Walker & Cockerell sc.
Night, Wednesday Feb. 14th. Night, Thursday Feb. 15th.
Rondeval and Klip Drifts seized.
And now, about 5·30 p.m., the goal of the day's march came into view. To the north could be seen a line of dreary green—the bushes which fringe all South African rivers. General French went forward to reconnoitre, halting his division and changing its formation. Gordon's Brigade was deployed on the left, Broadwood's on the right, and Alexander's ordered to follow as a rearguard. It had already dropped much behind and had lost no less than sixty of its horses. A few minutes' examination and reflection convinced General French that the wisest course was to push on rapidly for the drift, even though there were clear traces of the enemy, and though a Boer laager could be seen by the stream. Gordon on the left was to seize Rondeval Drift, Broadwood to take Klip Drift. Each Brigadier unlimbered his horse guns and shelled the enemy before crossing. But there was no real resistance; the Boers, aghast at the rapidity and resolution of General French's movements and staggered by the shrapnel from the Horse Artillery 12-pounders, fled in utter confusion, abandoning three laagers, 150 waggons, much ammunition, and a quantity of cattle and sheep. "Some of the larger cases in the Boer camp, marked 'biscuits,' of which there was a regular stack, were found to contain rifle ammunition," says a correspondent with the division. "The marks on the cases showed that they came from Europe viâ Delagoa Bay." The telegraph line from Magersfontein to Bloemfontein was broken, and Cronje left without other means of communication than those the heliograph afforded. Thus the Modder Drifts were won, and now the way to Kimberley was all but open. The seizure of the drifts was, in the judgment of a competent officer, the crisis of the whole elaborate series of movements which ended a fortnight later in the glorious success of Paardeberg. For if General French had waited or hesitated, the Boers would have called up reinforcements and a desperate fight would have been necessary before the river could have been crossed. And in the delay which must thus have been caused, Cronje might well have escaped. General French had risked much, since, so far as he knew, the Boers had 6,000 to 7,000 men along the Modder line and at Magersfontein, while no support could reach him until, at the earliest, the evening of the 14th. His total losses did not exceed half-a-dozen officers and men, and about 100 horses.
John Charlton.] [From a sketch by G. D. Giles.
THE RUSH TO KIMBERLEY: THE 10th HUSSARS CROSSING KLIP DRIFT.
Advance of the infantry.
[Feb. 13-15, 1900.
Behind him the infantry divisions continued to push steadily forward through the burning heat. At nightfall the 18th Brigade of the Sixth Division was at Wegdraai, half way between the Riet and Modder, the 13th Brigade at Waterval Drift, the Seventh Division with Lord Roberts at De Kiel's Drift, and the Ninth Division at Ramdam. So trying was the march, that from De Kiel's Drift fifty-seven officers and men had to be sent back to the rear in ox-waggons, prostrate with heat and exhaustion. On the evening of the 13th Cronje was still at Magersfontein, though the severance of his telegraph wires must have caused him great uneasiness.