[Nov. 1899.
Comparison of the opposing armies.
Certain points must now be noted as bearing upon the adequacy of this force for the work which was before it—the work of clearing a way to Ladysmith. In the first place the strength of the enemy was believed to be at least 25,000, and might easily be nearer 35,000. General Buller was thus, even adding in as available the 10,000 effectives at Ladysmith, by no means certain of outnumbering the enemy. In the second place he would have to act on the offensive, and would have to assail or "turn" strong Boer positions. To "turn" a position, it need scarcely be said, is to work round it. But positions held, as were these, by good and mobile troops cannot be successfully assailed, and certainly cannot be turned unless there is a considerable advantage of numbers on the assailants' side. In point of mobility General Buller's infantry could not compare with the Boers, who were, of course, to a man mounted, who slept in the open and needed no such elaborate transport system as is required in the British Army. While the British soldier was moving five miles the Boer could cover fifteen. Again, in artillery, which must be used freely to pave the way for an infantry attack, General Buller's army was very weak. The usual proportion in European armies is five guns to every thousand men; he had only thirty field guns, instead of 105, to 21,000 men. Finally, his mounted force was inadequate, and his transport system hastily improvised.
[Photo by Elliott & Fry.
Took command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade at Aldershot last year. He was born in 1845, and was educated at Eton. He joined the Rifle Brigade in 1865, and served with it in Canada and India, seeing a good deal of active service. A.D.C. to Lord Spencer, Viceroy of India, from 1868 to 1873, and Military Secretary to Sir John Adye, Governor of Gibraltar, and to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay. He went through the Egyptian campaign of 1882, and commanded a brigade in the Nile Expedition of 1898, being present at the battle of Khartoum. He was Assistant Military Secretary at the War Office during 1897 and 1898, and now commands the 4th Brigade in South Africa.
All these considerations militated strongly against any substantial success. It is not known whether he asked of the Home Government a larger force, but if he did it was not granted him. Yet 50,000 men with 200 field guns would have been not one whit too great a strength for the proper performance of his task. Here as elsewhere in South Africa the disasters which befell British arms may be traced to these three causes—under-estimating the enemy's force, attempting to effect most difficult operations in a difficult country with inadequate strength, and failure to observe the precautions which the lessons of the past have shown to be necessary.
Nov.-Dec. 11, 1899.] Composition of the British Force.
In the last week of November, General Buller's army was reinforced by two naval 4·7-inch guns and fourteen 12-pounders, which had been sent ashore from the Terrible for the defence of Durban. These weapons, from their great range and extreme power, were a valuable addition to the British artillery, though, mounted on improvised carriages and drawn painfully by oxen, they could not compare in mobility with our field guns. They were manned by bluejackets, who proved themselves formidable marksmen.
