[Photo by Gregory.
The regiment consisted of men selected from the 1st and 2nd Life Guards and the Horse Guards Blue; preference was given to light weights, out of consideration for the horses. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales had bidden the regiment farewell on the preceding day.
[CHAPTER IV.]
THE DESPATCH OF THE ARMY CORPS.
Dilatoriness of the Government—Full notice to the enemy—Mobilisation begins—Small proportion of cavalry—Loyal action of the Colonies—The greatest Expeditionary Force ever sent over seas—Embarkation of the troops—Food supplies—The voyage out—The plan of campaign—Character of the country—New tactics required—Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.
Dilatoriness of the Government.
The first reinforcements for the British army in South Africa to leave England after the tension became acute were three batteries of artillery, which had been ordered out as far back as September 8. Their despatch had been talked of for some months before, but such was the irresolution and timidity of the Cabinet that delay after delay had occurred. Even now, though these guns were most urgently needed, they were not sent out in the fastest procurable transports, but, with a strange neglect of military necessities, were placed on board two comparatively slow ships—the Zibenghla and Zayathla. Both cleared on September 25, but instead of being able at once to proceed, were detained by defects in boilers or by heating of the coal in the bunkers. The Zibenghla did not leave the Mersey until October 7; the Zayathla, a little more fortunate, got away from Queenstown on September 29. This ill-omened delay is significant in view of later events. Finally the Zayathla reached Capetown on October 25 and the Zibenghla on the 30th, having occupied, in one way and another, 30 to 35 days on a voyage which could have been accomplished with ease by vessels of moderate speed in 20 or 21 days. It is quite clear that those responsible for providing funds—cheapness was alleged as an excuse for selecting such slow vessels—had completely misapprehended the gravity of the crisis, and forgotten Nelson's great saying, Five minutes make the difference between victory and defeat. It is impossible with our British system of administration to discover who exactly was to blame, but clearly someone made a very serious mistake.