

[Feb. 6, 1900.

To support General Lyttelton's men on Vaal Krantz, General Hildyard had already advanced to the foot of the hill, and held his Brigade in readiness to move at a moment's notice. Here, as before Spion Kop, and in precisely the same manner, the British advance had come to a standstill. Before, it was Spion Kop that flanked and enfiladed our line of attack; now, it was Doorn Kloof, and, unless this frowning mountain could be stormed, there was little prospect of any success. So councils of war deliberated, while a protracted, aimless battle raged along the front. On the afternoon of February 6, the Boers suddenly attacked Vaal Krantz and gained some ground; for whole minutes, indeed, it appeared as though the hill might be lost. But General Lyttelton speedily rallied his men, and with the Durhams and King's Royal Rifles regained the ground that had been lost by a brilliant bayonet charge. During the day a fresh pontoon bridge was built just under Vaal Krantz, so as to give easier access to that fiercely disputed point. At nightfall General Hildyard's men replaced General Lyttelton's weary battalions, and yet more trenches were constructed. In the darkness the Boers made a third attack upon the hill, but as before were repulsed with some trouble.

VOLUNTEER AMBULANCE-MEN BRINGING THE WOUNDED ACROSS THE RIVER BY MEANS OF THE PONT OR RAFT.

Council of War.

Unless a resolute advance was made, Vaal Krantz was an utterly useless possession. It was exposed to fire from three sides; it was not a good artillery position; it had little natural strength; and it was now ascertained to be very far from being the "key to Ladysmith." The original intention, to follow up its seizure by a flank attack upon Brakfontein, had to be abandoned, because troops massing for such an attack would have been exposed to a devastating artillery fire from Doorn Kloof. The same consideration compelled the withholding of the cavalry who were to have menaced the Boer rear. Nothing remained, if the advance was to be pressed, but to storm the ridge which rose behind Vaal Krantz, and to assault and capture at the same time the lofty eminence of Doorn Kloof. A council of war was held to determine the course which should be taken. General Hart alone—"No-Bobs" as his soldiers called him, from the fact that he never bent his head before the storm of bullets—was for such an assault, which, it was allowed, must cost the lives or limbs of thousands of men. He was for going forward at all risks, and for storming Doorn Kloof. But the other officers were against so bold, so desperate, a course. They were for withdrawing and trying yet another line of approach to Ladysmith. To this General Buller was himself inclined, in view of the frightful difficulties of the country before him. Accordingly, a general retreat was once more ordered; General Hildyard's Brigade was to evacuate Vaal Krantz that night—the night of the 7th—and, with the rest of the army, to fall back to Springfield and Chieveley.

Evacuation of the ridge.

Feb. 5-7, 1900.] The "Key to Ladysmith" lost.

Losses.

The retreat was accomplished with perfect order and success. General Hildyard's troops fell back with all their wounded; once more the Tugela was recrossed, and the bridges taken to pieces. The enemy offered no other molestation than a few shells, but watched with exultation the long lines of troops and waggons moving slowly eastwards all the 8th. There were some among the Boers who supposed that the relief of Ladysmith had been finally abandoned, and in the British force there was at least talk of such a dreadful possibility. The soldiers were gloomy and dispirited, yet they still had confidence in themselves and in their commanders, notwithstanding the errors of the past month. Only two brigades out of the five composing General Buller's army had been seriously engaged, and all longed for a real trial of strength. The British losses in the fighting at Vaal Krantz were by no means heavy. The killed were 25, wounded 344, and missing 5. The Boers on their part owned to 21 killed and 31 wounded, but their losses were probably nearly equal to those of the British, with a larger proportion of killed, owing to the effect of the tremendous shell-fire directed upon Brakfontein and Vaal Krantz. According to Boer accounts, no fewer than 5,000 projectiles were thrown against these two positions by the British guns. Seldom have more shots been fired with less effect.