The loss of the convoy was a blow the effects of which were felt all through the march to Bloemfontein, as the forage, stores and provisions it contained could not be replaced without grave delay. Who was to blame for the utter inadequacy of this escort, it is impossible as yet to ascertain.
DESCRIPTION CARD.
Carried by every soldier sewn into the lining of his jacket. It is of white glazed calico.
[Feb. 15-16, 1900.
Cronje's retreat.
All through the 15th the Sixth Division had been engaged in skirmishing with the Boer force through which General French had cut his way. This force hung about the drift, and exchanged fire at long range, but though its "sniping" caused some annoyance, it was too weak to effect anything serious against a whole infantry division, with three batteries of artillery. At Magersfontein, Cronje had now at last arrived at the decision to retreat. Already burghers were riding off right and left, in a wild helter-skelter, heedless of commands and orders. What little discipline existed in the Boer camp had been greatly weakened by the presence of the enemy in the rear. About noon, at the instance of the Field Cornets, a council of war was summoned. High words were exchanged between Cronje and the European adventurers, who pointed out the peril of each instant's delay. But the final vote was for retirement, mainly through the insistence of the Free Staters, who were full of fear for their cattle and their farms. All outposts were withdrawn, and with the utmost precipitancy the burghers were called in from the trenches. The Boers abandoned everything except the essentials—food, ammunition, and the waggon train—and received orders to march with dawn along the Modder River, in the direction of Bloemfontein. What had led Cronje to this determination was the sight of General French's division scudding across the plain to Kimberley, and the columns of dust that rose in all directions on his left, betokening Lord Roberts' march. But his rooted opinion that the British could never move a large force away from the railway, his persistence in the belief that the object of all the British manœuvres was another assault on Magersfontein—this time from the direction of Jacobsdal—and his failure to seize the true purpose of the British Commander-in-Chief, had already undone him. In spite of frantic efforts it was now all but impossible for him to escape from the net which Lord Roberts had so skilfully spread. Nor was his force anything like so strong as the British officers opposed to him had believed. Instead of eight or ten thousand it had melted in the last few hours till it probably did not exceed at this juncture 5,000 men. About these were fully 26,000 British infantry and over 7,000 mounted men. The odds were such as to render the struggle all but hopeless.
FIELD DRESSING.