| Janissaries | 50,000 |
| Spahis | 250,000 |
| Artillery, armourers, etc. | 50,000 |
Guards besides those drafted from Janissaries and Spahis—war levies:
| Akinji | 40,000 |
| Ayab | 100,000 |
| Ayalet Askeri (cavalry) | 40,000 |
| Miri Askeri (infantry) | 100,000 |
Some explanation of these names will be desirable. The feudal and provincial troops were those whose military service was demanded by the feudal tenure of the timars or fiefs. Of the permanent troops, the celebrated body of the Spahis was recruited from the fiefs, sons of the Spahis being preferred, and were required to follow the banner of the Sultan himself. The Akinji were the light horse, the terror of the Germans and the Hungarians. The Ayab were infantry, a sort of Cossack on foot, as the Akinjis were Cossacks on horseback—without either the pay of the janissaries or the fiefs of the spahis. The famous corps of the janissaries was the heart of the army,—the most privileged, the most terrible, the most efficient of the soldiery. They were recruited from the children, taken in tribute from the conquered Christian states, a thousand a year, and generally became Moslems. The janissaries, the artillery and the guards were the only soldiery paid from the treasury. The Turkish conquerors made war pay for itself, living on the conquered country and carrying home immense loot. At the close of his careful pamphlet, Mr. Urquhart makes an interesting distinction between Janissary and Turkish principles. He claims that the former are “violence, corruption, and prostration of military strength, exhaustion of the treasury, resistance to all, and therefore to beneficial, change.” The Turkish principles, he claims, are altogether different and finer.[149]
The Turkish artillery was very formidable. It was by means of this and the setting of mines that Belgrad and Rhodes had been taken. There was no navy. There were a number of pirates, freebooters who put themselves at the service of the Sultan and won some considerable naval victories, but they were not a part of the regular Turkish force.
One constant order of battle was observed. The provincial troops of Asia formed the right wing, and those of Europe the left, the center being composed of regular bodies of cavalry and infantry, the janissaries forming the front line. In Europe the home contingents occupied the right wing. Thus were combined permanent and disciplined infantry and cavalry with irregular foot and horse; a feudal establishment with provincial armaments, and forces raised by conscription, by enlistment, and by tribute. By this arrangement the sultan could bring three enormous armies into the field simultaneously in the heart of Europe and Asia.[150]
A quaint description of the discipline of the Turkish army in 1585 was given by one William Watreman in his book entitled “The Fardle of Facions”, who thought that the speed, the courage and the obedience of the Turkish soldiers accounted easily for their great success in war for two hundred years,[151] and said that they were little given to mutinies and “stirs”.
Watreman was evidently not speaking of the privileged janissaries here, for they were greatly given to mutinies and “stirs.” They realized the immense power that the army possessed, and how definitely the sultan was in their hands. That part of the army stationed at Constantinople as guard to His Imperial Majesty had it in their power to demand the degradation and the head of any hated official, and usually these demands were granted. Authorized by the laws of their predecessors and their own as well, they might furthermore imprison the sultan himself, put him to death, and place on the throne one of his relatives as his successor. When all the corps of this militia of Constantinople unite under the orders of the Ulema, who give the weight of law to the undertaking, the despotic sultan passes from the throne to a prison cell, where a mysterious and illegal death soon removes him.[152] The long list of deposed sultans witnesses to this power. Little wonder then that Suleiman, after punishing the rebellious janissaries in 1525, planned to employ them immediately in a campaign.
On Monday, April 23rd, Suleiman left Constantinople with 100,000 men and 300 cannon.[153] His grand vizir had started a week in advance, commanding the vanguard of the army, largely cavalry. At Sophia both armies encamped, and the grand vizir is said to have “dressed his tent like a tulip in purple veilings.”[154] From this point the two armies separated. Ibrahim Pasha threw a bridge across the Save, and advanced to Peterwardein, a natural fort on the foot‐hills of the Fruska‐Gora mountains, which was manned by a thousand poorly equipped soldiers. Suleiman ordered Ibrahim Pasha to take Peterwardein, assuring him it would be but a bite to last him till breakfast in Vienna.[155] The sultan then proceeded to Belgrad. The grand vizir began preparations for the siege, storming ladders were laid, and on July 15th the first attack was made and repulsed with loss. The next night Ibrahim sent a division of the army to the other side of the Danube, and the fight continued all the following day until late evening, both by river and land, a flotilla of small boats being on the Danube. In a second assault the Turks pressed into the lower city, but they were again repulsed. Ibrahim, convinced that storming was less easy then he had thought, now prepared for a regular siege. After several day’s fighting a great building in the fort fell, and the walls were broached in several places. Nevertheless the besieged withstood two more assaults, and made a sally by which the Turks sustained great loss. At length Ibrahim laid mines under the walls of the fort, and on the 23rd day of July, twelve days from the first attack, an explosion, followed by a great assault and hard fighting, resulted in the taking of the place. Only ninety men were left to lay down their arms. The Turkish loss also had been heavy.[156]